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iForeword
This report on Radioactive Waste Management and Regulation by Mason
Willrich contains the results of a research project conducted under the auspices
of the Energy Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT
Energy Lab) for the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).
The project began June 1 and ended November 30, 1976. Mason Willrich,
currently Director for International Relations of The Rockefeller Foundation,
served as principal investigator during this period when he was also Visiting
Professor of Nuclear Engineering at MIT. Professor Willrich was assisted by
an interdisciplinary group drawn from MIT and the University of Virginia, where
he is Professor of Law (on leave). The research group included Stephen C.
Greenberg, Virginia law student; Richard K. Lester, MIT nuclear engineering
graduate student; H. Clyde Mitchell, MIT undergraduate (now a Virginia law
student), and Daniel A. Walker, Virginia law student.
This final version of the report has been reviewed by Norman C. Rasmussen,
Chairman of the MIT Nuclear Engineering Department, and by David J. Rose,
Professor of Nuclear Engineering at MIT, both of whom support its conclusions
and recommendations. A draft of the report was submitted for review and com-
ment to ERDA on September 1, 1976. The draft report was also distributed to
specially interested persons in other government agencies, nuclear industry,
environmental organizations, and academic institutions in order to obtain
their views on its contents and the benefit of their expertise with regard to
the radioactive waste problem generally. ERDA's comments and comments re-
ceived from numerous individuals were taken into account in preparing this
final version of the report. The views expressed in the report are
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Professor Willrich's and, other than as stated above, do not necessarily
represent the views of any other person nor any public or private institution.
David C. White
Director
Energy Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
November 1976
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The vast bulk of radioactive waste in the U.S. has been and will con-
tinue to be generated by two programs: the commercial use of nuclear materials
to generate electricity, and the military use of similar materials for nuclear
weapons and naval propulsion. Until now, most of the radioactive waste has
resulted from military activities. However, the commercial nuclear power
industry has now become a major source of additional waste. Radioactive
waste is thus an unavoidable consequence of our nuclear age.
Due to their intense and persistent toxicity, some types of waste must
be effectively isolated from the biosphere for thousands of years. Safe
management of this waste surely requires technological excellence, but the
social and political issues are at least as demanding. Radioactive waste poses
a major challenge to government.
Introduction
The purpose of this report is to assist in developing public policy
and institutions which are necessary for the safe management of radioactive
waste, currently and in the long term. Indeed, an underlying hope is that
the report will accelerate such development by the U.S. government.
The report focuses on the management and regulation of post-fission
radioactive waste generated in the U.S. This includes so-called high-level
(HL) and transuranic contaminated low-level (TRU) wastes.
In the commercial nuclear power industry, the source of post-fission
radioactive waste is the spent fuel discharged from reactors used to generate
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electricity. HL waste is generated during the reprocessing of spent fuel--
a chemical operation in which depleted uranium and by-product plutonium may
be recovered. TRU waste results primarily from reprocessing and from the
fabrication of fresh fuel containing recovered plutonium.
Similarly, with regard to military uses of nuclear energy, post-fission
radioactive waste originates in fuel removed from stationary reactors which
produce plutonium for nuclear weapons or mobile reactors which provide pro-
pulsion for naval ships. Military HL waste emerges at a reprocessing plant,
while military TRU waste is generated during reprocessing, and also in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Management of post-fission radioactive waste embraces a series of
discrete but deeply interdependent operations. These operations include
collection, temporary storage, treatment, packaging, transport, and permanent
disposition. Regulation of waste management operations to assure safety is
also composed of a number of discrete, interrelated activities. Regulatory
activities include development of general criteria and specific standards, and
application of established standards and criteria in licensing waste management
operations. The licensing process itself includes review and approval of
sites, of the design and construction of facilities, and of the conduct of
operations. Regulation also encompasses the monitoring of previously licensed
operations, prescription of emergency actions, and enforcement of obligations
in the event of violations of legal requirements.
Post-fission HL and TRU wastes are not the only radioactive wastes
which require safe management and regulation. Every step in the nuclear
fuel cycle--mining and milling, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor opera-
tion, reprocessing, and plutonium and uranium recycling--creates radioactive
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discharges in various forms. Depending on its toxicity, a waste stream is
either actively managed or else released to the environment. Moreover, various
parts of nuclear fuel cycle facilities will continue to be dangerously radio-
active long after the facilities themselves are shut down, and these parts
will require safe handling. This report focuses on HL and TRU waste streams
because they raise the most pressing and difficult radioactive waste management
and regulatory issues.
Although the report focuses on the U.S., important international
dimensions are taken into account. Ineffective management of radioactive
waste in one country may cause harmful effects in another. Moreover, low-
level radioactive waste is being dumped into the ocean, and geologic disposal
of HL waste beneath the ocean floor is being considered. Most of the oceans
and the deep seabed are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Finally, the reader of this report should bear in mind that it focuses
on a narrow, though important, problem which arises in a much larger context.
The specific risks posed by radioactive waste must also be compared with the
risks associated with other potential environmental pollutants. While radio-
active waste constitutes a potential radiological hazard for a very long period
of time, other possible pollutants may be even more persistent or more
dangerous, or both. The risks posed by radioactive waste must also be
balanced against the benefits to be derived from activities which produce
the waste and the consequences if those activities were stopped. The
security of the United States and its allies appears to rest in part on the U.S.
nuclear deterrent, and the well-being of every society depends on adequate
energy. The world urgently needs practical alternatives to fossil energy, and
nuclear fission has been demonstrated to be a practical way to generate elec-
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tricity.
Conclusions
1. The safe management of post-fission radioactive waste is already a
present necessity and an irreversible long-term commitment.
A rapidly growing number of spent fuel assemblies is accumulating
in temporary storage basins at commercial nuclear power plants, pending a
government decision on whether to authorize fuel reprocessing. If commercial
reprocessing is not authorized, the spent fuel must be safely managed indefinite-
ly. A relatively small volume of HL waste is being stored temporarily in tanks
adjacent to a privately owned reprocessing plant that is now shut down.
Commercial TRU waste has been disposed of previously in relatively small
amounts at various shallow land burial and ocean dump sites. Ocean dumping
of U.S. TRU waste has not taken place since 1970.
However, existing military waste will constitute a much larger and more
difficult management problem in the near future than the wastes being generated
by the commercial nuclear power industry. A large and still growing amount of
military HL waste is being temporarily stored in tanks. No specific plan or
schedule for treatment and permanent disposition of this waste has been
made public. Rough estimates of the cost of preparing the existing inventory
of military HL waste for safe permanent disposition run as high as $20 billion.
Large amounts of military TRU waste have already been disposed of, and generation
and management of this waste continue on a significant scale.
2. The basic goals of U.S. radioactive waste policy are unclear.
To the extent that they exist, policy goals have been largely
technologically oriented. The technological criteria for permanent disposition
of commercial HL waste are containment and isolation from the biosphere for
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as long as necessary to prevent it from being or becoming a harmful source of
radiation. The basic technological goal regarding TRU waste is undecided,
although if commercial reprocessing is authorized, the quantities of pluto-
nium contained in this category of commercial waste will be comparable to
the plutonium quantities in HL waste.
The technological criteria for military HL and TRU waste management are
unclear. Some critics fear that surface tank storage of already solidifed HL
waste will become a permanent disposition of existing volumes.
In general, radioactive waste policy contains no explicit criteria to
apply in developing institutional arrangements for waste management and regula-
tion. Yet institutional effectiveness is an essential ingredient of safe
management.
3. The existing organization for radioactive waste management is likely
to be unworkable if left unchanged.
The management of commercial HL waste is presently divided between pri-
vate industry and the federal government. The private sector is responsible
for temporary storage, treatment, packaging, and transport, while ERDA is
responsible for permanent disposition. Bifurcated responsibility for the
series of waste management operations which are technically and functionally
integrated creates incentives for each sector to pass through to the other
as many as possible of the risks and costs. Moreover, with responsibility
divided, underlying trade-offs between short- and long-term considerations are
difficult to make. The existing structure thus tends to prevent, rather than
to facilitate, the efficient management of commercial HL waste.
All management functions for commercial TRU waste have rested with
the private sector until now. Proposed Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
regulations, however, would shift the task of permanent disposition to ERDA.
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Collection, temporary storage, treatment, packaging, and transportation would
continue to be managed by the private sector.
ERDA is responsible for all stages in the management of most military
HL and TRU wastes. Most operations are conducted for ERDA by private contrac-
tors.
In the cases of both commercial and military HL wastes, permanent
disposition is authorized only at a federal repository on federal land. State
land use regulation of the location of permanent repositories for HL waste is
thus ultimately preempted by federal law. Nevertheless, through political means
and legal and procedural delays, a state government may effectively oppose
attempts by the federal government to establish a federal repository within its
borders without state consent.
4. The existing framework for radioactive waste regulation is likely
to be ineffective if left unchanged.
NRC has primary, comprehensive authority to license commercial HL and
TRU waste operations from temporary storage through permanent disposition.
However, NRC has relinquished regulatory authority over TRU waste to certain
states. The Department of Transportation has concurrent regulatory authority
with NRC over the transport of radioactive waste .
NRC has authority to license the permanent disposition of military HL
waste, but lacks authority to license the temporary storage and treatment of
such waste. NRC has no licensing authority over military TRU waste. There-
fore, no independent regulatory agency licenses existing military post-fission
radioactive waste operations to assure the public health and safety. Neverthe-
less, military HL and TRU wastes constitute the vast bulk of those in existence,
and incidents have occurred which have raised doubts about the safety of ERDA's
military waste management operations.
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Ocean disposal of HL waste is prohibited by U.S. legislation and inter-
national law, and ice sheet disposal in the Antarctic is prohibited by the
Antarctic Treaty. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has concurrent
jurisdiction with NRC over ocean dumping of TRU waste, although all such U.S.
activity has been suspended.
The federal scheme of regulation basically preempts state safety regu-
lation. State land use regulation may, however, operate to affect the location
of all radioactive waste operations, except permanent disposition of HL waste
at a federal repository. The location of such a repository is a federal matter
which ultimately preempts state law. However, as noted above, political and
procedural means are available for state opposition.
Pervading the entire framework for radioactive waste regulation are two
further features: (1) EPA is responsible for developing generally applicable
environmental standards for radiation protection; and (2) the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires a particular procedure, including pre-
paration of an environmental impact statement, for major federal actions regarding
radioactive waste management and regulation.
Recommendations
What steps should we take to strengthen the capacity of our governmental
institutions to deal effectively with the radioactive waste problem? We
recommend consideration of the following institutional reforms in order to
deal more effectively with post-fission wastes:
1. U.S. radioactive waste policy goals should be clarified to include
institutional criteria.
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Important criteria would be:
--strong built-in management incentives;
--clear differentiation of management, regulation, and research and
development functions;
--ample jurisdiction for each functional component to perform all inter-
dependent operations within an area of responsibility; and
--adaptability to a changing social environment.
2. A national Radioactive Waste Authority should be established as a
federally chartered public corporation.
The Authority would manage all HL and TRU wastes under U.S. jurisdiction
or control.
The Authority would be independent of ERDA. It would be governed by a
board of directors composed of members drawn from government, nuclear industry,
the academic research community, and the general public. Except for ERDA re-
search, development and demonstration activities, the Authority would own all
HL and TRU waste facilities in the United States. This would include facilities
for temporary storage, treatment and permanent disposition of waste, and any
specially constructed waste transport containers. The Authority would take
over existing commercial and military waste facilities.
The Authority would be self-financing. It would issue bonds and recover
the full costs of providing waste management services from its customers. It
would be authorized to conduct waste management operations itself or to con-
tract with private industry for the conduct of such operations.
The Radioactive Waste Authority would thus be intended to provide com-
prehensive, integrated, efficient management of both commercial and military
HL and TRU wastes. It is noteworthy that the Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution has made a comparable recommendation for establishment of a national
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nuclear waste disposal corporation in Great Britain.
3. With NRC as the primary agency, a comprehensive regulatory frame-
work should be established to assure the safety of all radioactive waste manage-
ment operations under U.S. jurisdiction or control.
All HL and TRU waste operations, whether involving commercial or military
waste, would be subject to NRC licensing. Licensing would be required of
existing (unlicensed) military waste operations, as well as future commercial
and military waste operations. Various categories of waste from diverse sources
may be regulated differently in appropriate circumstances, but all regulation
would occur within a unified framework, headed by NRC. Other interested federal
and state agencies would play advisory roles.
4. ERDA should continue to have primary government responsibility for
research, development and demonstration of radioactive waste technology.
That responsibility would, however, be separated from management of
industrial-scale operations on the one hand, and regulation on the other. ERDA-
supported radioactive waste research, development and demonstration activities
would be coordinated with and responsive to the needs of both the NRC and the
proposed national Radioactive Waste Authority.
5. The U.S. government should propose that an international Radioactive
Waste Commission be established under the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).
International approval would be required for any disposition of HL or
TRU wastes which would result in emplacement beyond the limits of national ju-
risdiction. The IAEA Commission would also review and comment on proposals
for permanent geologic disposition of HL or TRU waste within national juris-
diction.
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Finally, it is important to consider the problems of transition from
the existing situation to what we have proposed. The recommendations are not
especially sensitive to future scientific revelations or technological develop-
ments. While some of them may appear to be quite far-reaching--especially
those regarding a new structure for radioactive waste management--it is impor-
tant to recall that they can be implemented in most instances with little
impact upon large vested interests.
Since research, development, and demonstration would remain ERDA's
task, the Radioactive Waste Authority could be launched without any delay in
ERDA's plans for radioactive waste demonstration projects. For example, the
establishment of a national Radioactive Waste Authority would be compatible
with, and could indeed provide additional impetus for, ERDA demonstration of
long-term HL and TRU waste disposition techniques and treatment methods of
military HL waste, and also an early ERDA demonstration of HL waste solidifi-
cation.
There is today no long-term management of radioactive waste, no com-
prehensive scheme for regulation of such waste, and no commercial reprocessing
industry in the United States. We believe that institutions can be developed
which will provide reasonable assurance of safe management of radioactive
wastes in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world. There is an opportunity to do
so now, but it may well be the last clear chance.
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Chapter 2
RADIOACTIVE WASTE
This chapter is intended to provide readers who have not previously
considered the radioactive waste problem with the information they will need
to understand the analysis of waste management and regulation that follows.
The discussion is written with the non-technical reader in mind. The key terms
are also explained in the glossary.
Radioactivity
Radiation is the emission and propagation of energy through matter or
space. Radioactive materials emit energy in the form of electromagnetic ra-
diation, such as gamma or X-rays, or in the form of fast moving sub-atomic
particles such as alpha particles (the nuclei of helium atoms) and beta par-
ticles (electrons), both of which carry an electric charge, and neutrons, which
carry no electric charge. As radiation penetrates matter, it interacts with its
environment, and energy is transferred to the surrounding atoms resulting in
their ionization. This means that if the radiation is interacting with organic
tissue, the ionized atoms acquire new and different properties and may enter
into abnormal chemical combinations causing the decomposition or synthesis of
complex molecules. The net effect is to destroy living cells and to damage the
exposed tissue.
The energies of different kinds of emissions vary widely and so do
their penetrating powers. For example, alpha radiation is not very penetrating
compared with gamma and, to a lesser extent, beta radiation. Unlike the latter
two, therefore, alpha radiation does not constitute a major hazard to man if
the radiation source is external. If the source of radioactivity is inhaled
or ingested, however, than all three types of radiation are important because
of the close proximity of living tissue.
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We are concerned about radioactive waste because it is a potential ra-
diological hazard to man and other forms of life. A scale against which our
concern can be measured is the fact that we all live in a radioactive environ-
ment.
The biosphere--that thin envelope of soil, water, and air which contains
and sustains all life on Earth--receives radiation from outer space and from
many naturally radioactive materials found in the Earth's crust. Exposure
to radiation also arises from naturally occurring sources of radioactivity that
are present within living tissue. In addition, since the beginning of this
century, man has begun to add to this naturally occurring "background" radio-
activity. Medical X-rays, emissions from nuclear power plants during normal
operations, and radioactive debris from nuclear weapons tests are all sources
of ionizing radiation. Finally, depending on where a person lives and what he
does, he is exposed to more or less radiation.
Some of the more important factors affecting the magnitude of the
overall natural radiation level are altitude, geologic features, geographic
location and type of dwelling. For instance, for the first few kilometers above
the Earth's surface, the cosmic component of natural background radiation doubles
for every 1500 meter increase in altitude, and the natural background level
increases significantly in areas of high natural uranium and thorium content.-
The magnitude of the variations in exposure to radiation caused by local dif-
ferences in the natural background often exceeds the total exposure from man-made
sources. For example, a person living in Denver, Colorado, at an elevation of
about 1 mile above sea level, receives more radiation than a person working in
a normally functioning nuclear power plant on the James River in Virginia and
living nearby.
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When a radioactive nucleus* emits radiation--usually an alpha or beta
particle or a gamma ray--it "decays" into another nucleus which itself may or
may not be radioactive. A sequence of decays through two or more radioactive
nuclei is called a "decay chain." Every decay chain eventually terminates
with a stable, non-radioactive nucleus.
Each type of radioactive nucleus, or radioisotope, has a characteristic
fractional decay rate. Of course, it does not make sense to talk about the
"fractional decay rate" of an individual nucleus, since at any instant the
nucleus in question either will or will not have decayed. But the concept be-
comes meaningful if, as is invariably the case, we are dealing with a large
number of nuclei of the same type. In this situation we can legitimately
speak of a collective fractional decay rate. For instance, the radioisotope
cesium-137 decays at the rate of just over 2% per year. The decay rate is
independent of the absolute amount of the radioisotope present. A ton or a micro-
gram of cesium-137 will decay at the same fractional rate.
A commonly used measure of decay rate is the radioactive half-life. This
may be defined as the length of time required for half of the nuclei in a
sample of a radioisotope to decay to another nuclear form. Obviously, a radio-
isotope with a long half-life must have a low fractional decay rate, and, con-
versely, one with a short half-life will have a high fractional decay rate.
The half-lives of different radioisotopes span an enormous range from
millionths of a second to billions of years. After a period of time equal to
10 half-lives, the radioactivity of a radioisotope has decreased to 0.1 percent
of its original level. Table 2.1 indicates the half-lives of some of the con-
stituents of radioactive waste.
*The nucleus is the positively charged core of an atom, composed of protons and
neutrons.
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TABLE 2.1 - Half-Lives of Some of the
Constituents of Radioactive Waste
Radionuclide
Americium - 241
Americium - 243
Cesium - 135
Cesium - 137
Curium - 242
Curium - 243
Curium - 244
Iodine - 129
Iodine - 131
Krypton - 85
Neptunium - 237
Plutonium - 239
Plutonium - 241
Radium - 226
Strontium - 90
Technetium - 99
Tritium
Half-Life (Years)
458
7,370
3,000,000
33
.45
32
17.6
17,000,000
8 days
10.8
2,140,000
24,400
13
1,600
28
212,000
12.3
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In order to calculate the amount of radioactivity from a particular
source, it is not sufficient to know only the half-life of the radioisotope
involved. It is also necessary to know the quantity present. The level of
radioactivity, which is the product of the quantity of a particular radioisotope
and the fractional decay rate, is measured in curies. A curie is a unit which
measures the absolute (as opposed to the fractional) rate of nuclear decay.
One curie is defined as being equal to 3.7 x 1010 nuclear decays (or dis-
integrations) per second. It should be noted that this unit describes neither
the energy nor type of radiation that is emitted during a decay.
We need to know more than the number of curies in order to estimate the
biological significance of a volume of material that contains one or more radio-
isotopes, perhaps mixed with non-radioactive materials. All radioactivity is
not the same. As we have seen, different radioisotopes emit different forms
of radiation at different energies as they decay.
Furthermore, different living organisms and different organs within the
same organism all have varying degrees of sensitivity to radiation. Since
many effects of ionizing radiation are cumulative, individual exposure histories
are important. These exposure histories, together with individual radiation
tolerance levels, can vary significantly. For internal sources of radiation,
the physical and chemical form of the radioisotope and its route of intake are
also important.
If a human being is exposed to excessive amounts of radiation, depending
on the circumstances, the harmful effects may be immediate death, life shortened
by radiation-induced cancer, radiation-induced genetic change which may affect
subsequent generations, or temporary ill health followed by complete recovery.
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It is important to note that excessive exposure to harmful levels of ionizing
radiation may be caused by contact with a particular radiation source or
multiple contacts with many sources. The rate of absorption of radiation is
also important, since damaged tissue has more chance to recover from radiation
effects if the absorption takes place over a long rather than a short period.
How then do we protect ourselves from the potentially harmful effects
of excessive radiation? The relation between the magnitude of radiation dose*
and the resulting effect on human health is difficult to determine. The
government establishes dose limits, or Maximum Permissible Doses, which are
standards for radiation absorption per unit time.3 On the basis of these
limits, Recommended Concentration Guides (RCG's, formerly known as Maximum
Permissible Concentrations, MPC's) have been established. RCG's provide guidance
as to the concentrations of radionuclides in water suitable for unrestricted use.
The calculated RCG values are, therefore, a measure of the radiotoxicity of a
nuclide and are frequently used in calculations of radiological hazard.
In order to calculate the radiation dose to the human population resulting
from the presence of a particular radioactive source, it is necessary to predict
all the routes by which radionuclides would be transported, including concentra-
tion mechanisms, from their point of release to man. In order to determine
the critical exposure pathways to man, atmospheric, hydrologic, and, if the source
is initially buried, geologic pathway models must be developed.
Post-Fission Radioactive Waste
"Radioactive waste" may be defined broadly as waste material that is
contaminated or possibly contaminated by radioactive isotopes. More precisely,
*Dose may be defined as the quantity of energy imparted to a mass of material
exposed to radiation. A unit of dose is the rad, which is equal to one
hundred ergs of absorbed energy per gram of absorbing material. Another
dose unit is the rem (roentgen equivalentman) which is the dose of any ionizing
radiation that will produce the same biological effect as that produced by
1 roentgen of high voltage X-radiation (see the Glossary for a definition of
roentgen). It is related to the rad by a quality factor, the relative biological
equivalent (RBE).
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radioactive waste is residual material that is removed from the nuclear fuel
cycle and held because its release would constitute a hazard to man or to the
environment. Such waste does not include radioactive emissions, within pre-
scribed limits, which occur during the normal operations of various nuclear
facilities. As we use the term, "waste" includes residual material from which
certain materials might ultimately be recovered for subsequent use.
The commercial and military post-fission radioactive waste that is the
subject of this study is generated by nuclear fission in power reactors which
produce electricity for commercial use, and also in reactors which produce
plutonium for nuclear weapons and in propulsion reactors for submarines, missile
cruisers, and aircraft carriers. Post-fission radioactive waste may be differen-
tiated into various categories such as high-level (HL), transuranic* contami-
nated low-level (TRU), and non-TRU waste.
HL waste is composed of hundreds of radioisotopes, some in trace amounts
and some in very high concentrations, some with short and some with extremely
long half-lives. Various isotopes are typically gamma or beta or alpha emitters.
Because of the toxicities and long half-lives of some of the radioisotopes it
contains, HL waste will constitute a potential radiological hazard for hundreds,
thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of years.
TRU waste contains numerous radioisotopes in much lower concentrations
than HL waste. It is, however, especially troublesome because it is contaminated
with transuranic elements, including plutonium which have very long half-lives.
Indeed, for a given amount of electricity generated with nuclear fuel, more than
half of the plutonium ultimately discharged in all waste streams will emerge
in TRU waste. 5
*Transuranic means having an atomic number greater than uranium, that is,
greater than 92 (e.g., neptunium, plutonium, americium, curium, etc.)
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Low-level radioactive waste that is not contaminated with transuranic
elements is not as hazardous in the long term as TRU waste. With respect to
post-fission waste, it should be recognized that dividing low-level waste
into TRU and non-TRU categories, or deciding what is "transuranic contaminated,"
is a question of judgment based on a complete interpretation of complex data.
This report, as noted previously, focuses on HL and TRU wastes.
There is, unfortunately,no simple way to specify the length of time over
which radioactive waste will constitute a potential hazard. Figure 2.1 shows
how the potential radiological hazard of solidified HL waste changes as the waste
ages. The index used in this figure to measure the radiological hazard is the
number of cubic meters of water necessary to dilute one cubic meter of solidified
waste to the RCG level. The RCG value in water is used (rather than that in
air) because, for most disposal schemes, water-borne waste presents the most
significant hazard potential. Also included in the figure for the purposes
of comparison are the hazard indices of various uranium-bearing ore deposits.
A measure of the length of time for which the waste will remain a hazard,
and for which a long-term waste management strategy must presumably be designed
to be effective, might be the period for which the hazard index of the waste
is greater than that of a naturally occurring uranium ore. The argument would
be that, since the radioactive ore existed before primitive life began*, and
since life has evolved in the presence of this ore, we may therefore consider
a degree of radiotoxicity corresponding to this level as constituting an
"acceptable risk." Figure 2.1 shows, however, that the measure of toxicity
used in this case--the hazard index--is sensitive to the type of uranium ore
that is used as the reference.
Some pitchblend deposits contain uranium oxides almost completely un-
*The half-life of uranium-238, whose decay chain daughters are the major con-
tributors to the radiotoxicity of the ore, is about 4.5 billion years.
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diluted by any other materials. Only a small fraction of the world's known
uranium resources occur in such deposits, and many of them have already been
mined out. On the other hand, much of the uranium that is being recovered today
is extracted from deposits containing less than 0.2 percent of uranium by weight.
Diluting one cubic meter of 100 percent pitchblend mineral to the RCG
level would require far more water than would the dilution of one cubic meter
of sandstone containing 0.2 percent of uranium. Curve B in Figure 2.1 represents
HL waste from a reprocessing plant performing with uranium and plutonium re-
covery efficiencies similar to present design targets. This curve shows
that, if pitchblend were used as the basis for measuring a hazard, the waste
would reach an "acceptably" low level of radiotoxicity after about 3000 years,
whereas if 0.2 percent sandstone were used it would take billions of years.
It might also be argued that the use of such a hazard index to establish
the toxic lifetime of the waste fails to take adequate account of the fact
that in all schemes for disposal in geologic formations the rock formation it-
self would act as a dilutant for the waste. For example, one estimate for
disposal of waste in salt beds is that the salt and associated shale would
provide a dilution factor of 37,000.7 On the other hand, the waste would not
be distributed homogeneously throughout the salt, but rather would be placed
in canisters dispersed at intervals through the formation.
An alternative way to measure the period of radiological hazard would
be to determine the age of the waste when the total volume of water required
to dilute one kilogram of waste to the RCG level would be equal to the
volume of water required to dilute to the RCG level the mass of ore that had had
to be mined to produce the quantity of nuclear fuel which, when irradiated and re-
processed, generated the kilogram of HL waste. (For the LWR fuel cycle, the amount
of ore in question, assuming it contained 0.17 percent by weight of uranium, would be
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nearly 30 tons.) The concept is that use of nuclear fuel would ultimately result in
the transfer of radioactivity from one part of the earth's crust (where it is
in the form of uranium ore) to another--a waste repository. When the toxicity
of the waste falls to the level of toxicity of the naturally occurring material
that had been consumed to produce it, then the waste is no longer considered a
hazard. Again, there are problems with this approach. The risk presented by
radionuclides distributed and diluted throughout a large body of ore is perhaps
qualitatively different from the risk presented by radionuclides concentrated
in a canister of waste, even if the same volume of water is required to dilute
the ore body and the waste canister to the RCG level. Furthermore, much of the
initial radioactivity in the ore is not, in fact, consumed, but instead remains
in the ore "tailings"--the waste stream generated during uranium extraction.
The previous discussion illustrates, at least in part, some of the dif-
ficulties involved in quantifying the length of time that must elapse before
the waste can be considered no longer hazardous. The numerous variations on
the theme of waste hazard "potential" give answers ranging upwards from hun-
dreds of years.
Radioactive Waste Generation
Post-fission waste originates from spent fuel assemblies that are
routinely discharged from nuclear power production or propulsion reactors.
The irradiated fuel rods in these assemblies contain fission products; uranium,
whose original uranium-235 content has been reduced by fission; and plutonium,
which is produced by neutron capture in uranium-238.
After discharge from the reactor, the materials constituting spent fuel
assemblies move through a sequence of operations. Various categories of
radioactive waste emerge at different points in the sequence. The operations
are outlined briefly below. The radioactive waste management implications are
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discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
Temporary Spent Fuel Storage
Spent fuel assemblies are temporarily stored in water-filled storage
basins located near the reactor where irradiation has occurred. Radioactive
decay proceeds within the stored spent fuel sufficiently to permit safe handling
and safe transport. No plant for reprocessing spent fuel from commercial
power reactors is presently operating in the U.S.Consequently, the available
storage capacity of existing basins at operating power reactors is rapidly being
filled. As a result, additional temporary storage capacity, either at
various reactor sites or at a central location, will be required soon.
Spent Fuel Transport
After the cooling period, commercial spent fuel rods, which are still
highly radioactive, are placed in massive shielded containers for shipping
from the storage basin at the reactor site to a reprocessing plant. In the
case of military plutonium production, the production reactor and reprocessing
plant are located on the same site so that there is no need for off-site trans-
portation for reprocessing.
Reprocessing
Following arrival at a reprocessing plant, the assemblies are disas-
sembled and the spent fuel rods are chopped up. The residual mixture of
fuel materials and fission products is dissolved and sent through the plant
where a large number of chemical separations are performed. Plutonium and
uraium are recovered.
In the commercial nuclear power industry, the uranium can be re-enriched
in the uranium-235 isotope, or it can be mixed with plutonium. In either
case, uranium would be recycled in power reactor fuel. The recovered plutonium
can be blended with uranium in mixed oxide fuel for recycling in existing light
water reactors, or it can be stored for later use as fuel in breeder reactors.
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It is also possible to leave the plutonium in the radioactive waste, rather than
extract it.
In the weapons program, the recovered plutonium is used in the manufacture
of nuclear warheads. In the naval propulsion program, the uranium is recovered
and re-enriched, but the relatively small amounts of plutonium created during
fuel irradiation are disposed of with the waste products.
Most of the radioactivity that was initially contained in the spent fuel
is discharged from the reprocessing plant in the liquid HL waste stream. This
waste contains almost all of the non-volatile fission products, a small resi-
dual percentage of uranium and plutonium, and practically all of the other
transuranic elements. Other reprocessing plant wastes include: (1) low-level
waste--liquid and solid--containing low concentrations of short-lived fission
products and no more than trace amounts of long-lived transuranic elements; and
(2) waste--cladding hulls, failed equipment, spent process materials, trash, etc.--
with lower levels of radioactivity than HL waste, but with appreciable amounts
of the transuranic elements. Waste volumes in these two categories are much
larger than in the case of HL waste. Waste in the second category is what we
have previously called TRU waste.
One plant for reprocessing commercial power reactor fuels was previously
in operation at West Valley, New York. The plant was shut down in 1972 for
modifications and expansion. The owner, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., recently
announced that it would not be reopened owing to the high cost of the altera-
tions.8 Another larger commercial reprocessing plant is currently under
construction by Allied General Nuclear Services at Barnwell, South Carolina.
The completion of this plant is, however, dependent on obtaining financial
assistance from the federal government and a favorable resolution of pending
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regulatory decisions.
Plants for reprocessing production reactor fuel for weapons are located
at Savannah River, South Carolina, and Richland, Washington. The reproces-
sing of naval reactor fuel and fuel from ERDA research and test reactors
takes place at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Temporary Waste Storage
HL waste emerges in liquid formin the course of reprocessing, primarily
at the first stage of plutonium and uranium extraction. The liquid is stored
temporarily in tanks at the reprocessing plant.
TRU waste emerges in various forms--liquid, and combustible and non-
combustible solids--at the reprocessing plant and also at other points in the
nuclear fuel cycle. The main sources of TRU waste are: the fuel cladding hulls
and assembly structures from the head end of the reprocessing plant; the
residuals left from the coversion of liquid plutonium nitrate to plutonium
oxide powder (commercial use) or to plutonium metal (weapons use); and spent
process material, general trash and failed equipment left from reprocessing
and also from commercial mixed oxide fuel fabrication and military weapon
component fabrication. TRU waste is collected, temporarily stored, and sometimes
mixed with other less toxic wastes at these various fuel cycle stages.
Waste Treatment
Depending on its composition, radioactive waste is treated in various
ways: gases may be dissolved in liquids or adsorbed on solids, liquids may
be solidified, and solids may be incinerated (resulting in gas and less solid).
In general, treatment is designed to make the waste easier or safer to
handle subsequently. However, every treatment method has its own set of
costs and risks, and almost always results in the generation of secondary
waste streams.
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Waste Transport
Following treatment, radioactive waste is transported to a location
where it is more or less permanently disposed of. The importance of transport
depends on the site of permanent disposition. No transportation is involved
if HL waste is solidified in the bottom of a temporary storage tank and left
there indefinitely. Long distance transport involving railroad or truck and
ship would be necessary for either seabed or ice sheet disposal.
Permanent Disposition
A wide variety of methods for permanent disposition of HL waste is
being considered. The most practical appear to be those involving emplacement
in suitable geologic formations, either deep underground or under the ocean
floor. Other methods under study are ice sheet disposal and waste partitioning
combined with nuclear transmutation or extraterrestrial elimination of the par-
titioned long-lived actinides.
No method for permanent HL waste disposition has been adopted yet. How-
ever, much military HL waste which was originally stored temporarily as a
liquid in tanks has been subsequently solidified in situ. It now appears that
the task of exhuming these solids will be very difficult and costly, and for
this reason the waste may be left there for a substantial period of time--
perhaps indefinitely.
The technology has not yet been developed for the treatment and packaging
of military HL waste that has been already solidified in the storage tanks.
Estimates of the cost of preparing this waste for permanent disposition range
up to $20 billion. If, as some critics charge, the present in-tank storage
method for solidified salt cake is continued indefinitely, then such large
expenditures would be avoided. In this situation, however, the waste confinement
system would be less rigorous than the methods currently under consideration for
isolation of commercial high-level waste.
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Some TRU waste has been disposed of, essentially irretrievably, in
ocean dumping grounds. Other waste in this category has been deposited in
shallow burial grounds. Not all of these land burials will permit retrieval at
reasonable cost. The question of the permanent disposition of TRU waste to be
generated in the future is unresolved.
Radioactive Waste Quantities
The following is a brief review of the amounts of radioactive wastes in
various categories that have already been generated in the U.S., together with
some predictions of how these amounts may increase over the next twenty to
thirty years. The discussion compares military and commercial waste quantities.
High-Level Waste
As a result of military activities from the middle 1940's to the
present, the former U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its successor,
ERDA*, have generated about 215 million gallons of liquid HL waste.** Soli-
dification programs have been in operation for some years at the three sites
at which this waste is stored: the Hanford reservation near Richland, Washington,
the Savannah River Plant in South Carolina, and the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, near Idaho Falls in Idaho. As a result, over 80 percent of the
original liquid has been solidified. The volume reduction associated with
solidification has meant that, as of January 1, 1976, there was an HL waste
inventory of about 75 million gallons, half of which was in solid form.l2
More than 70 percent of this waste is currently stored at Richland, with
*With the passage of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 the former AEC was
fissioned into two parts--NRC (nuclear regulation) and ERDA (nuclear and non-
nuclear energy research, development and demonstration, enrichment services,
and nuclear weapon materials production).
**Up to 1974, some 205 million gallons had been generated. During that
year, it is estimated that 7.5 million gallons were added10 , and in 1975 a
further 4 million gallons of HL waste was generated.ll
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about 25 percent at Savannah River and 3 percent at Idaho Falls.1 3 It is
estimated that by the early 1980's,when most of the waste will have been
solidified, there will be a total of nearly 500,000 tons of residual HL solids
at these three sites.1 4
In contrast, the commercial nuclear power industry has until now pro-
duced less than 600,000 gallons of HL waste.* All of this waste is still in
liquid form and is stored at the site of the Nuclear Fuel Services reprocessing
plant at West Valley, New York.
The future production rate of military HL waste is uncertain, since
predictions must be based partly upon an assumed plutonium demand for nuclear
weapons. Predictions of future generation rates of commercial HL waste must
be based on assumed nuclear power growth rates and are therefore also subject
to considerable uncertainty. It has been estimated, however, that the com-
mercial power industry in the U.S. will have generated 60 million gallons of
liquid HL waste by 200016, and that not until about 2020 will the commercial
power industry have produced the volume of liquid HL waste that has already
been produced by U.S. military programs. More recent estimates, perhaps
based on a more conservative industry growth rate, indicate that current volumes
of military wastes are more than ten times the amount that will be accumulated
by the nuclear power industry by the year 2000.18
According to recent calculations, the volume of all the solidified HL
waste produced by the commercial nuclear power industry through 2000 will be
equivalent to a cube 66 feet on each side9, whereas the equivalent cube for
the existing military HL waste would have a side measuring approximately 200
20
feet. Of course, this should not be interpreted to mean that these small
*Although 600,000 gallons of liquid HL waste are stored at the Nuclear Fuel
Services site, much of this was generated during the reprocessing at West
Valley of spent fuel from an AEC production reactor at Hanford. The amount 15
attributable to the AEC cannot strictly be categorized as "commercial" waste.
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volumes are all that will be required to store the waste. Much larger storage
volumes will be necessary. But the calculation does indicate that the main
problem in safely managing HL waste will be one of confining the radioactivity,
rather than of finding enough storage space.
A volumetric comparison alone is inadequate when comparing military and
commercial wastes. Owing to differences in treatment processes, one ton of
spent fuel from a plutonium production reactor produces a larger volume of
liquid HL waste than would be produced by one ton of spent commercial power
reactor fuel. Furthermore, fuel in plutonium production reactors only re-
ceives about one-tenth as much irradiation exposure before discharge as com-
mercial power reactor fuel2 1 , and the amount of radioactivity in spent produc-
tion fuel is therefore correspondingly lower.
Both of these factors mean that the radioactive inventory of a unit
volume of military liquid HL waste is very much less than that of the same
volume of commercial liquid HL waste. This difference is maintained in the
final, solid volumes. It has been estimated that the long-lived fission product
concentration in the solidified military waste is on the order of a thousand times
22
less than in commercial waste.
About 600 million curies of cesium-137 and strontium-90 are stored at
23
Savannah River and Richland. (About 150 million curies of this is stored
separately as encapsulated solids at Richland, having been partitioned from the
24
liquid HL waste. ) Projections of waste from assumed commercial processing
of power reactor fuel indicate that about 700 million curies of cesium-137 and
strontium-90 would be in the waste delivered to a federal repository by 1990.25
The conclusion that clearly emerges is that the quantity of military HL
waste exceeds the amount generated by the commercial nuclear power industry,
and, at least on a volumetric basis, the difference is very large. Further-
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more, this difference is likely to continue at least until the end of the century.
TRU Waste
Through June 1974, 42 million cubic feet of military low-level waste
had been buried at ERDA's land burial sites. Through 1973, over 9 million
cubic feet of commercial low-level waste had been buried at six commercially
licensed sites.2 7
Until April 1970 there was no distinction made between TRU and non-TRU
low-level waste for burial purposes. At that time, the AEC decided that
radioactive waste with known or detectable contamination of transuranic
nuclides which would be subsequently delivered to federal burial grounds should
be segregated from other types of waste and stored in retrievable form.
This requires packaging and storage so that it remains readily retrievable
in contamination-free containers for an interim period of twenty years, and
retrievability should continue to be possible beyond that period.2 8
About 952 kilograms of plutonium are contained in the TRU waste buried
at the five major ERDA burial sites. 9 Of this amount, 740 kilograms were
buried before 1970 with no provision for retrieval, and the remaining 212
kilograms have been stored retrievably.30 Through 1973, TRU waste containing
some 80 kilograms of plutonium has been buried at the six commercial sites.31
There is likely to be no further shallow land burial of commercial TRU
waste if proposed regulatory changes are adopted. All future military and
commercial TRU waste (and that which is stored presently) will probably be
disposed of more carefully.
Military activities are currently generating low-level solid waste at
the rate of 1.3 million cubic feet per year.32 It is expected that this rate
will gradually decrease in the future. Recent projections of commercial waste
generation indicate that by 2000 there will be over 50 million cubic feet of
commercial TRU waste, including about 1 million cubic feet of spent fuel
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cladding waste. 3 (In these estimates, no allowance has been made for
volume reduction by compaction or other methods.)
In addition to the above quantities, low-level waste, military and commercial,
has previously been placed in canisters and discharged into the sea at U.S.
dumping sites off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Part of this waste is
contaminated with transuranics. Ocean dumping of U.S. low-level waste was sus-
pended in 1970. However, other countries are continuing this practice.
The existing amount of military TRU waste thus exceeds the current a-
mount of commercial waste, but the dominance is not as great as in the case
of HL waste.
Radioactive Waste Release
AEC, ERDA's predecessor as manager of military waste, intentionally
discharged or accidentally released large quantities of HL and TRU waste.
Between 1956 and 1958, about 31 million gallons of radioactive waste containing
1.3 million curies (excluding strontium and cesium, but including plutonium)
were poured into soil on the Hanford reservation. During the past two de-
cades, the radioactivity has decayed to a level of about 20,000 curies. 3 5 In
addition, the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant has discharged liquid effluent
containing large quantities of plutonium to sub-surface trenches that are not
isolated from the soil. Indeed, in the case of one particular trench, it is
36
estimated that about 40 kilograms of plutonium were released in this way ,
creating a potentially severe radiological hazard, and leading to the addition
of a neutron poison to the trench in order to eliminate the possibility of a
spontaneous fission reaction.* Since the beginning of operations at the Hanford
*Initially it was believed that this possibility was quite high, but later cal-
culations showed that the chance of a chain reaction was in fact extremely small,
even without the addition of poison. Nevertheless, for purposes of comparison,
it is noteworthy that the HL waste generated by a typical U.S. power reactor (i.e.,
a 1000 MWe light water reactor) during its entire operating lifetime (about
30 years) would contain about 30 kilograms of plutonium. In this context, it
should be remembered that shallow land burial of roughly 740 kilograms of
plutonium has taken place at ERDA's five principal burial sites without pro-
vision for retrievability. 3 7
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site, up to 43 million curies of beta emitters and 192 kilograms of plutonium
have been carried into the soil in 140 billion gallons of liquid effluents. 3 8
The current beta inventory in the soil is approximately 10,000 curies, about
39
one-half of which is cesium-137 and strontium-90. The transport of most of the
radionuclides, including cesium-137, strontium-90 and plutonium, has been sig-
nificantly retarded by the soil.40
At Savannah River and the Hanford reservation, liquid HL waste is
neutralized and stored in carbon steel tanks. The liquid HL waste tank farms
at the Hanford reservation have developed twenty leaks amounting to the loss
of about 450,000 gallons of neutralized waste.4 1 All the waste tanks which have
leaked were constructed prior to 1956. The largest leak so far occurred in
1973 and caused the escape of 115,000 gallons of HL waste containing 50,000
curies into the surrounding soil. Eight leaks have occurred at the Savannah
River Plant, but onlyone of about 100 gallons is known to have resulted in con-
tamination of the surrounding soil.4 3 These leaks have neither killed nor injured
anyone to date. Nonetheless their hazard will remain for hundreds or thousands of
years. At Idaho Falls, where the liquid HL waste is unneutralized and stored as
acid in stainless steel tanks before solidification, there have been no leaks.
The HL waste management record has improved over the years. For example,
at the Hanford reservation the controlled releases of radioactive liquids to the
environment have been significantly reduced: in 1965 about 140,000 curies of
beta activity were intentially discharged, but in 1970 as a result of operational
and design changes the amount had dropped to 13,000 curies44 Efforts to upgrade
performance continue.
2-22
Potential Causes of Harmful Effects
Many events may cause the release of radioactivity from waste management
activities. They can be classified as accidents due to human failure, inten-
tional acts, or natural phenomena.
Accidents may be due to either inadequate construction or improper opera-
tion. An example of the first would be the leaks which occurred in carbon
steel, military HL waste tanks.
Intentional acts against waste management facilities may be charac-
terized as acts of either warfare or sabotage. For instance, the temporary
HL waste tanks adjacent to a reprocessing plant might be sabotaged for the
purpose of achieving long-term local contamination. Surface waste management
activities might be targeted with nuclear weapons to increase the degree, dura-
tion, and coverage of contamination after a nuclear war. However, the same
weapons would be much more effective if they were used initially in the destruc-
tion of cities or military targets.
Finally,various natural events can abruptly or chronically initiate re-
leases of radioactive materials to the environment. Abrupt events include floods,
earthquakes, volcanoes, and, conceivably, meteors. They may result in im-
mediate environmental contamination,or they may expose the final waste form
to slow but continual degradation and subsequent seepage into the biologically
active media of soil and water. In chronic release scenarios, the essential
question is how much waste will reach the soil or watershed during its
period of toxicity. Chronic events include the possible shifts of water
tables and river courses, the glacial erosion caused by Ice Ages, slow but
continual geologic faulting, leaching processes, and surface ice flows and
underground lake migration in Antarctica.
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Conclusions
From the preceding outline of the basic facts of the post-fission radio-
active waste problem in the U.S., several conclusions may be drawn:
1. Radioactive wastes must be safely managed to prevent possible radio-
logical hazards to life.
2. As a consequence largely of nuclear weapons programs, the U.S.
government has already committed itself to a radioactive waste management
responsibility of major proportions which is still growing.
4. Because of the maturing nuclear power industry, the U.S. is generating
a rapidly increasing volume of radioactive waste. The vast bulk of this
waste remains in the form of spent fuel elements in temporary storage basins
at commercial power reactor sites. Whether or not these elements are re-
processed, they pose a growing waste management problem.
4. In the past, the U.S. government's record of management has been
marred in a sufficient number of instances to be a cause of concern.
An inevitable legacy of our nuclear age, radioactive waste constitutes
a potential Nth century hazard.
2-24
Footnotes to Chapter 2
1. Unruh, C.M., "Nuclear Radiation", Nuclear Technology, 24 (December 1974),
314-322.
2. Extracted from: El-Wakil, M.M., Nuclear Heat Transport, International
Textbook Company, Scranton, 1971, 430.
3. See Standards for Protection Against Radiation, 10C.F.R.20, Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
1973.
4. Ibid..
5. Bray, G.R., "Other-Than-High-Level Waste", in Proceedings of Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Workshop on the Management of Radioactive Waste:
Waste Partitioning as an Alternative, held at the Battelle-Seattle
Research Center, Seattle, Washington, June 8-10, 1976, NR-CONF-001,
U.S. NRC, Washington, D.C.,1976, 102.
6. With the exception of the uranium ore reference lines, all the informa-
tion in this Figure was taken from: Dance, K.D., High-Level Radioactive
Waste Management: Past Experience, Future Risks, and Present Decisions
Report to the Resources and Environment Division of the Ford Foundation,
April l, 1975, 21.
7. Bell, M.J., Heavy Element Composition of Spent Power Reactor Fuels,
ORNL-TM-2897, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, May 1970.
8. Nucleonics Week, Vol. 17, No. 39 (September 23, 1976), 1.
9. U.S. General Accounting Office, Isolating High-Level Radioactive Waste
from the Environment: Achievements, Problems, and Uncertainties, Report
to the Congress, B-164052, Washington, D.C., December 18, 1974, 3.
10. Ibid.
11. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., February 4, 1976, at p. 1460.
12. Ibid.
13. Dance, K.D., High-Level Radioactive Waste Management: Past Experience,
Future Risks, and Present Decisions, Report to the Resources and Environ-
ment Division of the Ford Foundation, April 1, 1975, 27.
14. The volume of the current inventory of military wastes, if solidifed as
salt cake or calcine, would be about 220,000 m (see footnote 22). The
density of salt cake is roughly 1800 kg/m3 (WASH-1528, Environmental
Statement: Future High-Level Waste Facilities, Savannah River Plant,
Aiken, S.C., April 1973, 16.) The mass of the current inventory of
military waste, in the form of salt cake, would be 487,000 short tons.
2-25
15. See footnote 8.
16. GAO (Supra note 9), 3.
17. Dance, K.D. (Supra note 13), 15.
18. February hearings (Supra note ll),p. 1464.
19. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Alternatives for
Managing Wastes from Reactors and Post-Fission Operations in the LWR
Fuel Cycle, ERDA-76-43, Washington, D.C., May 1976, Vol. 1, 3.12.
20. Nucleonics Week, Vol. 17, No. 30 (July 27, 1976), 13.
21. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Final Environmental
Statement, Waste Management Operations, Hanford Reservation, Richland,
Washington, ERDA-1538, Washington, D.C., December 1975, Vol. 1, X-33.
22. Letter of October 27, 1976,from Frank Baranowski, Division of Nuclear
Fuel Cycle and Production, ERDA, to Mason Willrich.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. U.S. General Accounting Office, Improvements Needed in the Land
Disposal of Radioactive Wastes - A Problem of Centuries, Report to the
Congress, RED-76-54, Washington, D.C., January 1976, 4-5.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. ERDA-76-43 (Supra note 19), 3.15-3.22.
34. GAO (Supra note 9), 14.
35. Ibid.
36. Smith, A.E. (comp), Nuclear Reactivity Evaluations of 216-Z-9 Enclosed
Trench, ARH-2915, Richland, Washington, December 1973.
37. GAO (Supra note 26), 5.
38. Baranowski, F. (Supra note 22).
2-26
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Alternative Processes for Managing
Existing Commercial High-Level Waste, NUREG-0043, Battelle-Pacific
Northwest Labs, Richland, Washington, April 1976, 38.
42. 241-7-106 Tank Leak Investigation, ARH-2874, Atlantic Richfield Hanford
Co. (ARHCO), Richland, Washington, November 1973.
43. Dance, K.D. (Supra note 13), 28.
44. Baranowski, F. (Supra note 22).
3-1
Chapter 3
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
In Chapter 2 we concluded that post-fission radioactive waste is a
growing problem with both immediate and long-term ramifications. The problem
requires enlightened, far-sighted management.
This chapter, therefore, focuses on radioactive waste management. It
does so in a strategic, not a tactical sense. We consider key decisions,
rather than day-to-day operations. Of course, management involves a decisional
process that carries the radioactive waste problem forward from the present into
the future. As we shall see, radioactive waste management is a paradigm of
decision making under uncertainty. It is a task, moreover, that is strongly
characterized by multiple conflicting objectives and the distribution of
risks and costs through time.
The purpose of this chapter is to present in a coherent manner the
strategies that are under consideration for the management of post-fission
radioactive waste. The discussion is structured to provide readers with an
understanding of how the sequences of key decisions that constitute waste
management strategies are interrelated. It is important to determine the con-
straints each decision imposes on the available technological options. It
is also important to consider the risks, costs,and benefits associated with
the various strategies. Our task is to identify the strategies and the major
issues which they raise. We do not attempt quantification. Therefore, the
analysis which follows is intended to provide a framework for the problem that
is sufficiently flexible to cope with the uncertainties involved, yet rigid
enough to provide guidance for waste management decision making.
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Overview
The main waste management strategies currently available for commercial
and military HL and TRU wastes are shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 The strategic
decisions have been highlighted. The sequences of decisions correspond chrono-
logically to the actual material flows (for example, from reactor spent fuel
discharge to permanent disposal of HL waste). This is not necessarily the
order in which the strategic decisions will be or should be made. The de-
cisional interdependence of waste management planning, unlike the flow of the
waste itself, does not move in one direction through time. For example, the
selection of a method of permanent disposition may influence the selection of
the form of solidified waste and possibly the requirements for waste composi-
tion. Such decisional interdependence is a recurrent theme.
Military and commercial management are separated. In the short term,
the technologies required to deal with these wastes of different origin are
significantly different, particularly in the high-level category. Further-
more, important early decisions in the case of military waste, starting with
the initial decision to reprocess, have already been made, whereas almost
all of the major issues concerning commercial waste generation and management
(with the notable exception of the decision to develop a substantial nuclear-
electric generating capacity) have yet to be settled.
Because of the future importance of nuclear power and the unresolved
nature of the accompanying post-fission waste management decisions, it will
be illuminating to consider in the following order the general implications
for nuclear power development of reprocessing, the waste management impli-
cations of a decision not to reprocess, and the radioactive waste implications
of reprocessing. The stage will then have been set for a discussion of the
management of commercial HL, military HL, commercial TRU,and military TRU wastes.
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FIGURE 3:. 2
ACCUMULATED MILITARY WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
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Reprocessing: Implications for Nuclear Power Development
The first decision in Figure 3.1 is whether to reprocess spent fuel
from commercial power reactors. Since the reprocessing decision profoundly
affects the whole future development of nuclear power, waste management issues
in this context must be kept in perspective, neither exaggerated nor lost from
view.
The present incentive for reprocessing spent power reactor fuel is to
extract uranium and plutonium so that these fissionable materials can be re-
cycled as fuel in commercial power reactors. It is not clear that the value
of the fissionable material extracted from spent fuel will outweigh the cost
of reprocessing. Uncertainty arises from a number of sources.
First, the value of plutonium and uranium recovered through reproces-
sing depends on the price of natural uranium. At the present time, the extent
of uranium ore resources is not well known. Although the selling price of
uranium ore has been increasing rapidly, future price trends are highly un-
certain and are likely to be affected by other factors in addition to the
availability of uranium ore.
The second major source of uncertainty is the cost of spent fuel re-
processing and the cost of fabricating fuel containing mixed plutonium and
uranium oxides. Mixed oxide fuel fabrication is much more expensive than
the fabrication of the low-enriched uranium fuel used currently in light
water reactors. Two types of uncertainty are associated with these costs:
(1) Neither reprocessing nor mixed-oxide fuel fabrication has reached the
stage at which it can be called a "mature" industry. Cost estimates for com-
mercial plants have to be made by extrapolation from smaller scale demonstra-
tion-type plants. (2) The regulatory requirements for these plants are
in a process of substantial change. In particular, the safeguards against theft
or diversion that must accompany plutonium through all stages of recycle are
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undetermined.
Therefore, the calculations often used to estimate the economic feasi-
bility of spent fuel reprocessing and plutonium and uranium recycle cannot
provide a conclusive answer to the question of whether or not to reprocess.
To put the decision in perspective, it is necessary to include its long-
term implications. Many of the important implications for waste management
will be dealt with separately, however, and the implications for the future
of nuclear power are merely outlined here.
A decision not to reprocess spent fuel, if adhered to, is likely to
mean that nuclear power will only play a short-term, interim role in meeting
U.S. energy demands. The duration of that role would be limited by the ex-
tent and quality of uranium ore deposits known and yet to be discovered.*
The present generation of commercial power reactors, the light water
reactors (LWRs), use slightly enriched uranium fuel that contains 2-4 percent
uranium-235 and the remainder uranium-238. Fission of uranium-235 in present
LWRs is accompanied by the conversion of some of the uranium-238 isotope into
plutonium which is easily fissioned, but LWRs are relatively inefficient conver-
ters. Without reprocessing, therefore, fission is limited to roughly 70 percent
of the uran.ium-235 contained in fresh fuel--equivalent to about two percent
all the uranium loaded into the reactor--and that fraction of the plutonium pro-
duced from the initial inventory of uranium-238 which fissions before the de-
pletion of the fissile inventory and the build-up of neutron-absorbing "poisons"
render the core incapable of sustaining a chain reaction and fuel must be dis-
charged. The exact percentages vary depending on which particular fuel manage-
ment scheme is chosen.
*However, in the unlikely event that it becomes technically feasible, economically
attractive, and environmentally acceptable to extract the uranium that is known
to exist in very low concentrations in enormous quantities in certain shale and
granite formations,and in seawater in much lower concentrations still, the
duration of a nuclear power industry without spent fuel reprocessing would no
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If the decision is made to reprocess spent fuel and to allow the
recycle of uranium, but not plutonium, then the uranium resource constraint
will still basically apply. The recycled uranium would add at most about
20 percent to the energy that could ultimately be produced. If, however, the
decision is to permit spent fuel reprocessing and to allow recycling of both
uranium and plutonium in existing LWRs, the recycled plutonium would add per-
haps an additional 25 percent to the energy output from nuclear power.
The extension to the lifetime of an LWR economy gained by a decision to
recycle plutonium would depend on the scale and growth rate of the industry.
For instance, if there were enough uranium to support a constant-sized LWR popu-
lation for 40 years without recycling plutonium, thena decision to recycle
would add about a decade to the life of the industry. In a growing LWR economy,
however, a 25 percent increase in the available energy resource would produce
less than a 25 percent increase in the lifetime of the industry. Thus, even
with large-scale reprocessing and recycling of uranium and plutonium, a nuclear
power industry relying solely on the existing type of commercial nuclear re-
actors would remain an interim energy option, given the current resource con-
straints.
The future of nuclear power as a long-term energy option hinges primarily
on the successful development and commercialization of a plutonium breeder
reactor, and such a breeder necessarily requires large-scale reprocessing of
spent fuel. Plutonium breeder reactors use mixed plutonium-uranium fuel sur-
rounded by a uranium blanket. Through uranium-238 neutron capture and subsequent
conversion, fission of plutonium in a breeder reactors results in
the production of more plutonium than is consumed. In short, a breeder re-
actor is a much more efficient converter of plentiful uranium-238 into plutonium
than is a light water reactor.
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A plutonium breeder of the liquid metal cooled, fast neutron reactor
type (LMFBR) is the long-term technological option currently being pursued
as the highest priority in the U.S. and by every other country with a major
nuclear power program. The breeder reactor development programs in a number
of other countries including France, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, and the Soviet Union are currently on a more advanced schedule than the
U.S. program. The U.S. reprocessing decision must be seen in this dynamic
worldwide context.
It is possible to construct a strategy in which spent fuel is reprocessed
and the plutonium is not recycled to existing LWRs but rather stored for an
interim period and used subsequently in plutonium breeder reactors. This may
well occur in Europe because of the earlier introduction of breeders into
commercial use. In the short term, the effect of delaying a reprocessing
decision on the U.S. nuclear industry would be significantly different from
a decision to recycle plutonium immediately to LWRs. In the long term, and
particularly in the long-term effect on radioactive waste management, the
difference will be quantitatively marginal and qualitatively non-existent.
There is only one possible way in which nuclear power might be developed
which would avoid both the uranium resource constraint and a plutonium breeder
reactor economy. This would involve a fundamental shift from the uranium-
plutonium fuel cycle, on which the worldwide nuclear power industry has been
largely based, to the thorium-uranium-233 fuel cycle. The technical and
economic feasibility of such a radical mid-course shift needs further study
before it can be seriously considered. If the main reasons for wishing to
escape from the plutonium economy are its diversion and routine handling
implications, it is by no means clear that the situation would be improved
by long-term reliance on a uranium-233 economy. Uranium-233 is a fissionable
material which is about as useful for making nuclear explosives as plutonium,
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and it would be accompanied at all stages in the fuel cycle by uranium-232, an
isotope which decays to form isotopes that emit highly penetrating gamma
radiation.
The preceding paragraphs have shown that the way in which nuclear fission
is most likely to become a long-term energy option is through the successful
development of a plutonium breeder reactor. The prospect of a large, mature
nuclear power industry based on plutonium raises profound issues for society
aside from the energy that will be produced. Very large amounts-tens of
thousands of kilograms--of plutonium will emerge annually from reprocessing
plants, flow through fuel fabrication facilities, and be recycled into breeder
reactors. Can a reactor which uses liquid sodium as coolant and fast neutrons
for fission be made safe? Can toxic plutonium be managed in reprocessing and
fuel fabrication operations without undue risk to the health of workers?
Can large flows of plutonium--a few kilograms of which are sufficient for a
nuclear explosive--be managed so that no significant amounts are stolen or
diverted for use in nuclear weapons?
These issues are in addition to the long-term radioactive waste impli-
cations of a plutonium economy. All of them are imbedded in the basic re-
processing decision. With these overarching considerations in mind, we shall
now examine in greater detail the waste management implications flowing from
the reprocessing decision.
No Reprocessing: The Once-Through Fuel Cycle
As mentioned earlier, when spent fuel is discharged from a power reactor
it is stored at the reactor site in water-filled basins. The water acts as a
heat transfer medium for the radioactive decay heat that must be removed from
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the fuel, and also provides shielding and a secondary containment barrier for
any radioactivity that the fuel cladding fails to contain.
If the decision is made not to reprocess, the spent fuel cannot be
left where it is for very long. Water basin storage of unpackaged, irradiated
spent fuel is an unreliable method of isolating the contained radioactivity for
periods longer than a few years, primarily because of deterioration in the
quality of the containment provided by the spent fuel cladding. Economies of
scale are likely to show that long-term storage of spent fuel should be
carried out at one or more central locations rather than at each reactor.
Hence, after a period of cooling at a reactor site, spent fuel assemblies
would be shipped in specially designed casks to these storage facilities.
In any case, whether storage is centralized or dispersed, packaging will be
required to provide an extra degree of containment. For spent LWR fuel, there
is likely to be a period of 3-4 years between reactor discharge and packaging
so that the provision for radiation shielding and heat removal in the package
design is made easier.2
The question of whether to store the fuel retrievably or dispose of it
irretrievably arises at this stage. The difficulties created by trying to
establish a clear distinction between these states will shortly be discussed.
Nevertheless, addressing the question at its face value for the moment, it
could be argued that,in a society that is becoming acutely conscious of
energy shortages, it would seem unlikely that an irretrievable disposal tech-
nology will be chosen for the spent fuel, despite the judgment that resulted
in the initial decision not to reprocess. Irretrievable disposal would de-
prive future generations of the opportunity to resurrect a long-term nuclear
option using the spent fuel inventory of fissile material. On the other hand,
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it could also be asserted that acute awareness of energy shortages does not
presently appear to be effective in ensuring that future generations will have
the opportunity to utilize oil and gas resources.
The technologies for irretrievable disposal of packaged spent fuel are
similar to those for the disposal of HL waste in geologic formations. These
will be discussed in later chapters.
Various methods for retrievable storage have been proposed, including
water-cooled basins, air-cooled vaults, concrete surface silos, near-surface
heat sinks and geologic formations. Any method adopted must contain the radio-
activity in the fuel and protect the fuel against mechanical, chemical, or
thermal damage. It must also provide a safe subcritical arrangement for the
fuel so that the risk of a fission chain reaction is acceptably low. This
environment must be maintained under normal conditions and the facility must
be designed to withstand a "maximum credible accident", such as the kind of
natural catastrophe most likely in the area of the site.
An integral part of the design of a retrievable storage facility will
obviously be the provision for retrievability. It is unclear as to how long it
is feasible for a facility to retain this characteristic. A period of one
hundred years is often mentioned as being practical for near-surface or
surface engineered storage. However, retrievability is a feature that will
not disappear overnight. Instead, inevitable deterioration of the various
barriers will gradually make the recovery process more and more difficult. There-
fore, in the case of a water-cooled basin, air-cooled vault, concrete surface
silo or near-surface heat sink, the spent fuel would need to be removed
before storage becomes "irretrievable." For geologic storage concepts,
however, this may not be necessary. It should also be remembered that over
the life of the storage facility the perception within society of what may or
may not be retrievable is likely to vary with the levels of technological
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ability and the incentives for retrieval.
One result of reprocessing and recycling plutonium is that only about
one hundredth of the plutonium that would otherwise have to be stored in
spent fuel is discharged in the HL and TRU waste. The plutonium in an unre-
processed spent fuel assembly would take almost two hundred thousand years
longer to decay to any given level than the plutonium discharged in the HL
and TRU waste that would otherwise be generated by reprocessing that assembly
and recycling the recovered plutonium. The implication sometimes drawn from
this is that reprocessing irradiated fuel and subsequent fissioning of about
99 percent of the contained plutonium is advantageous from a long-term waste
management perspective. This may be true, but the argument is not so simple.
For instance, irradiation in an LWR of a fuel assembly whose fissile
enrichment is provided by recycled plutonium results in the production of more
than ten times as much of the higher actinides (mainlyamericium and curium) as
is produced by the equivalent irradiation of an assembly enriched in uranium-235.3
Unless these isotopes--all of which either are themselves long-lived or decay
to other long-lived species--are extracted from the waste and eliminated, part
of the long-term management advantage disappears. Furthermore, it has already
been noted that a decision to reprocess and recycle plutonium, combined with
the development of a breeder, would allow nuclear fission to become a long-
term energy option. Therefore, rather than making the very long-term compari-
son on the basis of a single assembly, it would perhaps be more reasonable to
compare the implications of storing the spent fuel accumulated during a
short-term nuclear option with those of storing HL and TRU waste generated
during the development of a long-term breeder-based nuclear power industry.
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Reprocessing: The Closed Fuel Cycle
Having outlined some of the important issues arising from a decision
not to reprocess, we now turn to the radioactive waste implications of the
alternative. The discussion continues under the assumption that a decision
to reprocess spent fuel is accompanied by a decision to recycle uranium and,
sooner or later, plutonium. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion assumes
plutonium recovery occurs during reprocessing.
From a waste management perspective, this route could be viewed as
increasing the complexity of subsequent operations. Before reprocessing,
almost all of the fission product and transuranic radionuclides are retained
within the spent fuel assemblies by the cladding. Reprocessing involves
chopping up the fuel,releasing fission product gases, leaching out the spent
fuel core material from the cladding hulls with nitric acid, and subjecting
the fuel solution to a series of chemical extractions designed to recover and
purify uranium and plutonium. Each of these operations results in additional
dissemination of the radionuclides originally contained in the spent fuel and
the consequent generation of many waste streams with different physical forms
and chemical compositions. However, it must be remembered that during repro-
cessing almost all of the by-product plutonium is extracted. As noted in
Chapter 2, plutonium is extremely radiotoxic, has a half-life of about 24,000
years, and is a major contributor to the long-term risk from post-fission wastes.
After extraction it may be recycled and fissioned into shorter-lived fission
products.
A brief review of the HL and TRU waste steams generated during repro-
cessing follows, with the emphasis on waste management.
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After the chopping and leaching, the pieces of fuel cladding (hulls)
remain undissolved. In addition, residual traces of undissolved spent fuel
remain on the cladding hulls. Up to 0.1 percent of the fission products and
actinides are trapped in this way. The chop and leach operation results in
the release of gaseous wastes.
Plutonium and uranium are extracted from the nitric acid fuel leach
solution into an organic solvent. The aqueous solution remaining after this
first cycle co-extraction of uraniumand plutonium is the principal component
of the HL waste stream. The major constituents of HL waste are the fission
products and the actinides. Over 99 percent of all the non-volatile fission
products contained in the spent fuel appear in the HL waste. It is expected
that approximately 0.5 percent of the uranium and plutonium contained in the
spent fuel will not be recovered. Thus, this fraction will appear mainly
in the HL waste stream, together with almost all of the other actinides (the
important ones being neptunium, americium,and curium.)*
The properties that are important in the subsequent handling of
the HL waste stream are the thermal power and the curies of radioactivity
generated by decaying fission products and actinides, and the neutron emission
rate from spontaneous fission. It should also be noted that the chemical
form of the liquid HL waste stream is a nitric acid solution.
Finally, solid TRU waste in addition to the cladding hulls and assembly
pieces emerges during the course of reprocessing. This waste may be divided into
a number of different categories: combustible trash; non-combustible solids;
slurries, sludges and resins from water clean-up; and filters from gas clean-up.**
*An AEC report has stated that 99.5% recoveries of uranium and plutonium repre-
sent the practical limits of the reprocessing methods currently in use.7 State-
ments such as this, combined with empirical evidence from the Nuclear Fuel
Services reprocessing plant which did not achieve these recovery efficiencies,
lead some observers to feel that expectations of a 99.5% recovery are unduly
optimistic.
**Large volumes of low activity aqueous waste are also generated during repro-
cessing. Only trape mln titifi nf n-nmoln-r- ^ i4- -ik 4 · lA*
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At this point, a brief digression is appropriate. Modifications can
be made to existing procedures or equipment that facilitate the management of
wastes generated during reprocessing. These may not, strictly speaking, be
considered as waste treatment technologies since, rather than actually handling
waste streams, the waste management problem is affected in its gestation period.
The major thrust of improvements currently being considered is to develop "low
chemical additive" flowsheets, and wherever possible to avoid unnecessary
secondary waste streams.8 The quantity and variety of wastes generated is
thus minimized and the chemical composition aids subsequent operations.
This general principle--prevention rather than correction--may be
extended beyond reprocessing to all sources of radioactive wastes in the fuel
cycle. It is impossible to avoid completely the generation of waste as long
as there is fission, but much can be done to affect the type of waste that
is generated.
Commercial HL Waste
Now let us focus on commercial HL waste. The structure of the following
discussion corresponds to the decision scheme in Figure 3.1 (on page 3-3). It
should be re-emphasized that the order in which these decisions are actually
made will not necessarily be the same as the order in which they are pre-
sented here.
Waste Partitioning
After reprocessing, the next strategic decision is whether or not to
alter the chemical composition of the HL waste that emerges. Any operation
which changes the waste composition will take place in the liquid phase. This
step will therefore almost certainly precede waste solidification, since
performing further radioisotope extraction operations directly after reproces-
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sing seems more sensible than first solidifying the waste, subsequently re-
dissolving it,and then changing the waste composition.* However, in the future
a revised sequence may, for as yet unknown reasons, become attractive.
Both radioisotope extraction and solidification will occur at the
reprocessing plant site since the transportation of liquid HL waste is pro-
hibited for safety reasons. Such a prohibition is appropriate since the risks
of transport in liquid form outweigh the gains, if any, of waste treatment off-
site.
Why should the HL waste composition be altered after it emerges from the
reprocessing plant? Two different rationales are proposed. First, the removal
of certain radioisotopes from the waste may facilitate subsequent waste storage
and disposal. Extraction for this purpose is generally referred to as "waste
partitioning." Second, the waste contains isotopes that could be recovered and
used in other applications. Extraction for this purpose may be called "isotope
mining." Of course, waste partitioning and isotope mining are not mutually
exclusive, since an isotope might, for example, be partitioned to reduce long-
term risks from the waste and might also have commercial value.
With respect to partitioning, we observe that spent fuel reprocessing
technology is governed by the law of diminishing returns. With available
technology, it is not likely that it will pay to extract more than about
99.5 percent of the uranium and plutonium from the spent fuel. The extra
cost of more complete extraction would more than offset the value of the energy
in the fuel material recovered by the effort.9 Therefore, as previously noted,
the HL waste contains about 0.5 percent of the plutonium and uranium contained
in the spent fuel as well as almost all of the fission products and transuranic
actinides apart from plutonium. In this regard, it should also be pointed out
*It may be necessary to store the liquid HlL waste temporarily to allow
further radioactive decay before the extractions take place.
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that even if economic constraints did not apply and the sole reason for
recovering plutonium were to reduce its contribution to the long-term risk in
HL waste, it would still not be worthwhile to recover more than about 99.5 per-
cent of the plutonium. This limit on recoveryis due to the fact that the 0.5
percent remaining is eventually augmented by a similar amount that "grows" into
the waste from the decay of the transplutonic actinides americium and curium.
To increase the plutonium recovery efficiency while leaving the other actinides
in the waste would, therefore, be illogical.
All isotopes of the actinide elements in HL waste either have long
half-lives or eventually decay (perhaps via one or more intermediates) to
other isotopes with long half-lives. "Long" here can be taken to mean
thousands of years. On the other hand, almost all of the fission products have
much shorter half-lives and take much less time to decay to innocuous levels.
(Iodine-129 and technecium-99 are two of the exceptions, with half-lives of
17 million and 212 thousand years, respectively.) The rationale for par-
titioning is as follows: if HL waste can be divided into fractions according
to half-life, the flexibility of subsequent waste storage and disposal opera-
tions will be increased, since it will then not be necessary to isolate all
the waste from the biosphere for the length of time dictated by the toxic
lifetime of the longest-lived radionuclide present in the unpartitioned
stream. Therefore, if the actinides and perhaps the long-lived fission-products
can be partitioned from the HL waste, the residual fission product waste will
probably need to be isolated from the biosphere for only about one thousand
years. This is a long time in human history, but a relatively short time
in geologic terms. It is short enough to be confident about the continuing
integrity of the geologic formation in which the waste is stored.
The long-lived fraction partitioned from HL waste might then be eliminated.
Transmutation and extra-terrestrial disposal have been proposed as elimination methods.
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The former would essentially convert long-lived radionuclides into shorter-lived
ones, and the latter would provide an isolation method of cosmic proportions.
Both alternatives are still in an early stage of development and are not
likely to play more than a peripheral role in waste management planning in
the near future.
Strontium-90 and cesium-137 have also been suggested as candidates for
partitioning from HL waste, since these isotopes contribute about 90 percent
of the activity in the spent fuel after a few years of cooling and continue to
dominate for the first several hundred years. During this time they are the
most important heat emitters, dictating the thermal design of the waste storage
repository. However, removal would not materially reduce the potential hazard
posed by these radioisotopes since it is impractical to apply either nuclear
transmutation or extra-terrestrial disposal methods to them.
Methods to partition the long-lived radionuclides with sufficiently high
extraction efficiencies have not yet been demonstrated, but the indications are
that if they are feasible they will also be expensive. The same holds for the
additional fuel cycle operations that would be necessary for the transmutation
option and the space technology required for extra-terrestrial disposal.
Furthermore, these new steps would introduce new, short-term, operational risks
and would also generate new secondary waste streams containing long-lived
radioisotopes. While the total quantity of these radioisotopes would be reduced,
they would be more widely distributed in waste streams other than HL waste.
Assessment of the partitioning/transmutation and partitioning/extra-
terrestrial disposal options will be a difficult task, since it involves com-
paring the potential benefits of a reduction in risk that will not begin to
take place for almost a thousand years with the increased costs and short-term
risks of the technologies that must be implemented if this is to be achieved.
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Turning to isotope mining of HL waste, the production of isotopes as
by-products of the nuclear power program will far exceed the amounts required
for applications in most cases. The management of the residual waste will
be effectively unchanged. Furthermore, use of the radioactive isotopes that
are mined defers, but does not eliminate, their contribution to the waste
problem, since they must eventually be disposed of unless they have decayed
to harmless levels during the period of their use. Indeed, waste management
may be complicated further, since the radiotoxicity (and sometimes the chemical
toxicity) of these isotopes requires their use to be tightly controlled.
Waste Solidification
Whether or not some isotopes are extracted after reprocessing, the liquid
HL waste stream is a hazard if it is not handled and processed properly. Soli-
dification immobilizes the waste and reduces its volume, thereby diminishing
the potential hazard.
Current regulations require solidification to take place no later than
five years after the liquid HL waste is generated at a commercial reprocessing
plant. A number of different types of solidified product are proposed, each
of which can be prepared by a number of different chemical processes. Despite
this proliferation of means and ends, solidification technology is already
quite well developed, and some of the processes have been extensively applied.
Calcination has been used to solidify some U.S. military HL waste for over a
decade. Calcined waste is, however, quite leachable. For this reason it is
probably unsuitable for long-term waste disposition. Methods to produce
vitrified waste have therefore been developed. The final product of vitri-
fication is a glassy matrix containing waste. It is highly leach resistant
and is regarded as being well suited for long-term isolation of waste. The
technology for other solidifed waste forms, for example, supercalcine, metal
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matrix, glass ceramic and coated pellet, is at an earlier stage of development.
It has been suggested that, instead of solidification, HL waste might
be disposed of simply by injecting it in liquid form into suitable rock for-
mations. The decay heat from the waste would be sufficient to melt the sur-
rounding rock. As the waste continued to decay, the molten rock-waste would
eventually solidify, thus immobilizing the waste in a stable, non-leachable form.
This in situ melting concept for liquid HL waste disposal could only be utilized
if the reprocessing plantwere sited above a suitable geologic formation, unless
the present regulations are changed to permit transport of liquid HL waste.
The concept is not generally favored, perhaps because it is so unequivocally
irretrievable from the outset. It is worth noting at this stage that the
in situ melting concept has also been proposed for the disposal of solid HL
waste. Similar considerations apply, except that in this case collocation of
the reprocessing plant and disposal site would not be required.
Interim Retrievable Storage
The next major decision concerns retrievable storage of solid HL waste
in surface or near-surface storage facilities. After the waste is solidified
and suitably packaged, it can be transported either to a permanent storage or
disposal site directly, or first to an interim storage facility and then, at
some later date, to a final resting place. Interim retrievable storage con-
cepts place the responsibility for waste isolation on man-made systems maintained
under appropriate surveillance. As noted previously for storage of unre-
processed spent fuel, "interim" generally is used to mean a period of up to 100
years.
The idea of interim retievable storage of HL waste has had a checkered
history. The present situation is that an earlier decision to construct an
interim storage facility for the waste has been reversed,and it is now planned
to transport solidified HL waste directly to a permanent storage/disposal
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site. However, the retrievable storage concept may still be revived. Water-
cooled basins, air-cooled vaults,and concrete surface silos have all been
proposed as storage methods.
Interim retrievable storage of HL waste allows time for the development
of new, improved permanent disposition technologies. Actinide partioning-elimi-
nation schemes could also be developed during a period of interim storage. If
the stored wastes are in solid form, however, subsequent redissolution for
the purposes of partitioning could prove to be either technically unfeasible
or too costly.
It is argued by some that, apart from the development of partitioning
which would reduce the time required for waste isolation, scientific and tech-
nological progress that will take place during a period of interim storage
will not reduce significantly the long-term risk of permanent and probably
irretrievable disposition in geologic formations. If this is true then the
incentives for a period of retrievable storage are greatly reduced. The same
conclusion can be drawn by those who argue that there is already enough technical
evidence to show that the risk presented by isolation in geologic formations
is acceptably low. Furthermore, it is argued that even if significant progress
is made during the interim period, society at that point may be unable to
find the resources to retrieve the waste and store it permanently, if this is
then regarded as desirable. The prospect of societal collapse is also invoked
in this context. There is no reason to expect such social disintegration to
wait until the permanent disposition of radioactive waste has been completed.
Others feel that a decision now to select and implement a final dis-
position method--a decision based on the supposition that current knowledge
is adequate and unlikely to be improved significantly in the future--must be
avoided. They argue that, despite the additional responsibility that is in-
volved, future generations would prefer to be in a position to make waste
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management choices of their own, rather than to witness passively the ir-
reversible consequences of a previous decision. But, of course, the implied
assumption here is that our current assessment of what constitutes "irretrieva-
bility" will be shared by future generations, whereas it may be that recovery
of waste from what would today be considered an irretrievable state might not
present insurmountable obstacles for the increased technological capabilities
of future generations, if such a task were then perceived to be necessary.
Nevertheless, the argument is sometimes extended to propose the viability of
a "permanent" retrievable storage option. Because of the limited time for which
a single storage facility can retain its retrievability property, "permanent"
retrievability can only be retained by continual renewal and replacement
of the systems used to isolate the waste--a burden that is justified, in the
minds of the proponents, by the fact that in a sense all options continue to
remain open in successive generations.
The trade-offs between the essentially irretrievable option of permanent
geologic disposition and retrievable storage as a permanent strategy centers on
the question of where reliance should be placed: on our existing ability to
predict the evolution of geologic history over the next million years or so, or
on the ability and motivation of future generations to manage the waste safely.
From a different perspective one might argue that,in the case of permanent
retrievable storage, primary reliance is placed on the present and continuing
ability to predict the evolution of human history over much shorter periods.
In this case, because of the periodic renewal of storage facilities that
would be necessary, the time scales for prediction are measured in hundreds
rather than thousands of years.
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The distinction between immediate and essentially irretrievable geologic
disposition and a period of (or perhaps "permanent") retrievable storage is
not as clear-cut as has been presented above. For instance, an inter-
mediate concept would involve emplacing the waste in an engineered retrievable
storage facility constructed within a deep geologic formation. The advantages
claimed previously for retrievability would be retained, and, in addition, the
geologic formation would provide a safety barrier over and above the man-made,
primary containment. The man-made containment would be necessary for the
retrievability provision and it might perhaps be expected to survive for up
to a hundred years, or considerably longer if maintained and periodically
renewed. The geologic formation could provide long-term containment if, at
any stage, society were unable to continue to maintain the facility. Be-
sides, the concept would be less susceptible to the disruption
that might be caused by terrorist or military attack that is claimed to be a
significant disadvantage of surface or near-surface storage facilities.
On the other hand, the cost of constructing and maintaining such an
interim retrievable facility would certainly be greater than either the cost
of a permanent geologic repository with no provision for retrievability or
the cost of a retrievable storage facility located at or near the surface; and
the risks to operating personnel might be greater than for either of the other
two concepts. Furthermore, in spite of the extra degree of containment that
would be provided in such a facility, the concern that has been expressed as
to the adequacy of the sealing process in geologic repository concepts would
be aggravated, since, by definition, if the waste were to be retrievable,
access would have to be retained.
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Permanent Disposition of HL Waste
Many persons with diverse backgrounds believe that the most important
decision to be made in developing a radioactive waste management system is
the choice of a permanent disposition method. It is easy to understand why:
the waste must be isolated from man and the environment for as long as it will
present a potential radiological hazard.
Unfortunately, one characteristic of choosing a permanent disposal
method is that we can never know whether we have chosen safely, since such a
long period of time is likely to elapse before errors in judgment or mistakes
in implementation show up. However, this feature of decision making regarding
permanent waste disposition appears more extraordinary than it really is.
Most major social decisions are made under large uncertainty and affect a
separate distribution of benefits, costs,and risks within a society geographically
and/or economically, if not across long stretches of time.
Here, we are concerned with what may be done to minimize the risk
that something actually will go wrong.
A technical consensus appears to have been reached to the effect that the
best place to isolate HL waste is under the earth's surface. The major debate
concerns which areas of the earth's surface and which underground geologic
formations are the most suitable. Continental land masses, the ocean floor,
and polar ice caps are proposed as suitable areas. Since these three areas
together include most of the surface of the earth, we must be more specific.
On land, a number of different geologic formations are being considered.
Rock salt has been a candidate for over two decades. HL waste disposal in
salt formations continues to be the favored alternative within the U.S.
government. Hard, insoluble crystalline rock formations such as granite
and basalt are in some ways preferable to plastically flowing, water-soluble
salt, but in other respects they are less desirable. The same applies to for-
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mations of shale or sandstone.
More than two-thirds of the earth's surface is covered by the oceans.
Some areas of the ocean's deep seabed are geologically and seismically stable,
are remote, and are biologically relative unproductive. These areas are, more-
over, separated from man's immediate environment by huge volumes of a diluting
medium. Thus, the deep seabed contains possible sites for HL waste repositories.
The disposal concept is not ocean dumping, but rather controlled emplacement of
solidified, packaged, HL waste in either the argillaceous sediment or the
underlying basaltic bedrock. The engineering capability to perform the required
ocean floor operations is quite highly developed. Therefore, seabed disposal
appears technically feasible. However, more knowledge is needed concerning
the physical, chemical,and biological mechanisms by which radionuclides in HL
waste could be released from the repository and transported through the seabed
and into the marine environment.
HL waste storage or disposal in or under the Antarctic ice sheet is an
alternative that is currently not considered as attractive as deep continental
or seabed disposal. Most of the schemes envisioned would allow the waste to
melt its way through the ice sheet, eventually coming to rest either at the
ice-rock interface or within the bedrock itself. Other concepts include the
construction of an interim surface storage facility which, after decommissioning,
would become covered with snow and would subsequently sink through the ice
towards the bedrock.
The previous discussion has focused on the technological implications
of the decision sequences involved in the implementation of various commercial
HL waste management strategies. Some of the more important risks, costs,and
benefits arising from these decisions have been identified. An in-depth com-
parison, based on detailed and comprehensive studies, will be necessary to
provide the foundation for choosing which particular strategy or strategies
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should be implemented.
Military HL Waste
This section discusses the military HL waste situation and various
ways in which it might be handled in the future. First, we discuss what may
be done with the waste that has already accumulated. Then we consider the
alternatives available for managing military HL waste generated in the
future. The majority of the future waste will come from the continuing plutonium
production program. The division is somewhat artificial, since management
policy for waste in prospect is heavily influenced by previous practices.
Nevertheless, by structuring the discussion this way, it is easier to focus
on the important waste management issues. Figure 3.2 (on page 3-4) shows
diagrammatically the management strategies currently applicable for mili-
tary HL waste.
Existing Waste Treatment
In Chapter 2, the quantities of existing military HL waste were briefly
outlined. This information will now be augmented.
By the early 1980's, it is estimated that approximately 65 million
gallons of HL waste will exist in solid form. An additional 9 million gallons
will be "in process" as liquid that is being allowed to decay before solidifi-
10
cation and liquid that cannot be solidified with present technology. At the
present time, 72 percent of the military HL waste is stored at Hanford, 25
11
percent at Savannah River, and 3 percent at Idaho Falls. These ratios will
not change appreciably by the early 1980's.
At Savannah River and Hanford, with the exception of the HL waste pro-
duced in the very early reprocessing plants that have long since been shut
down, almost all HL waste is originally generated in acid form. Acid liquid
HL waste must be stored in stainless steel tanks. In the immediate post-World
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War II years stainless steel was expensive and not easy to obtain. The
decision was therefore made to neutralize the wastes. This substantially
increases the liquid waste volume and causes most of the more radioactive
isotopes (with the exception of cesium-137) to precipitate out in a sludge.
Nevertheless, neutralized waste can be stored in carbon steel tanks. These
were (and still are) cheaper than stainless steel tanks, and were therefore
used for storing the sludge and liquid after generation. The lifetime of
carbon steel tanks was shorter than expected and leaks occurred.
One possible way to deal with the leaks would have been to reduce the
working lifetime of the tanks. This could be done by building new ones and
periodically transferring waste from one tank to another. An alternative
procedure would be to solidify the waste. The leaks would be stopped. Further-
more, since solidification reduces volume, extra storage space would be created
in existing tanks. The latter alternative was cheaper, and it was selected.
Solidification of neutralized liquid HL waste is achieved by evaporating
it down to a damp salt cake. Evaporation does not solidify all of the liquid,
however, and there is always a quantity of residual liquor remaining. (Before
solidifying the Hanford waste it is necessary to partition most of the principal
heat-emitting isotopes, strontium-90 and cesium-137, since the tanks in which the
solidified waste is stored, unlike those at Savannah River, are not equipped with
cooling coils. These isotopes are encapsulated in solid form and currently stored .n
water basins.) The solidification program will not reach a steady state until
the early 1980's, by which time there will be nearly 500,000 tons of residual
solids in the tanks.1 2
What should be done with these solids? Should they remain where they
are or should they be removed?
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One possible course of action is to leave them where they are without
further treatment. It is practically certain that such a plan would be
deemed unacceptable. Salt cake is extremely soluble, the carbon steel tanks
are corroding, and the arrangement would provide reliable containment for no
more than a few decades. Another alternative is to leave the solids in the
tanks and treat them further. The salt cake might be converted into a form
less susceptible to leaching. Then the tanks might be covered with asphalt
or concrete to make them more inaccessible to water and living organisms.
If the solids are to be removed from the tanks, the problem of extrac-
tion must be faced. Two methods are currently being considered. Neither
seems very attractive. High-pressure water jets might be used to sluice out
the partially dissolved solids. Such a procedure would not be suitable for the
many tanks (particularly at Hanford) that are cracked because dissolution of
the salt would reopen the previously blocked cracks and cause still more
leakage. Alternatively, the solid salt cake might be dug out of the tanks--a
risky procedure made more difficult because access to the tanks is currently
limited to a few narrow vent pipes. Furthermore, the excavation work would in-
crease the risk of releasing airborne radioactivity.
After it is removed, what should be done with the salt cake? It will
probably require further treatment to produce a solid form that is more suitable
for permanent disposition. The technology required for this step is not yet
developed. It is not clear whether there is a form that fulfills the dual
requirements of long-term stability and the ability to be produced from salt
cake.
Finally, the costs of treatment and removal of existing military HL
waste from tanks at Hanford and Savannah River must be mentioned. Cost
'Z
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storage is not suitable for commercial HL waste.
Management of Future Wastes: Short-Term
Major modifications to existing management practices for HL waste at
Idaho Falls do not appear necessary in the immediate future. The important de-
cisions yet to be taken concern the post-calcination steps and apply equally
to existing and future waste.
This is not the case at Hanford and Savannah River. The root of the pre-
sent problem--and its magnitude is considerable--seems to have been the initial
decision to neutralize the acid waste. This practice continues. The issue is:
should future acid HL waste be neutralized? At this stage, it is helpful to
briefly compare a neutralized waste/salt cake system with an acid waste/calcine
system.
As discussed previously, the initial decision to neutralize was based
on the availability and cost of carbon steel compared to stainless steel. The
former is still cheaper than the latter, but it should also be remembered that
neutralization results in a significant increase in volume so that the tankage
required for acid storage is less than for storage as a neutralized solution.
In addition, the lifetime of stainless steel tanks is longer than that of carbon
steel tanks used for waste torage purposes.
Solidification technology is different for the two systems. Calcined
waste, although not suitable for long-term storage because of its leachability,
is a satisfactory base from which to produce glasses and other more suitable
forms. Calcination of acid waste has taken place routinely since 1963. On
the other hand, it is not possible to calcine neutralized wastes with present
technology, and the evaporation/crystallization method used to solidify waste
at Savannah River and Hanford is not entirely satisfactory. In addition,
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estimates vary over a wide range from $2 to $20 billion dollars just to
prepare the existing military HL waste inventory at Hanford and Savannah
River for permanent disposition. Two conclusions seem appropriate: (1)
The cost of managing military HL waste is likely to be greater than the cost
of commercial waste management for quite some time to come. (2) In radioactive
waste management, the longer term consequences of decisions made only on the
basis of short-term considerations can be enormous. It should also be
remembered that "longer term" here means about 50 years--a very small frac-
tion of the toxic lifetime of the waste.
With regard to existing solid HL waste, the situation at Idaho Falls is
significantly different from Hanford and Savannah River. At this site, the
acid waste has not been neutralized. Instead, it has been stored temporarily
in stainless steel tanks, from which there have been no eaks. Since the open-
ing of the waste calcination facility in 1963, it has been processed to form
a dry granular solid called waste calcine. The calcined waste is stored in
stainless steel bins partially underground. The lifetime of these bins is
estimated to be several hundred years.
Calcined waste, however, is relatively leachable. Bin storage cannot
therefore be relied upon to provide adequate isolation for the toxic lifetime
of the waste. Thus the question of when to begin removal will have to be
settled. Unlike the situation at Hanford and Savannah River, the removal of
solid wastes from storage bins will not be a very difficult technical opera-
tion. In view of the technical similarity between the waste produced at
Idaho Falls and that from the commercial power reactor program (they are
both retained in acid form and then calcined), the waste management deci-
sions made for each should presumably be consistent. For example, it would
not seem consistent to decide upon an extended period of storage for calcined
waste in bins at Idaho Falls and also decide that retrievable engineered
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most suitable long-term strategy for the waste has yet been made. Indeed,
the period of formal deliberation that will precede this decision, beginning
with a presentation of the available technical alternatives, is scheduled to
be initiated in 1977. Considerable delay is possible, perhaps likely, in view
of the costs involved.
After HL solid waste has been removed from the tanks and converted into
a different form, it is necessary to decide on a site for final disposition
and then to package and transport the waste to the site chosen. (Retrievable
interim storage is also a possibility, but it would be an additional, costly
stage in an already very costly program, and, depending on the performance of
the existing temporary storage facilities over the next few decades, it might
also be unnecessary.) The location could be either on or off the tank storage
site. At the moment, on-site disposition seemsunlikely. Earlier AEC efforts
to establish the feasibility of on-site geologic disposal of the solidified HL
waste at both Hanford and Savannah River were suspended some time ago.* The
alternative off-site permanent disposition methods for solidified military HL
waste are similar to those for solidified commercial waste. However, alter-
natives that are international in scope, specifically deep seabed and ice
sheet disposal, may not be available for military waste disposal if other
governments raise political and legal objections.
Demonstration of Permanent HL Waste Repository
ERDA has recently initiated its National Waste Terminal Storage Program,
in which the current research and development phase of radioactive waste dis-
posal activities will evolve into a system capable of dealing with the final
*Recent reports indicate, however, that investigations at Hanford have resumed. 14
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salt cake is more soluble than calcine and is clearly not suitable for long-
term storage. A method for converting it into a less leachable form such as
glass has not yet been demonstrated on a commercial scale, and it will be a
difficult problem to solve. The volume of salt cake per unit of spent fuel
reprocessed is significantly greater than the corresponding volume of calcine
produced by an identical amount of spent fuel. Finally, calcined waste in bins
at Idaho is much more retrievable than salt cake, especially the material in
the flawed tanks at Hanford.
With this comparison in mind, we may consider the question of whether or
not to continue to neutralize future HL waste at Hanford and Savannah River.
At Hanford, the military production of plutonium is gradually being phased out.
Of the nine production reactors that have operated at one time or another
over the past thirty years, only one is still functioning, and that one will
possibly be shut down within a few years. Therefore, in view of the relatively
small quantity of HL waste that is still to be generated at Hanford, a switch
to an acid waste management system at this stage may be uneconomical. The
Savannah River plant is now the major plutonium production facility in the
u.S.,and itwill continue to generate HL waste in relatively large quantities
for as long as plutonium is required for nuclear weapons. In this case, it may
be preferable to convert to an acid-calcine system. Nevertheless, a recent
assessment, based upon economic estimates to 2000, indicates that it will
be cheaper to continue with an improved neutralization-salt cake system than
it would be to convert to an acid-calcine system.l3
Permanent Disposition: Existing and Future Waste
It is possible that existing military HL waste, in salt cake form, will
be left in existing tanks more or less permanently. No decision as to the
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disposition of HL waste from the nuclear power industryL 5 An integral part of
this program will be the pilot-scale demonstration of a number of HL waste
repositories.
The target date is 1985 for the initial waste repository demonstration
to start. It will begin with the establishment of a pilot facility to be fol-
lowed by expansion, and then, if nothing unforeseen has occurred and the demon-
stration has been successful, conversion into a full-scale federal repository.
The change from an expanded pilot plant to a full-scale federal repository will
be characterized by the foreclosure of the retrievability option. Storage
rooms will be backfilled and sealed. Six sites for pilot repositories are
to be established on a staggered basis, with the first two in salt and ready
to receive waste in 1985, the second two in formations other than salt and
starting operations simultaneously two years later, and the fifth and sixth,
also in formations other than salt, starting in 1989 and 1991.
What are the technical benefits from operation of a pilot-scale plant
before it is converted into a permanent repository? Experience will be gained
in the handling of packaged solid waste; in the construction and operation of
surface and underground facilities for receiving waste; in the emplacement of
waste in the geologic formation; and in the measurement of the physical effects
of waste emplacement caused by heat and radiation fields and mining stresses.
It will, of course, be impossible to "demonstrate", with high assurance of
validity, the capability of the repository to contain HL waste over the period
for which it constitutes a potential radiological hazard. What can be demon-
strated is the ability to receive and emplace solid waste in the repository.
In the technological dimension, confidence in the long-term reliability is
more likely to stem from the geologic and hydrologic measurements preceding
repository site selection. Such measurements are intended to provide reliable
information as to the age and stability of the formation in question.
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What are the possible non-technical benefits from the demonstration?
It seems generally acknowledged that one of the major obstacles to public ac-
ceptance of nuclear power is concern that there is no safe solution to the
radioactive waste problem. It is believed by many that this concern is de-
rived, at least in part, from the absence of a demonstrated permanent waste
repository. It seems reasonable to conclude that one of the most important
purposes intended by the waste repository demonstration "on a timely basis"
(i.e., in operation by 1985) is to increase public confidence.
But what worries the public about the disposal of radioactive waste?
It is the concern that, in pursuit of our objectives of providing ourselves
with energy and security, we might also be responsible for harm inflicted on
one or more generations far into the future by failing to provide adequate
isolation of this radiologically hazardous material.
Assuming the demonstration is successful within its limitations, what
will it help to achieve in public confidence? It is possible that a demon-
stration will satisfy the public that the task of radioactive waste management
can be dealt with safely. But if this occurs, the demonstration will have
created an "illusion of certainty" (to quote Kenneth Boulding's phrase). Even
those who have great confidence in the ability of our society to dispose of
radioactive waste in a safe manner would not claim that the operation of
a waste repository for a few years will, in itself, provide substantial evidence
to support a conclusion that the waste is very unlikely to harm man or the
environment thousands of years in the future. Should we proceed on the basis
of such an illusion of certainty in the public mind, even if the illusion is
not shared by those in authority?
Another possibility is that the general public becomes more sophisticated
in its ability to make judgments on the basis of technical and probabilistic in-
formation, and the predominant view will be that the risks of radioactive waste
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disposal are acceptable. If such a development actually takes place, the pub-
lic will be unlikely to regard the demonstration as being of the utmost signi-
ficance as an input into a long-term decision-making process. A third pos-
sibility is that there will be a public reaction against what is seen as an
attempt to manipulate opinion with the demonstration. In this event, the
obstacle which the radioactive waste problem poses to public acceptance of
nuclear power will become even greater. It may be concluded from this discus-
sion that it would be unwise to rely too heavily on the successful demonstration
of pilot permanent waste repositories to obtain public acceptance of the
waste management program.
Finally, we consider a related but broader question: what is the optimum
rate of implementing waste management strategies? Technological constraints
such as the time required for research and development, and physical require-
ments for waste handling or lack thereof, enter into the decision. Delays in
commercial reprocessing would permit delays in implementing commercial HL waste
management strategies. But the perceptions of the general public as to the
urgency of demonstrating solutions to radioactive waste problems are also
important, and these do not necessarily correspond to the technical demands of
the Situation. Increasing the rate of implementation may be perceived to be
unsatisfactory, even if it is technologically quite feasible. On the other
hand, the public may begin to equate "no decision" with "no solution", and, to
the extent that the tendency has political significance, its effect will be
to accelerate implementation, leading to the possibility of premature resolution
of issues from a technological viewpoint.
Current public perceptions are complicated by a history of institutional
torpor in which the AEC, influenced by the slow development of commercial
reprocessing, pursued a slowly paced waste management program while perhaps
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failing to recognize the importance of developing an approach that was
generally acceptable to the public, even before it became an immediate tech-
nological requirement. The argument that nuclear power should not be used to
generate electricity until a safe method for long-term radioactive waste dis-
posal had been demonstrated seems to have been largely unanticipated. This is
perhaps understandable in view of the lack of substantial public concern
about military waste management operations during three decades of the build-up
of nuclear armaments.
In any event, ERDA's terminal storage plan, involving the development
of multiple sites and broad public participation in the major decisions, now
appears calculated to balance technological and political factors in demonstra-
ting that there are solutions to the long-term radioactive waste management
problem.*
Commercial TRU Waste
Under existing ERDA standards16 and proposed NRC regulations 7, TRU waste
is defined as low-level waste which is presumed to contain more than ten nano-
curies of long-lived transuranic radioactivity per gram. This definitional
limit is currently being studied and may be revised upward or, possibly, com-
pletely redefined.
Low-level, transuranic contaminated waste (TRU waste) will require more
careful management than other kinds of low-level waste because of the very
long time for which it will remain a radiological hazard. Indeed, assuming
that reprocessing and recycling are introduced using existing process methods,
more than half of the plutonium released in nuclear fuel cycle wastes will be
contained in low-level waste streams . However, although TRU waste contains
*In this regard, it is ironic that TRU waste, rather than HL waste, may be
used in the initial demonstration of a waste repository, which may take place
in a salt formation near Carlsbad, New Mexico.
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at least as much plutonium as HL waste, the plutonium concentration is very
much lower. Nevertheless, in basic policy decisions involving long-term storage
criteria for TRU waste, the quantity of long-lived radionuclides may be given
as much emphasis as the concentration.
TRU waste streams of three types--non-combustible solid, combustible
solid and liquid--are generated by three stages of the commercial fuel cycle--
reprocessing, the conversion of liquid plutonium nitrate to solid plutonium
oxide, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication. Measured by the amount of plutonium
contained in TRU waste per unit of electric power produced, TRU waste is
created in these three stages at roughly the same rate. 9 In similar units,
each type of TRU waste--combustible and non-combustible solids and liquid--is
produced at approximately the same rate. These two facts imply that all TRU
waste streams from all TRU waste producing stages of the fuel cycle should
receive roughly equal attention.
With this brief introduction in mind, we will discuss the major TRU
waste management decisions. As with HL waste management, all decisions are
interdependent.
The management of TRU waste can be affected by operational changes
at the points of generation. As in the case of HL waste management, this
concept is one of prevention rather than correction. For instance, the ef-
ficiencies of plutonium recovery at the reprocessing plant* and plutonium
utilization at the mixed oxide fuel fabrication plant could both be improved,
so that less plutonium is lost in the TRU waste streams. The argument used
earlier for plutonium recovery from HL waste involving the law of diminishing
returns applies here. It may be economic to remove part of the plutonium
contained in some TRU waste and recycle it to reactors. But in order to
*For convenience, the nitrate-oxide conversion facility will now be considered
as part of the reprocessing plant. In practice, the two functions, reprocessing
and conversion, will essentially be combined into one process flowsheet.
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obtain a significant reduction in the long-term environmental risks from these
wastes, it will be necessary to achieve a higher recovery efficiency. The
cost of these operations will not match the value of the extra fuel obtained
as a result. It therefore seems likely that the reprocessor and fabricator
would require some form of encouragement--a government subsidy as a carrot or
regulatory standard as a stick--if these improvements are to be achieved.
Similar considerations apply to the flowsheet modifications that could be
made at reprocessing and mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants to make the
physical form and chemical composition of the TRU wastes more suitable for
subsequent waste management operations.
The issue of improved plutonium recovery is related to the HL waste
partitioning question. The ability of waste partitioning to reduce the long-term
risk of HL waste management has already been discussed. Since the amounts of
long-lived radionuclides in unpartitioned HL waste and untreated TRU waste are
similar for each unit of electricity produced, it could be argued that a decision
taken to partition HL waste, if consistent, would have to be accompanied by a
decision to remove enough of the transuranics (mostly plutonium) from the TRU
waste to achieve a corresponding reduction in long-term risks.
Transuranic recovery from TRU waste would precede or follow a number
of other treatment steps. For instance, sorting and shredding followed by
incineration of combustible waste produces a residue (or ash) that can be
processed for plutonium recovery. An incentive for incineration (or some
other method of combustion) is the volume reduction that is achieved. Re-
duction factors varying between 20 and 50 are claimed for the different
processes. Mechanical compaction can also be used to reduce the as-generated
volume of both combustible and non-combustible solids.
In view of the great variation in TRU waste streams generated in re-
processing and mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants, it is not surprising that
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there are a great many different treatment technologies. Some of them are
still at an early stage of development, probably because the commercial
nuclear industry has not begun to generate TRU waste in significant quantities,
and until recently TRU and non-TRU low-level wastes were not distinguished in
management operations involving military and research and development waste.
Others are equally applicable to TRU and non-TRU wastes, and certain of
these have been used routinely for some time. A substantial proportion of
these generally applicable non-high-level waste treatment technologies has not
yet been introduced into commercial waste management systems.
Nevertheless, all of these technologies are designed to achieve one or
more of the following objectives: the creation of a waste form with good long-
term storage properties; volume reduction; the reduction of short-term risks.
In all cases, the importance of minimizing secondary waste stream production is
clear, since each operation involving the handling of radioactive materials tends
to disseminate the radionuclides in the feed stream among a number of different
output streams.
The final two stages in TRU waste management--each of which bears di-
rectly on the long-term risk posed by this waste--are immobilization and final
disposition. They must combine to prevent the migration of radionuclides from
TRU waste to the biosphere. Again, in view of the wide variety of TRU waste forms,
there will be a number of applicable immobilization technologies.
It is becoming increasingly likely that the long-term isolation cri-
teria that will be applied to HL waste will also be applied to TRU waste.
The logic behind this trend is based on the realization that the amounts of
long-lived radioactivity in these two waste categories are comparable, although
the concentrations are, of course, significantly different. Decisions con-
cerning the permanent disposition of HL and TRU wastes will be closely related,
and the options presented in the section on HL waste are applicable.
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Military TRU Waste
Military TRU waste comes principally from two sources--plutonium sepa-
ration from irradiated plutonium production reactor fuel and the fabrication
of nuclear weapons. Information concerning the latter is classified. As
has already been mentioned, until 1970 TRU waste under the jurisdiction of
the old AEC (most of which had a military origin) was emplaced in shallow
burial grounds with no provision for retrieval. Since then, TRU waste at
ERDA (formerly AEC) burial sites has been stored retrievably above ground.
Taking the long-term perspective, particularly with regard to permanent
disposition, it seems unjustifiable to manage the military and commercial TRU
wastes so that the risks posed by one will be greater than those posed by
the other. The waste must be managed consistently, regardless of origin. In
the case of the weapons fabrication waste this may present security-related
problems. But these difficulties can be solved administratively, and they
should not obscure the fundamental waste management issue--the long-term nature
of the risk.
Conclusions
From the preceding discussion of radioactive waste management strategies,
the following conclusions emerge.
1. The decision whether or not to reprocess commercial power reactor
fuel has fundamental importance for the future development of nuclear fission
as a source of energy. Nuclear fission is likely to be a long-term energy
option only with reprocessing and successful breeder reactor development.
Either the uranium/plutonium, or the thorium/uranium-233 fuel cycle, or a com-
bination of both, is possible as a long-term fission energy option, but the
uranium/plutonium fuel cycle is the most likely to mature first. With
reprocessing and plutonium recycling in existing commercial LWR's only, the re-
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latively short lifetime of the fission energy option based on the uranium/
plutonium fuel cycle is only marginally extended.
The reprocessing decision may be delayed, and spent fuel discharged
from LWR's may be stored pending the outcome of breeder reactor development
and demonstration efforts now underway. If, however, reprocessing is ruled
out permanently, then the costly breeder reactor development program should be
promptly stopped and the funds and manpower currently devoted to it should be
allocated to development of other long-term energy options instead of nuclear
fission. From another perspective, the top priority assigned to plutonium
breeder reactor development and the continued expenditure of substantial re-
sources in support of that priority in the U.S. (and every other country with
a major nuclear power program) imply that a decision in favor of reprocessing
may have already been made in principle, and that the remaining issues are
when and on what conditions reprocessing should begin.
2. Radioactive waste management is an important, though not in itself
decisive, issue in the reprocessing decision. If commercial spent fuel is
not reprocessed, over the long term it will be a major waste management
problem. Some form of reprocessing may eventually be necessary as a waste
treatment measure, if not to recover uranium and plutonium for use as fuel. If
commercial spent fuel is reprocessed for the purposes of fuel recycling, then
HL and TRU waste streams which emerge principally during reprocessing and
uranium/plutonium mixed oxide fuel fabrication will be interrelated long-term
waste management problems.
3. The decision whether or not to reprocess military fuel was made
at the outset of the U.S. nuclear weapons program in order to obtain plutonium
for use in weapons. From past military plutonium production, the legacy of
liquid and solid accumulations of HL waste in temporary tanks constitutes a
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multi-billion dollar treatment problem before the waste can be safely placed in
a permanent repository.
4. Radioactive waste management operations are interdependent. The risks
and costs of permanent disposition methods affect and are affected by particular
waste solidification, packaging, and other treatment methods. In view of the long-
term risks, essentially all HL and TRU waste, regardless of its commercial or mili-
tary origin, should be eventually destined for one set of government-managed radio-
active waste repositories.
5. Decisions regarding every phase of radioactive waste management must be
made under uncertainty. Research and development can narrow technological un-
certainty. Short-term, small-scale demonstrations of permanent waste repositories
can show that radioactive waste can be safely emplaced in geologic formations,
but little more.
6. Radioactive waste management requires comprehensive strategic planning.
A key issue in such planning is the distribution of risks and costs through time.
The balancing of multiple conflicting objectives may contribute even more to the
difficulty of waste management decision making than the more familiar character-
istic of technological uncertainty. In radioactive waste management, quality of
thought is more important than timeliness in decisions because the current costs
of delay are likely to be much less than the future costs of error. This rea-
soning runs counter to the strong pressure which currently exists for an early
"solution" to the radioactive waste problem.
7. From a technological standpoint, radioactive waste operations require
a fully integrated management framework. The management framework should be
vertically integrated so as to include all operations from temporary waste
storage, through treatment and transport to permanent disposition. The frame-
work should be horizontally integrated to include post-fission HL and TRU wastes
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of both commercial and military origin.
Radioactive waste management will be a continuing challenge for govern-
ment throughout the nuclear age and perhaps for many centuries beyond.
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Chapter 4
EXISTING POLICY, LAW AND ORGANIZATION
Having considered the character of radioactive waste in Chapter 2 and
the range of strategic decisions involved in waste management in Chapter 3, we
are now in a position to analyze in some detail the existing situation in the
U.S. regarding radioactive waste management and regulation. First, the policy
goals are briefly discussed. Next, the organizational structure for management,
regulation, and research and development related to radioactive waste is analyzed.
Finally, the existing situation regarding implementation of radioactive waste
policy is described.
Goals
Present statements of the basic policy goals of radioactive waste
management vary somewhat according to the federal government agency concerned.
The statements of the EPA and ERDA to date have focused mainly on technological
safety. EPA's position is:
Waste management means containment of radioactive materials
until they have decayed to innocuous levels. The objectives
that EPA has are to minimize exposure to present and future
populations and to avoid dilution into the biosphere. 1
ERDA's is similar:
...the effective management of nuclear wastes in a manner which
effectively protects man and his environment... 2
With respect to commercial HL waste in particular, ERDA's objective is:
to provide multiple terminal storage sites on time to receive
solidified waste without inhibiting the power industryo 3
ERDA has acknowledged the importance of broad public participation in the
selection of technological options, so that the options ultimately chosen
will gain broad public acceptance.4
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NRC has set forth the broad goals of its regulatory efforts in these
terms:
1. Isolation of radioactive wastes from man and his environment
for sufficient periods (in some cases hundreds or thousands
of years) to assure public health and safety and preservation
of environmental values.
2. Reduction to as low as reasonably achievable:
a) Risk to the public health both from chronic exposure
associated with waste management operations and possible
accidental releases of radioactive materials from waste
storage, processing, handling or disposal.
b) Long-term social commitments (land-use withdrawal, re-
source commitment, surveillance requirements, committed
site proliferation, etc.)5
NRC has also expressed interest in attaining certain social, economic, and
environmental goals. A recent NRC task force report on radioactive waste goals
and objectives also reflects concern with the institutional arrangements re-
quired for waste management, economic impacts, the foreclosure of future op-
tions, time frames for action, distribution of hazards and benefits, the un-
certainties permeating decision making, and public involvement in waste manage-
ment decisions.6
Organizational Overview
Institutional arrangements are required to carry out waste management
policy. The overall organization must include capacities for three generic
functions: waste management itself, regulation of waste management to assure
safety, and research and development to improve both management and regulation.
We use the term "waste management" to mean the actual performance of
physical and administrative tasks that comprise the proper short- and long-term
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handling of radioactive materials. These activities include temporary storage,
treatment, packaging, transportation, and retrievable storage or permanent
disposition. Retrievable storage and permanent disposition may be termed
"long-term" activities, while all others are "short-term," regardless of
when they occur. Current management responsibilities can be described by con-
sidering in turn each of the four categories of post-fission waste, based on
type and origin within the scope of this report: (1) commercial HL waste;
(2) military HL waste; (3) commercial TRU waste; and (4) military TRU waste.
As we shall see in some detail subsequently, the responsibility for management
is variously divided between ERDA and private industry depending on the type
and origin of post-fission wastes.
The regulatory function includes basically three types of activities:
setting general criteria and specific standards, licensing or approving various
managerial activities (e.g., siting, construction, and operation of facilities),
and monitoring and enforcement related to ongoing operations. Again depending
on the type and origin of post-fission wastes, primary responsibility for
regulation is divided among NRC, ERDA (through self-regulation or regulation of
its contractors), and certain state governments. Supplementing the primary
agencies are the regulatory responsibilities of several "non-nuclear" agencies,
which derive their jurisdiction from legislation on transportation or the
environment.
Contrasted with the complexity of institutions involved in management
and regulation, a single agency--ERDA--is responsible for formulating and con-
ducting or sponsoring the great bulk of radioactive waste research and tech-
nology development.
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Management
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended , and the Energy
Reorganization Act of 19748 , waste management responsibilities are divided
among ERDA and licensees of NRC or Agreement States.9 ERDA personnel, however,
do not actually operate ERDA's waste management facilities: this work is done
almost entirely by ERDA contractors, subject to ERDA management policies.
Thus, when we refer to ERDA or federal "management," we mean such a two-
tiered managerial arrangement.
Commercial HL waste is to be managed by licensees until it is delivered
to ERDA facilities for final disposition. Under current regulations licensees
must solidify liquid HL waste no later than five years after its generation
and must transfer it to an ERDA repository no later than five years after its
10
solidification. Thus private industry is responsible for the short-term
(temporary storage, treatment, packaging, transportation) while the federal
government is responsible for the long-term (retrievable storage or permanent
disposition).
Responsibility for management of military HL waste resulting from
weapons production and naval nuclear propulsion programs is comprehensively
vested in the federal government. The Department of Defense (DOD) is a
relatively minor manager of military waste, since it must handle spent fuel
elements from naval reactors for only limited periods of time, until they are
transferred to ERDA. DOD does not manage HL waste from weapons production,
since ERDA itself produces plutonium for weapons and manufactures the warheads.
As discussed in Chapter 3, it is during plutonium recovery that weapons HL
waste is generated. 1 1
The present law and NRC regulations allow private industry licensees
to have both short- and long-term management responsibilities for commercial
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TRU waste. However, regulations proposed by the former Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC) and inherited as proposals by NRC would alter this situation for
the long-term. The proposed regulations could prohibit burial of any trans-
uranic waste and require licensees to transfer all transuranic waste to
12
federal (i.e., ERDA) facilities within five years of generation. Reso-
lution of certain technical and economic problems with the proposed regulation
plus the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement on it are necessary
before it becomes effective. All but one of the six commercial low-level
waste burial sites now in operation have suspended TRU waste burial.l3
Most military TRU waste is managed within the federal government by
ERDA in the long-term and by ERDA or DOD in the short-term. Again, DOD manages
relatively small amounts of TRU waste from weapons component assembly and naval
propulsion programs, which it generally transfers to ERDA as soon as possible.
In addition, several commercial operators inherited some buried military TRU
waste when they took over sites which had previously been run by the AEC.
At least one commercially operated burial site (at Hanford)' continues to re-
ceive military TRU waste from nuclear navy operations.1 4
Regulation
The body of radioactive waste regulation is still in the early stages
of development. This should be borne in mind throughout the following dis-
cussion.
NRC efforts now under way in the area of waste regulation include:
1) development of a regulatory program for radioactive wastes;
2) establishment of a confirmatory research program to support
regulatory and licensing activities in waste management;
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3) classification of the types of nuclear wastes;
4) development of specifications for the solids which will be
acceptable forms for HL waste;
5) review of requirements for the disposal of low-level waste at
commercial burial grounds; and
6) coordination of activities with state and local governments and other
federal agencies.1 5
Criteria and Standards
Authority to promulgate radiation safety criteria and standards applicable
to radioactive material is vested in the federal government.l 6 NRC has authority,
derived from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, to establish criteria and standards for protection against radiation
applicable to licensed activities.1 7
ERDA develops criteria and standards for its own operations. EPA also
has some authority in this area of regulation. When it was created in 1970,
EPA received, among other powers, the authority previously vested in the
Federal Radiation Council (which was abolished) to
...advise the President with respect to radiation matters,
directly or indirectly affecting health, including guidance
for all Federal agencies in the formulation of radiation
standards and in the establishment and execution of programs
of cooperation with States.1 8
The 1970 Reorganization Plan also transferred from AEC to EPA the responsibility
for
...establishing generally applicable environmental standards
for the protection of the general environment from radioactive
material. As used herein, standards mean limits on radiation
exposures or levels, or concentrations or quantities of radio-
active material, in the general environment outside the boundaries
of locations under the control of persons possessing or using
radioactive material. 1 9 (Emphasis added.)
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EPA has relied to date upon this latter language, which excludes from EPA
radiation standard-setting those activities of both NRC licensees and ERDA
that are located geographically within the possessor/user's facility. (Thus EPA
has jurisdiction to set exposure standards for transport of wastes.) Some EPA
statements indicate an attempt to expand the standard-setting authority
of the agency to reach within the boundaries of NRC-licensed or ERDA facilities
by reviewing NRC's and ERDA's own standards for protection against radiation
under the authority of its "guidance" mandate. This could create regulatory
redundancy and conflict. So far, however, EPA has not tried to alter the
nuclear agencies' established standards for operations.
Licensing/approval activities are the central function of post-fission
waste regulation, and they present the most complicated aspect of the present
situation. While NRC and ERDA have general licensing/approval duties within
their respective areas of jurisdiction, several other agencies, within and out-
side the federal government, also have claims of varying strength for additional,
occasionally overlapping, authority to license. Before discussing these ad-
ditional agencies, we will outline current allocations of authority between
NRC and ERDA for the various regulatory activities, aside from standard-setting,
and identify some of the uncertainties that exist in these allocations.
Siting HL and TRU Waste Facilities
Siting requirements adopted to date concern mainly land ownership.
ERDA's practice is to purchase, rather than to lease, land for its use; thus
ERDA waste management facilities are and will be located on federally owned
land. "[D]isposal of high-level radioactive fission product waste material
will not be permitted on any land other than that owned and controlled by the
Federal Government." Current NRC regulations require applicants for low-
level waste burial licenses to provide an environmental analysis of the proposed
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site,22 and allow burial only on land which is owned either by the federal
or a state government. 3 Reprocessing plants and temporary storage facilities
24
for HL waste may be located on privately owned property. Whereas TRU waste
disposal can now take place on state or federal land, proposed regulations would
limit permanent disposition of such waste to property owned by the U.S. govern-
25
ment. Further siting requirements are being developed by the NRC. The
role of other federal and state agencies in siting is discussed further below.
Facilities Construction and Operation: HL Wastes
NRC has sole authority to license commercial HL waste management facili-
ties and operations from the standpoint of radiological safety. Moreover,
section 202(3) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 also subjects any ERDA
facility handling commercially generated HL waste to NRC licensing. It would there-
fore appear that ERDA research, development, and demonstration facilities using
-commercially generated HL waste are subject to NRC licensing. 2 6ERDA is not, however,
planning to use commercial HL waste in its pilot plants for demonstration of a
permanent waste repository. ERDA is now studying the problem of obtaining
a suitable quantity and composition of waste for use in its projects designed
to serve as demonstrations of long-term waste repositories.
As noted above, ERDA contractors are responsible for day-to-day manage-
ment of military HL waste. These contractors are both supervised (in a
managerial sense) and regulated (for safety assurance) by ERDA through the
terms of its contracts. ERDA manual chapters on waste management, which
give very general guidance, 8 standards for protection against radiation,29 re-
quirements for reporting of occurrences,30 etc., are incorporated by reference
into contract terms. ERDA approval of contractor operations is not open
to public scrutiny as in the case of NRC approval of private industry opera-
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tions which it licenses. But this type of ERDA self-regulation is specifically
authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The approach may be justifiable
in some instances on national security grounds. But it should be recognized
that for the short-term, ERDA exercises "regulatory" as well as managerial
control over its own military HL waste.
For the long-term, section 202(4) of the Energy Reorganization Act
gives NRC licensing authority over the following ERDA facilities:
...Retrievable surface storage facilities and other facilities
authorized for the express purpose of subsequent long-term storage
of high-level radioactive waste generated by the Administration,
which are not used for, or are part of, research and development
activities. 32
Under this provision, NRC must license the long-term disposition of both com-
mercial and military HL wastes. However, definitional problems with the language
of section 202(4) have created uncertainty as to the scope of NRC regulatory
authority.
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the government's
construction of the Energy Reorganization Act in July 1975 in a memorandum sup-
porting NRC licensing of ten proposed new waste storage tanks to be built at
33
Hanford and Savannah River. ERDA took the position that these tanks would
not be subject to NRC licensing under section 202 of the Act because "such
waste storage facilities have not been considered in the past by the Congress
to be the type of facility which would be utilized by the AEC or ERDA for long-
term storage of high level radioactive waste." 34 The ERDA stance was based
also on the argument "that it was the Congressional intent when the...Act was
enacted...that section 202(4) apply only to waste facilities, the design
characteristics of which were then unknown to the Congress and that those
facilities when submitted to the Congress in the authorization process would
be clearly characterized...as 'authorized for the express purpose of subsequent
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long term storage."' 35 The NRDC filed suit against ERDA in September 1976
seeking a declaratory judgment on the licensing issue, as well as an injunction
against the construction of the tanks.3 6
Subsequently, NRC concluded that "the projected ERDA facilities are not
now subject to licensing under section 202(4)."37 The Commission premised
this conclusion upon ERDA assurances "that the use of the facilities will
extend less than twenty years" 3 8 and "that no part of the facilities will be
used for long-term storage," 3 9 as well as the expression of a like opinion by
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress. NRC made the continuing
validity of its decision "contingent upon ERDA's keeping it informed of any ma-
terial changes in plans for these facilities and a report on their use and
plans for future use in years following completion of construction." 4 1
There is at least one Congressional statement to the effect that section
202(4) of the Energy Reorganization Act should require NRC licensing of these
new tanks, and that "it was our intent that any new construction of waste sto-
rage facilities by ERDA, including those built according to an existing design,
should be licensed by the NRC."4 2 As of this writing, the outcome of the NRDC
legal action has not been judicially determined.
Under present law, it is clear that military HL waste already in
existence at the time the Energy Reorganization Act was enacted is not subject
to NRC licensing. Some of the waste in question has been stored at ERDA
facilities since the 1940s. Critics have asserted that any period longer than
20-30 years constitutes long-term storage.43 More significantly, ERDA has
for some time been solidifying liquid HL waste in place within storage tanks
in order to prevent further leakage. The result, as discussed in Chapter 3,
is that removal of this solidified HL waste for treatment and transfer to NRC-
44
licensed, long-term waste repositories may prove very expensive. In the
meantime, ERDA will retain regulatory authority over military HL waste as
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long as it remains solidified in tanks which existed prior to the passage of
the Energy Reorganization Act.
Nevertheless, NRC's basic licensing authority over the permanent
disposition of military HL waste, which includes the promulgation of safety
criteria for acceptance of waste at a permanent repository, could give it sub-
stantial indirect control over at least some aspects of short-term ERDA manage-
ment (e.g., form of waste and type of packaging for the ultimate disposal in
NRC-licensed waste repositories). This would not, however, enable NRC to exercise
short-term monitoring and enforcement with regard to ERDA wastes, nor to es-
tablish a schedule for ERDA waste treatment in preparation for transfer to a
permanent waste repository.
As noted above, section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act excludes
from NRC licensing ERDA research and development activities involving ERDA-
generated HL waste. On October 28, 1976, President Ford issued a major state-
ment on nuclear policy in which he directed, among other things, that:
the first demonstration depository for high-level wastes which
will be owned by the Government be submitted for licensing by
the independent NRC to assure its safety and acceptability to
the public.
This statement settles the question as to whether waste demonstration facilities
using ERDA-generated HL waste are subject to NRC licensing. ERDA officials have
suggested that TRU waste might be used, rather than HL waste, in the initial
demonstration which is most likely to occur in a salt formation near Carlsbad,
New Mexico. President Ford's statement does not directly dispose of the
issue of licensability if TRU waste is used in a demonstration long-term
repository. It remains to be seen whether ERDA will submit a demonstra-
tion waste repository involving TRU waste to NRC licensing, even
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though there will be potential health and safety risks to be considered and
the results of the demonstration are intended to be relevant to the safety
of long-term HL waste repositories. The legal situation on this point is not
clear.
Facilities Construction and Operation: TRU Waste
The 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provided a means
whereby states can regulate commercial low-level waste operations within their
boundaries under the Agreement States program. 5 Pursuant to these provisions,
NRC relinquishes this part of its regulatory power to states which desire
this authority and conform to the Commission's standards. But NRC retains
the authority to suspend or revoke an Agreement with a state if the public
health or safety is threatened. The suspension power has never been exer-
cised thus far. Close working relationships between the states and the NRC are
typical. There are now 25 Agreement States. Pursuant to the Agreement States
program, certain states wholly or partially regulate five of the six currently
operating commercial low-level burial facilities: Barnwell, South Carolina;
Beatty, Nevada; Hanford, Washington; Moorehead, Kentucky; and West Valley,
New York. (The Sheffield, Illinois site is under exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion.)47 Of course, even in Agreement States section 274 of the Atomic
Energy Act reserves to NRC exclusive jurisdiction to license significant
quantitites of special nuclear materials.
Proposed NRC regulations would prohibit shallow land burial of TRU
waste and shift long-term management of such waste from private operators to
ERDA. If finally adopted, these regulations would take this aspect of regu-
latory authority out of the Agreement States and place it once more in the
federal government. It would be logical for NRC to have this role, in light
of its parallel long-term regulatory responsibilities for HL waste. However,
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existing law expressly requires NRC licensing of long-term storage of HL
waste only.4 8
NRC is tending toward simplifying the defined categories of radioactive
waste into high- and low-level only, 9 assimilating what is now called trans-
uranic contaminated low-level waste into the high-level category. Alternatively,
NRC might attempt to exercise indirect control over long-term TRU waste reposi-
tories by including safety criteria for such repositories in its requirements
for transport by NRC licensees of TRU waste to the repositories. A more
straightforward solution to this ERDA-NRC jurisdictional problem would seem
to require legislation.
NRC is currently rethinking the radioactive waste aspects of its
Agreement States program. Discussion between NRC staff members and state
50
government radiation control officials has begun. Such reconsideration is
taking place in an environment of waning state interest and financial capacity
in the development of an adequate radiological safety program, and increasing
controversy about the safety of low-level waste burial sites. Apparently many
states would willingly rid themselves of the expense and responsibility of
this phase of radioactive waste regulation.
ERDA has sole regulatory authority over military TRU waste. DOD
regulates the short-term management of TRU waste generated by weapons component
assembly or naval nuclear propulsion programs at DOD facilities themselves,
but this waste is transferred eventually to ERDA.
No definition of "high level radioactive waste" is supplied by the Energy
Reorganization Act itself. However, at the time the Act was passed, existing
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regulations excluded TRU waste from the high-level category. Under current
practices and proposed regulations transuranic waste is viewed with considerable
concern since, as discussed in Chapter 3, the quantitites of plutonium con-
tained in low-level and high-level wastes generated by commercial plutonium
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recycle will be roughly equal.52 Nevertheless, as we have seen above, the exis-
ting U.S. regulatory structure does not provide firm assurance of NRC regu-
lation of either commercial or military TRU waste.
Transportation
Charged by a series of legislative enactments culminating in 1975,
the Department of Transportation (DOT) shares responsibility with the nuclear
agencies for assuring safe transport of hazardous radioactive materials in
53
commerce. Recognizing their common jurisdiction, DOT and the former AEC
in 1973 entered into a Memorandum of Understanding which allocates regulatory
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duties in this area. The Memorandum recognizes DOT's general authority to
develop safety standards for packaging by shippers and handling by carriers,
but it authorizes AEC to develop criteria for packages of Type B, large
quantity, and of fissile materials. Each agency further pledges to enforce
the other's standards and to exchange information prior to issuing new regu-
lations in this area. As noted, the Memorandum was signed before the AEC
functions were split between NRC and ERDA. It is now applicable to both the
federal nuclear agencies, since the former AEC specifically imposed the same
standards of care for transport upon both its licensees and its license-exempt
contractors. ERDA has acknowledged its obligations by incorporating the rele-
vant AEC manual chapter into its own body of manual chapters, which is incor-
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porated by reference into all ERDA shipper contracts. NRC likewise has
adopted without significant variation that part of previous AEC regulations
pertaining to the packaging of radioactive material for transport by its
56
licensees. Both nuclear agencies also require shippers to follow a regis-
tration and approval procedure that parallels DOT regulations for the shipment
of non-radioactive hazardous materials.57 As indicated above, all waste ship-
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ments outside ERDA or NRC facilities must also meet EPA's generally applicable
standards for protection of the environment against radiation. 5 8
There is one exception to the federally dominated scheme of waste
transport regulation. In the case of transportation of waste containing less
than critical mass quantities of special nuclear materials within Agreement
States, neither DOT nor NRC has jurisdiction. State laws and regulations
apply instead. However, all Agreement States require packaging to comply
59
with DOT standards.
Current federal transportation and packaging regulations, in effect since
1968, are virtually identical to the regulations adopted by the IAEA in 1961.
The IAEA, however, revised its regulations in 1973. ERDA and NRC are now
considering revisions in response to these changes by the international organi-
zation.
A number of recent radioactive waste transport incidents have sparked
controversy. Also, most of the state nuclear power initiatives that have
been proposed include provisions on transportation. In response, NRC has
committed itself to a program of emergency response planning, environmental
impact assessment, and risk analysis.60
Monitoring and Enforcement
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 grants both NRC and ERDA ample authority
for monitoring and enforcement. 1 Monitoring consists mainly of screening
required reports, auditing managers' inventories, and inspecting sites.
Enforcement involves the punishment of violators and ordering remedial
safety actions, particularly during emergencies. NRC has general regulations
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governing these activities, and ERDA conditions its contracts on adherence
63
to manual chapters with similarly general requirements. If a contractor
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cannot be convinced to comply with manual chapter standards, ERDA may rescind
the contract and, if necessary, confiscate the facility.
It is unclear, however, how ERDA manual chapters compare in legal weight
with regulations such as those formulated by NRC and published in the Code of
Federal Regulations. From ERDA's standpoint as a regulator, the question is un-
important since it can exert contractual pressures on its managers. But the issue
may be important to an intervenor seeking a court order against ERDA requiring it
to enforce its own standards.
DOT has general monitoring and enforcement authority regarding radioactive
64
waste transport. Maritime shipments of wastes are subject to Coast Guard regula-
tory jurisdiction if accompanied by ERDA personnel.65ERDA shipments are, however,
exempt from Coast Guard regulatory jurisdiction if accompanied by ERDA personnel66
The Federal Aviation Administration's role in waste shipment regulation is negli-
gible since neither NRC nor ERDA contemplates the use of air shipment in waste
management operations.
Federal-State Relations
The general role of individual states in waste management regulation
is an issue of increasing importance. This issue underlies much of the pre-
vious discussion.
A number of states have already challenged the notion of exclusive
federal jurisdiction over radioactive waste regulation. The numerous state
nuclear power initiatives which have been proposed, all of which have been
so far rejected by large majorities of the voters, have generally contained
provisions expressly aimed at the radioactive waste problem. The California
Legislature enacted several laws intended to impose milder conditions on
nuclear power development in the state than were contained in Proposition
15 which was defeated in June 1976. One of these recently enacted laws
prohibits any nuclear power plant land use in the state or certification by
the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission until
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the commission finds that there has been developed and that
the United States through its authorized agency has approved and
there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal
of high-level nuclear waste. 6 7
Michigan's governor informed ERDA during the summer of 1976, in response to
ERDA's preliminary investigation of possible disposal sites in the state,
that
...before any further negotiations, discussions, or binding de-
cisions or contracts are made, I, as Governor, must be assured
in writing that a disposal site will not be selected without
approval of the state.6 8
Also in 1976, Connecticut passed legislation prohibiting the transportation of
commercial radioactive waste within or through its boundaries unless the
Connecticut Commission of Transportation has first issued a permit authorizing
its shipment. The law includes strong inspection and enforcement provisions,
including civil fines of up to $10,000 for each violation.69
The federal government is constitutionally established as a government
of limited powers. All authority not delegated in the U.S. Constitution is
expressly reserved to the several states by the 10th Amendment. In general,
the states retain broad authority to legislate and to regulate activities
within their respective borders in order to assure public health and safety.
Land use is also a subject that is traditionally considered within primary
state control. Therefore, state regulation of radiological hazards in general,
and radioactive waste in particular, would clearly be appropriate and
necessary, but for two qualifications. The first qualification is that, under
the Commerce Clause, state regulation must not constitute an undue burden on
70
interstate commerce; the second is that, under the Supremacy Clause,
state regulation must not conflict with valid federal legislation or regulation. 71
Of the two, the preemption issue is more important in view of the existing
federal legislation and regulatory scheme previously discussed. Based on
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the pervasiveness of congressionally mandated federal regulation of radio-
active waste management and the congressional intent expressed in legislative
histories of the relevant acts, it is reasonable to conclude that current
federal law (including the Agreement States program) would preempt attempts to
regulate radioactive waste operations for the purpose of controlling radiolo-
gical hazards.72 Such a conclusion is supported by Northern States Power v.
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Minnesota, in which the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the 8th Circuit Court
of Appeals holding that the AEC-prescribed limits on radioactive effluents from
nuclear power plants preempt state regulation, and that states cannot impose
more stringent radiological standards.
However, state land use controls which in effect zone out radioactive
waste operations from certain areas may still be valid, depending on the purpose
of the exclusion and the specific character of the activity excluded. Probably
a state or locality, acting pursuant to state law, could control the siting of
reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants, including temporary radioactive
waste storage facilities, as part of a broader scheme to control industrial
74development and the location of major industrial facilities. State dis-
approval of a site for a nuclear facility must rest on grounds other than the
potential radiological hazard involved. On the other hand, a state or locality
probably could not prevent the siting of a permanent radioactive waste reposi-
tory, which is legally required to be on federal land, presently owned or
acquired.75 Federal radiological regulation would appear to preempt state
efforts to regulate transportation of radioactive waste to the extent the
state's concern is based on safety issues. Finally, although it is clear
that if there are nuclear power facilities in a state, that state cannot
impose radiation protection standards different from those adopted by the
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federal government, a state law which prohibits outright the construction of
any nuclear power plants in the state has not yet been tested in court.
The operational reality of federal-state relations in any field is
framed by the law, but it is influenced decisively by politics and economics.
Whether or not state regulation would be eventually declared federally pre-
empted and hence invalid in a court test, the governor, legislature, or people
of a state can in many ways effectively resist an activity within the state's
borders that is authorized or directed by the federal government. This is
true of the location of military installations, such as the Navy's Project
Sanguine (now Project Seafare),76 and of radioactive waste repositories, such
as the AEC's defunct proposal for a repository in a salt formation near Lyons,
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Kansas.77
States interested in participating in the regulatory decision making
process will probably be able to exert their greatest influence at the site-
approval stage of a federal licensing process. As long as state claims are
not merely pretexts to bar outright these facilities, states must be allowed
to assert reasonable influence in siting and other regulatory decisions that will
affect the non-radiological safety and welfare of local communities. It is
presently unclear how serious federal-state conflicts over regulatory juris-
diction with regard to radioactive waste will become. In any case, political
pressures are likely to play at least as forceful a role as legal precedent
in the ultimate resolution of whatever conflicts arise. There is already
evidence of political bargaining in the development of solutions to the
78
problem of repository siting, and the federal nuclear agencies presently
appear determined to work cooperatively with the states concerned.
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International Regulation
Activities involving radioactive waste may occur within or beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. Moreover, radioactive waste operations within
one nation may have effects beyond that nation's jurisdiction, either in another
nation or in an area outside the jurisdiction of any nation, such as the high
seas, the deep seabed, Antarctica or in space. Radioactive waste management
activities occurring or having effects beyond U.S. jurisdiction may, if con-
ducted by U.S. nationals, be subject to U.S. regulation, or regulation by other
affected nations, or various forms of international regulation, or all three
concurrently. The international ramifications of radioactive waste are impor-
tant to consider, especially in view of existing practices regarding ocean dumping
of low-level waste by other nations and future options for seabed and ice sheet
disposal of HL waste.
Nationally, under the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972, 9 EPA has authority to issue permits for the transportation of all
materials (except dredged material, which is the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of the Army) for the purpose of dumping them in the territorial waters of the
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United States. Dumping of HL waste is specifically prohibited, but the
dumping of TRU waste is not. The U.S. government has nonetheless enforced a
moratorium on TRU waste dumping since 1970. 2 Neither EPA nor ERDA has yet
interpreted "dumping" to include emplacement of radioactive waste under the ocean
floor in the deep seabed. However, EPA has claimed that it has licensing
jurisdiction over such action.8 3 Both the meaning of dumping and EPA's assertion
of jurisdiction are subject to dispute, and may require Congressional or
judicial clarification.
As a brief digression at this point, it is noteworthy that EPA has
parallel authority to control fresh water pollution through a different
permit-issuing program under the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of
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1972.84 Under the legislation, HL waste "discharge" is prohibited. 8 5
No one,of course, contemplates using U.S. fresh waters for post-fission waste
disposal purposes, but the prevention of radionuclide migration from temporary
storage facilities or permanent repositories to aquifers is one of the pri-
mary technological goals of radioactive waste management. EPA has no authority
to license radioactive waste facilities on land. It has maintained that NRC
and ERDA have sole jurisdiction over discharge of source, by-product, and spe-
cial nuclear materials, a position recently affirmed by the Supreme Court.8 6
It is not clear what effect, if any, this decision will have on EPA's claim
for permit-issuing power over possible ERDA deep seabed emplacement, where
again only source, by-product, and special nuclear materials are involved.
Internationally, the U.S. is a party to a number of multilateral agree-
ments relating to U.S. radioactive waste policy. Two have major significance.
The 1958 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention on the High Seas, applying
to all parts of the sea not included in the territorial waters of a nation,
provides the foundation for modern international attempts to protect the
maritime environment. The High Seas Convention makes it the general duty
of nations to exercise "reasonable regard to the interests of other states
in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas." Three more specific
obligations apply directly to the problem of marine pollution: (1) nations are
to promulgate their own regulations so as to prevent pollution "from the
exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil";8 9 (2) "taking
into account" any international regulations, nations "shall take measures to
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prevent pollution of the seas from the dumping of radioactive waste"; and
(3) nations have a duty to "cooperate with the competent international organi-
zations [here, the IAEA] in taking measures for the prevention of pollution
of the seas or air space above." 9 1 These High Seas Convention obligations
are by no means stringent. Obviously, the U.S. and other nations can choose
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to interpret the "reasonable regard" standard strictly or loosely and then be-
have accordingly. The requirements to take into account international regu-
lations and to cooperate with IAEA, however, imply at least consultation with
IAEA prior to implementing deep seabed emplacement of HL waste. (Ocean dumping
of TRU waste is apparently not considered an acceptable U.S. option, although
other nations are continuing to dump low-level waste and it is not clear whether
some of this waste is TRU contaminated.)
In 1975 the London Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter9 2 entered into force. It prohibits, ex-
cept in the case of emergencies at sea and other emergencies for which no other
solution is feasible, "dumping" of HL waste at sea.9 3 An appropriate national
authority is required to monitor ocean dumping of low-level radioactive waste;
reports on each dump must be made to it.94 Regional cooperation is encouraged,
but enforcement is specifically a national matter.95 The "emergency" ex-
ceptions have been criticized as possibly allowing parties a means of exemp-
ting themselves from the dumping prohibition. While the parties probably did
not intend "dumping" to include deep seabed emplacement, the issue is not
closed due to subsequent treaty interpretations.
The United States is also a party to the 1959 Antarctica Treaty,9 6 which
specifically prohibits the "disposal" of radioactive waste in Antarctica. 9 7
Each of the parties is entitled to designate observers, who have complete
freedom of access at all times subject only to the jurisdiction of their
nation, to monitor compliance with this ban, among other obligations in the
Treaty.9 The parties further agree "to exert appropriate efforts, consis-
tent with the Charter of the United Nations," to insure that no one engages
in radioactive waste disposal in the Antarctic.99
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Hence, use of the Antarctic ice sheet as a permanent repository for HL waste is
clearly prohibited for the parties to the Treaty. However, in 1991 the treaty be-
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comes subject to review and possible modification on request of any party, and the ice
sheet disposal option may be considered in negotiating a modification.
The outcome of the current Law of the Sea Conference may also affect
the prospects for seabed disposal. The Informal Single Negotiating Text, which
is currently the basis of the negotiations, contains provisions which would
clarify and reinforce existing international legal norms affecting marine
pollution generally. The Text would establish an International Seabed
Authority to regulate development of seabed resources. Although primarily
concerned with resource development, the competence of the Authority would seem
necessarily to extend to seabed disposal of radioactive waste, at least to
the extent of assuring that any proposed waste disposal activity does not
unduly interfere with existing or possible future seabed resources exploration,
development or production activity.
Finally, other governments may specially object to any U.S. disposal of
radioactive waste of military origin in an area beyond its national juris-
diction. The motive for such an objection may be general concern with the im-
pact on the environment, or it may be political concern with the military ori-
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gin of the waste involved.
In view of the international constraints regarding radioactive waste
operations noted above, it is noteworthy that, as part of his October 28,
1976 statement on nuclear policy, President Ford directed the Secretary of
State:
to discuss with other nations and the IAEA the possibility of
establishing centrally located, multinationally controlled nu-
clear waste repositories so that the number of sites that are
needed can be limited.
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Such a proposal could well have advantages for a number of industrial countries
with large nuclear power programs which lack suitable sites for waste repositories
on their national teritories, for instance, Japan and some European countries, and
also for less developed countries which do not need to develop their own facilities
-for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle because of the relatively small size of
their nuclear power programs. Moreover, such a proposal for multinationally
controlled radioactive waste repositories would supplement President Ford's
proposal in the same policy statement for a "new international regime to
provide for storage of civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel," and it
would complement previous U.S. proposals for the establishment of multinational
nuclear fuel centers as a means of reducing the risks of nuclear weapons pro-
liferation.
Research and Development
The Energy Reorganization Act left ERDA with principal research and
development authority for military and commercial radioactive waste technology.1 0 2
NRC and EPA conduct essentially confirmatory research and studies aimed at
improving the quality of their regulations. NRC recognizes ERDA's broader
research capabilities and must necessarily rely on much of the data furnished
by ERDA without confirmation. Such a separation is important so that NRC, as
an independent regulatory agency, does not find itself in a position where it
is being asked to license technology developed by itself.1 0 3
ERDA's Fiscal Year 1977 budget reflects the dramatically growing govern-
mental concern over finding technological answers for radioactive waste manage-
ment problems. The combined military and commercial programs have received a
three-fold increase in funds from approximately $30 million to about $90 million.1 0 4
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Commercial waste programs within this budget have been expanded by a factor
of five, from about $12 million to over $60 million.1 0 5 ERDA summarizes
the priorities in its budget as follows:
The ERDA FY 1977 commercial waste budget is keyed to providing input
decisions on reprocessing, waste forms and storage modes for
high-level radioactive waste. The selection of specific sites and
development of repositories for terminal storage is considered the
major item in a greatly expanded ERDA Fiscal Year 1977 waste budget.
For earlier necessary or desirable waste management activities,
technology is either in use or considered well developed, i.e.,
the basic technical principles are clearly understood and data
needed for design are available. Efforts to reduce these prin-
ciples to practice, especially in high-level liquid waste soli-
dification, are also the subject of expansion in the FY 1977
budget. All of the foregoing effort has been keyed to the ex-
pected needs of the nuclear fuel cycle industry.1 0 6
ERDA, then, plays the role of principal researcher, in addition to its
roles as major manager and self-regulator of most of its own management
activities. Since "research and development" as used in the Atomic Energy
107Act include basic authority to engage in demonstration projects, ERDA
also has the authority to demonstrate the feasibility of ultimate deep
geologic disposal (the currently favored technology), as well as other
phases of radioactive waste operations.' ERDA decisions made in the research
and development area and also with regard to demonstrations involving TRU
waste seem insulated from NRC regulatory control. Yet, such decisions
profoundly affect the direction of the national waste management effort and po-
licy-making in this area.
Implementation
In 1976, the Federal Energy Resources Council, in cooperation with
several agencies, including ERDA and NRC, issued a status report on radio-
active waste management, in which it listed four requirements for proper im-
plementation:
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-The thorough reviews mandated by the National Environmental
Policy Act,
-The promulgation and satisfactory compliance with generally
applicable environmental standards and criteria issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency,
-Compliance with licensing criteria and requirements of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and
-Opportunities for full public participation.1 0 8
The National Environmental Policy Act1 0 9 (NEPA) is an omnipresent
federal policy-making mechanism. It requires every federal agency to prepare
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in connection with "...every recom-
mendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment..."1 10
Each EIS must contain a detailed statement by the responsible officials on:
-the environmental impact of the proposed action,
-any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
-alternatives to the proposed action,
-the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and
-any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it
be implemented.lll
It must be prepared in consultation with and must include the comments of
"...any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with
respect to any environmental impact involved."1 1 2
NEPA does not require avoidance or rectification of environmental harm
from a proposed project. But any EIS not prepared in accordance with the
procedural requirements set forth above may be deemed "inadequate" by a court.
An agency may then be required to draft a new EIS. EIS's, when published,
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become part of the public record. EPA, sometimes in conjunction with the
Council on Environmental Quality, reviews and comments on all EIS's.1 13
Public sentiment and/or EPA ratings can be important factors in Congressional
decisions to fund agency proposals or in court hearings on whether or not to
enjoin agency actions.
Operations in the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle which are federally
licensed or contracted for constitute "Federal actions," as does the promulga-
tion of regulations designed to control these operations. The question of which
contemplated actions are "major" and likely to "significantly" affect the
environment is more complicated. But is is clear that, prior to im-
plementation, ERDA and NRC must prepare "generic" EIS's for their respective
management and regulatory programs in regard to radioactive waste. Thereafter,
ERDA must prepare an EIS in connection with each major step it takes to implement
its waste management program regarding either military or commercial waste, and
NRC must prepare an EIS specifically covering every license it issues for
radioactive waste operations, whether the proposed operation is to be conducted
by ERDA or private industry.
On the horizon is the EIS which will be necessary for the planned pilot federal
HL waste repository. ERDA intends to incorporate this demonstration in its
programmatic statement on commercial HL waste management. Whether ERDA will be
successful in doing so remains to be seen.
As discussed in Chapter 3, HL waste emerges in the course of nuclear fuel
reprocessing. Before commercial processing can begin, NRC must complete its
Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the Use of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed-
Oxide Fuel in LWR's (GESMO), complete an extensive public hearing on the subject,
issue final regulations governing the licensing of commercial reprocessing plants,
and complete hearings and issue a license for the operation of a particular
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plant. The health, safety, and environment section of GESMO was completed in
August, 1976. The safeguards supplement should be issued in the near future.
The GESMO schedule has thus already slipped several months behind the 1977 date
originally proposed for a final NRC decision.
In May, 1976 federal decision making concerning reprocessing and recycling
suffered a legal setback in NRDC v. NRC.1 1 he NRC had announced circumstances
under which it might in the future have decided whether or not to permit interim
licensing of a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant to occur. The Court concluded
that any interim license of a fuel fabrication or reprocessing facility would
inevitably be a substantial and irretrievable commitment to wide-scale use, and
so could not occur without completion of the full GESMO process. It found that the
NRC interim licensing procedure failed to satisfy NEPA specifically because of the
inadequate treatment of alternatives to plutonium recycle and of hazards of theft,
diversion and sabotage.
Legal developments during the summer of 1976 have made radioactive waste an
important unresolved issue in the commercial power reactor licensing process.
In July the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ordered NRC to reconsider
the Vermont Yankee reactor operating license and the procedure used to issue the
license. llrior to the decision in Vermont Yankee, the issuance of power reactor
operating licenses had been based, in part, upon an AEC rule which concluded that
waste hazards in reactor operations were "insignificant." The court found this
determination "arbitrary and capricious," because the factual premises upon
which it was based had not been adequately supported or "ventilated."
Shortly thereafter, the NRDC filed a petition with NRC requesting the
adoption of rules for implementation of the Vermont Yankee decision.1 1 6
On August 16 the Commission announced the reopening of the rulemaking proceeding
117
on the Environmental Effect of the Uranium Fuel Cycle. This rulemaking was
4-29
reopened for the purposes of supplementing the record on the reprocessing and
waste management issues, and determining whether or not, on the basis of the
supplemented record, the disputed rule should be amended, and if so, in what
respect. NRC suspended issuance of any new full-power operating licenses,
construction permits, or limited work authorizations at least until the promulgation
of an interim rule on the matter. The earliest possible date of such promulgation
was stated to be December 1976. However, an NRC request for a judicial
stay of the court's mandate could permit interim action before the end of the
year. For now, a national moratorium on nuclear power growth is in effect. NRC
is in the process of completing a new environmental survey on the probable
contributions to the aggregate environmental effects of a nuclear power reactor
that are attributable to the reprocessing and waste management stages of the
fuel cycle. It remains to be seen exactly what sort of consideration of the
reprocessing and waste management issues at the reactor licensing stage will
be deemed adequate for purposes of compliance with NEPA.
Regarding military waste, ERDA has said very little to date about imple-
mentation schedules. (Congressional hearings are, however, scheduled for late
1976 on the subject. 118) Procedures analogous to those described above with
regard to commercial HL waste (EIS's, hearings, rulemaking, licensing) must also
occur for the government's military HL waste program. The NRDC complaint on
the new waste tanks alleges in part that "ERDA has determined not to prepare
environmental impact statements under NEPA with respect to [the Hanford and
Savannah River projects] and has announced its decision in written negative
declarations."1 19 ERDA, on the other hand, says that it will include dis-
cussion of the environmental impact of these tanks in its documents describing
waste operations at these facilities. The Administration has announced
the following timetable for completion of its three defense waste documents:
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Savannah River January 1977
Idaho Falls June 1977
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Richland September 1977
The NRDC has recently petitioned NRC to adopt interim regulations
governing disposal of low-level radioactive waste (including TRU waste) and
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to prepare a programmatic EIS on this aspect of waste management. NRC has
not yet issued a disposition of this petition. NRC's waste classification effort
could conceivably redefine HL waste to include some or all TRU waste. In any
case, NRC promulgation of the 1974 AEC proposed TRU waste regulation must await
action on the above petition.
Prior to President Ford's statement on nuclear policy of October 28,
1976, ERDA's time schedule for implementing commercial waste management
technologies was as follows:
1979 - technology for handling commercial post-fission waste, other
than high-level, available for industrial adoption;
1983 - high-level waste solidification technology available for startup
of commercial plants;
1984 - technology available for packaging, transporting and handling
spent fuel, in the event of a decision not to reprocess spent fuel;
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1985 - at least one repository ready to receive waste.
President Ford's nuclear policy statement directed ERDA:
to demonstrate all components of waste management technology
by 1978 and to demonstrate a complete repository for such wastes
by 1985.
In the same statement, the President decided that:
the United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used
nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable
step in the nuclear fuel cycle.
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In light of this decision, the President directed ERDA:
to assure that the waste repository to be demonstrated by 1985]
will be able to handle spent fuel elements as well as the separated
and solidified waste that would result if we proceed with nuclear
fuel reprocessing,.
President Ford's statement, which was issued in the final days of the
1976 campaign, may be discarded by President Carter or it may be used as a
point of departure or base-line for Carter Administration nuclear policy
development. If the latter course is chosen, which appears more likely in
view of President Carter's statements on nuclear matters expressed during the
campaign, then a number of difficulties will arise regarding the implementation
of U.S. radioactive waste policy:
- First, it is unrealistic to expect that "all components" of waste
management technology pertaining to the commercial nuclear fuel cycle can be
demonstrated satisfactorily within the next two years. This seems especially
the case for the critical step of HL waste solidification technology since
waste from high burn-up commercial fuel will not be available for such
demonstrations during the period.
- Second, there is an apparent difference between President Ford's
directive to ERDA to demonstrate a waste repository by 1985 and ERDA's
previously announced intention to have a federal repository ready to receive
waste on a demonstration basis by 1985. If the demonstration is to consist of
waste emplacement and a subsequent period of observation, then the President's
statement constitutes a significant acceleration in the HL waste terminal storage
program. Indeed, it seems doubtful that an actual demonstration period of less
than eight years will be deemed adequate for a "complete repository," including
the capacity to store spent fuel as well as HL waste (and possibly TRU waste).
In this connection it should be noted that, as of the end of 1976, no site had
been finally selected for such a demonstration.
- Third, the President's nuclear policy statement says nothing about
the handling of radioactive waste of military origin, which, as noted in Chapters
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2 and 3, will constitute the majority of the radioactive waste present in
the U.S. for the remainder of the 20th century and will present the most diffi-
cult and costly technological problems to be resolved.
Conclusions
The U.S. inventory of radioactive waste has two sources -- commercial
and military nuclear activities. Military wastes presently comprise by far
the greatest proportion of the most toxic waste. The future management
challenges are comparable in their overall importance, although the difficulties,
costs and schedules differ.
1. In their statements of basic policy goals, federal officials have
thus far adopted a primarily technological perspective. "Safe management"
has essentially meant "isolation and containment." More recently, policy makers
have mentioned, however tangentially, other factors such as risk/cost analysis,
institutional stability, public confidence, consolidation of management re-
sponsibilities, and inter-agency and international coordination.
2. The present organization for achieving radioactive waste policy goals
has basically three functions: management, regulation, and research and de-
velopment. Overall management responsibility is divided in a complicated way
between the private industry (licensees of NRC and/or Agreement States) and
the federal government (ERDA and its contractors). Commercial HL waste is to
be managed in the short term by licensees and in the long term by ERDA.
Military HL waste is solely a federal responsibility: ERDA manages plutonium
production facilities that create HL waste, and DOD is responsible for managing
spent fuel elements from naval propulsion programs until they are turned over
to ERDA. Commercial TRU waste is presently managed by licensees in the short
and the long term. NRC has proposed regulations, however, that will shift long-
term management responsibility to ERDA. Present military TRU waste is managed
4-33
solely by the federal government, primarily by ERDA.
3. The landscape of regulatory authority appears rather cluttered.
It is composed mainly of NRC and ERDA at the level of federal government,
but other federal agencies, state governments, and international bodies
also have regulatory claims, though some are uncertain. Primary authority
for setting criteria or standards for radioactive waste operations rests with
NRC and ERDA in their respective areas of regulatory responsibility. EPA
intrudes on this scene, however, with its authority to set generally applicable
environmental standards for radiation exposure and to give guidance to all
federal agencies in the formulation of radiation standards.
The heart of regulatory activity in waste operations is the licensing/
approval function. Responsibility for licensing commercial HL waste opera-
tions rests solely with NRC. This authority appears to cover, indirectly,
any ERDA research and development storage facility that receives commercial
HL waste.
Military HL waste management is approved in the short term by ERDA,
which conducts its monitoring and enforcement activities through contractual,
rather than regulatory,mechanisms. For the long term, NRC has licensing
authority encompassing military HL waste storage facilities not used for
research and development, excluding ERDA facilities existing at the time the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 became effective. Thus ERDA retains re-
gulatory authority over its then existing facilities despite the continued
absence of plans to transfer the military HL waste solidified in place at
Hanford and Savannah River to ERDA planned, NRC regulated permanent repositories.
Also, ERDA approves its own site selection, construction and operation
of research and development storage facilities. However, NRC will license
ERDA demonstration repositories for HL waste, at least if this type of waste
is involved in the demonstration.
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Regulatory authority over commercial TRU waste is exercised by NRC or
relinquished, wholly or in part, by NRC to Agreement States. The present
scheme would be altered, however, by proposed NRC regulations requiring all
short-term managers to transfer their TRU waste to ERDA for long-term manage-
ment; ERDA would then acquire long-term regulatory authority. If these re-
gulations are adopted, NRC could, if it desired, implement a short-term
regulatory strategy which might effectively give it control over long-term
regulation. Such a strategy, however, would not infringe upon ERDA's current
regulatory jurisdiction over military TRU waste, where ERDA has undisputed
short- and long-term authority.
Overlapping the regulatory authorities of NRC and ERDA is DOT's re-
sponsibility to insure the safe transport in commerce of hazardous radioactive
materials. Cooperative arrangements between DOT and AEC (applicable now to
both ERDA and NRC) divide responsibilities for establishing criteria for
packaging and handling waste and allot sole responsibility for licensing of
waste transport to the nuclear agencies, who agree to enforce their respective
standards and applicable DOT ones as well.
4. The states' authority to regulate waste management operations is
basically preempted by the federal government. Though challenges are con-
tinuing, the existing law is that states may only regulate non-radiological
aspects in a way that does not unduly interfere with federal promotion and
regulation of nuclear energy. Political pressures from concerned states can,
however, be quite effective in altering the federal government's behavior.
There is also ample room for state (and citizen) participation in federal
decision processes.
5. Ocean use options involve additional national and international
environmental institutions. Nationally, EPA has permit-issuing authority
for ocean dumping of TRU waste, though the U.S. does not currently employ such
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an option. Dumping of HL waste is prohibited, though probably this would
not include deep seabed emplacement. EPA has also claimed permit-issuing
authority over any deep seabed waste emplacement. Internationally, formal
agreements to which the U.S. is a party place no unreasonable constraints upon
U.S. radioactive waste decisions, but they do require a balancing of other
nations' interests. High-level waste "dumping" is prohibited (with "emergency"
exceptions), though here again it is doubtful that the term includes deep sea-
bed emplacement. No effective international monitoring or enforcement institu-
tion currently exists. The outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference, which is
presently unclear, must be taken into account if the U.S. government decides to
pursue any of the "ocean options" for radioactive waste disposal. Finally,
Antarctica is legallyoff-limits for any type of radioactive waste disposal.
6. ERDA dominates waste management research and development. NRC and
EPA contribute mainly confirmatory research in areas of particular regulatory
interest. ERDA thus occupies the dual position of chief researcher and major
manager of high- and low-level waste (as well as that of self-regulator of
much of its own military waste management activities). A potential problem
with such an institutional arrangement is that the managers within ERDA find
themselves forced into management strategies dictated by their research
counterparts, instead of being able to direct research efforts according
to the necessities of waste management operations. On the other hand, there
is a need for close coupling of research and development to operations, especially
during the early stages of technological innovation.
7. The schedule for implementing current radioactive waste policy
seems unrealistically rapid with regard to commercial waste in light of
likely slippage in the NRC decisional process regarding nuclear fuel reproces-
sing, and also in view of recent basic changes in U.S. nuclear policy which
will defer commercialization of reprocessing. On the other hand, a schedule
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for dealing with military waste remains to be developed. In any event,
policy decisions regarding radioactive waste are not self-executing. Im-
plementation depends on the existence of a dedicated organization, the
availability of adequate technology and funds, and -- last but not least --
public acceptability of proposed actions.
Existing institutional arrangements for management and regulation of
radioactive waste are inadequate for the future.
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Chapter 5
INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
A major radioactive waste problem already exists in the United States.
The nation is irreversibly committed to dealing with this waste problem in
some fashion, now and in the future. The technical parameters and size of the
problem will change, and it will expand more or less rapidly with continued
use of nuclear fuel for electric power production. Radioactive waste has not
yet caused substantial and irreparable injury to man or the environment, although
costly mistakes have occurred. We are still free to manage the problem in a
variety of ways. Our management options are far broader than the usual shop-
ping list of "technical alternatives." No irreversible institutional commit-
ments have been made. And yet, as Chapters 3 and 4 show, institutions which
will be adequate for safe management of radioactive waste in the future are
not now in place.
This chapter, therefore, discusses alternatives available for modifying
old and developing new institutional arrangements that will be needed to
provide reasonable assurance of the safe management of post-fission radio-
active waste in the U.S. in the decades ahead. It is important to emphasize
that institutions capable of managing changing problems in a dynamic world must
evolve. No organizational arrangement will be appropriate in every situation
and for all time. In exploring institutional alternatives for radioactive
waste management and regulation, therefore, we are seeking practical arrange-
ments for the next few decades, not a utopian model for the lifetime of the
potential radiological hazard. We must frankly recognize that whatever re-
commendations emerge from the ensuing analysis will, if adopted, sooner or
later prove to be inadequate to meet the challenge then posed by radioactive
waste--just as the institutions now in place are in urgent need of repair.
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Policy Goals
Stated objectives of public policy are often vague or general. High pub-
lic officials may declare that the overarching goal of U.S. radioactive waste
policy is "safe management." Scientists may state that our objective must be
"isolation" of waste from the biosphere for as long as necessary to prevent
"harmful effects" to man and the environment. However, "safety" is not easily
defined. "Isolation" is a shorthand way of expressing a complicated and
relative concept. And what is deemed to constitute "harm" to man or environ-
ment is a judgment based on subjective values as well as objective facts.
Despite their vagueness, policy goals may be important guides to action.
Lack of content does not necessarily indicate the absence of candor. Ultimately,
goals are defined through a process of political consensus building. The condi-
tions and content of this consensus change over time. Our goals thus embody
shared perceptions of what is an appropriate balance of benefits, costs, and
risks.
Discussion of future goals of radioactive waste policy is most usefully
organized into two types of concerns: technological and institutional.
Technological Concerns
The technological goals of radioactive waste management will be rela-
tively straightforward, though not easily attained. The basic goal is familiar:
sufficient isolation of radioactive waste from the biosphere for long enough
to guarantee that the risk of harm to man and the environment is acceptably
low. This is existing policy for permanent disposition of waste. But the
specific meaning of terms such as "sufficient," enough," and "acceptably low"
are issues which have yet to be adequately addressed in the decision making
process. The goal stated is a sliding one which each of us may judge differently.
Therefore, the goal could be met by a spectrum of actions ranging from general,
delayed release of the waste material into the environment to complete
containment of every nuclide virtually forever. The goal, as stated, is
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meaningless operationally. The definition of limits for such judgmental terms
is a basic step in the decision process by which we will select radioactive
waste technologies and the institutions necessary to deploy them.
In the future, it is important to apply comparable technological goals
to short-term and long-term waste management. Thus, the likelihood of acci-
dental leaks during waste handling operations should be reduced to very low
levels, and there should be appropriate safeguards against malevolent acts
at all waste management facilities. Similarly, the desired isolation for
the long term may be achieved by (1) assured initial emplacement,(2) reliable
containment, and (3) selection of the best practicable geologic formations.
Uncertainties must be identified and effort channeled into areas where
uncertainties can be reduced. For instance, the prediction of geologic
upheavals may rest on some largely irreducible sources of uncertainty. But
significant improvements in the ability to estimate the consequences of such
an event may be possible by near-term scientific and technological investiga-
tion, and such improvements may be very helpful in determining the efficacy
of a particular geologic isolation system.
Institutional Concerns
Technological goals are not self-implementing. Institutional mecha-
nisms must be developed to achieve them. The evolving nature of the radioactive
waste problem demands institutions which are dynamic. Yet the long-term charac-
ter of the potential hazard requires unprecedented endurance.
Then upon what or whom should we rely to guarantee that radioactive*
waste will be isolated from the biosphere for the duration of its potential
hazard? It may appear that we confront a clear-cut choice of relying either
on nature (geologic disposal) or man (permanent storage). Of course, the
real choices are among various combinations of man-made and natural mechanisms,
but the emphasis in the combination we choose may turn out to be very imporant
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in the long term.
Current policy favors permanent geologic disposal with some reasonable
possibility for short-term reversibility. An alternative policy would be
reliance on technological systems requiring virtually perpetual surveillance
and some degree of active management.
Those favoring primary reliance upon nature may argue that, if the
past is any indicator of the future, we can expect political instability
and violent social change. Men are fallible and apt to act malevolently.
Drastic events resulting in the destruction of society as we know it are
possibilities which cannot be ruled out. The future course of human history
is unpredictable and reliance upon future generations to deal with the waste
problem would be irresponsible. In such circumstances, we owe future generations
a guarantee of safety from the deadly waste generated by our nuclear endeavors.
Therefore, this generation has the responsibility to commit permanently our
radioactive waste to a natural place for safekeeping. If this permanent dis-
position sooner or later will become irreversible--and with our present tech-
nological ability this seems unavoidable--then so be it. Such reasoning has
been influential in developing current U.S. policy.
While geological isolation has obvious attractions, there may be ad-
vantages in depending on man more than nature for the time being. The geo-
logic argument rests on our present ability to accurately predict natural
history. If we fear human fallibility in the future, how can we be so sure
of the correctness of our present judgments about geological isolation? Man
has the capacity to learn and thereby achieve a higher level of technological
ability. Man can adapt to changing circumstances. Furthermore, if we rely
on man-made systems for waste storage, future generations may be in a posi-
tion to choose to commit the waste problem to nature if it then appears the
wisest course to follow. On the other hand, some future civilization may
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well resent our nuclear age if it has no escape from perpetual care for
our waste. And a post-fission civilization may have grave difficulty in
continuing to care for fission wastes centuries after all benefits from
waste generating activities have ceased.
Permanent geologic disposal involves present commitments based on
present knowledge and predictions of the geologic history of particular for-
mations thousands of years into the future. Once made, geologic
dispositions may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for future genera-
tions to reverse if we guess wrong. Permanent geological disposal thus re-
linquishes to nature the future management of radioactive waste.
Perpetual human care involves commitments that future generations can
modify, including a basic shift from continued surveillance to permanent geologic
disposal. As long as technological containment systems function safely, sur-
veillance alone is required. But the safety of reliance on human care rests
on a prediction that the stock of knowledge concerning nuclear matters will
continue to develop and accumulate and never be substantially lost throughout
the future turbulent course of history.
Furthermore, there is no technological artifact in existence today, or
that can be reasonably expected to appear in the future, that is capable of
performing its originally intended function for many thousands of years.
Deterioration in performance is unavoidable. Therefore, perpetual human care
entails periodic renewal and replacement of waste containment systems in
addition to the surveillance that will always be necessary. Perpetual care
retains for man the waste management burden and imposes that burden on suc-
cessive generations.
Technological systems, which maintain retrievability, and geologic
disposal methods, which do not, may both be vulnerable to natural catastrophes.
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However, technological systems may be more vulnerable to man-made calamities
than geologic disposal.
The motives which underlie a policy which favors permanent disposal of
radioactive wastes are ambiguous indeed--confidence in our present mastery of
nature, fear of future social collapse, or an expedient desire to elicit public
acceptance of nuclear power development. Similarly, the motives underlying
a policy favoring surveillance are difficult to discern--faith in the capacity
of man to muddle through, fear of future natural disasters, or an expedient
desire to do the minimum necessary to accelerate nuclear development.
Turning from this rather apocalyptic view of the future, let us now
consider an immediate and mundane question. How are radioactive waste policy
goals to be achieved? This basic organizational question will be explored by
discussion of the three functional areas into which we have previously divided
the radioactive waste problem, namely, waste management, safety regulation,
and technology development.
Waste Management
Chapter 3 showed, from a technological viewpoint, the desirability of
an integrated radioactive waste management framework, and Chapter 4 described
the present fragmented management structure.
Now let us reexamine two questions from an institutional viewpoint.
First, is there a need for a centralized and integrated management framework for
HL waste? And second, does a comparable need exist regarding TRU waste? There-
after, we will consider a third question: If an integrated management scheme
is necessary, what alternative forms are available?
HL Waste
HL waste remains radioactively dangerous for thousands, perhaps hundreds
of thousands of years. Since human and environmental protection from the radio-
logical hazard of this waste is our primary concern, the organization of any
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workable HL waste management scheme must be dictated largely by the long-term
nature of the management problem. Although commercial and military waste manage-
ment problems differ in the short term, the fundamental problem of permanent
disposition will be basically the same for HL waste, regardless of its origin.
The present structure of long-term HL waste management reflects this analysis.
Both commercial and military HL waste will ultimately wind up in the same
repositories, under the management of one federal agency, ERDA. Relatively few
permanent repositories will be required to contain both commercial and mil-
tary waste streams to be generated for the foreseeable future. Site selection
is arduous and time consuming. Safety considerations dictate storage of the
waste in few rather than many repositories if possible. Good long-term manage-
ment for commercial waste insures good management for military waste if
management is consolidated. This reasoning indicates the desirability of
maintaining the unified aspect of the current structure rather than fragmenting
it.
The next issue is whether or not short-term HL waste management opera-
tions (temporary storage, treatment, packaging,transportation) should be in-
cluded in an integrated management framework, along with long-term waste
repositories. There are a number of advantages to be gained by including
short-term commercial and military HL waste operations in a single management
authority with long-term respositories. Waste management procedures as a whole
are characterized by a high degree of interdependence. Permanent disposition
is deeply affected by treatment, which in turn is affected by waste compo-
sition. This type of technological interdependence is an important rationale
for integration in any industry (e.g., the petroleum industry). To the extent
that separate managers are responsible for the solution to a technologically
integrated problem, separate constraints and motivations will be present.
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This will increase the likelihood of inconsistent strategies for the solution
to elements of the problem. We argue that such inconsistencies heighten the
risk of an "incorrect" solution to the problem as a whole.
A division of management responsibility would also introduce undesirable
transaction costs and risks. Such a separation would provide an incentive
for the short-term manager to pass on the maximum amount of cost and risk to
the long-term manager, and vice versa, since the operational decisions would
be dictated by separate sets of economic and technical considerations. It
may be possible to achieve effective results while maintaining separation of
long-term and short-term management. But such effectiveness would depend on
the development of a high degree of cooperation via regulatory standards and
criteria (e.g., acceptance criteria for HL waste forms). The likelihood of
conflict in criteria development and implementation would be increased. More-
over, it would be especially difficult to make trade-offs between short- and
long-term risks within a managerial framework in which management responsibility
is divided.
On the other hand, an integrated management approach would eliminate
the short-term/long-term conflicts which a bifurcated system would encourage.
An integrated organization would create incentives for waste management ef-
ficiency within established safety criteria; the manager would seek to minimize
overall cost rather than to pass on costs and risks. Unified long-term/short-
term HL waste management would minimize the danger of self-defeating mistakes
since all decisions would be made through a single authority.
Integration of waste management functions is not, however, a virtue in
and of itself. It is an attractive organizational solution which grows out
of a situation characterized by technological interdependence, a particular
economic incentive structure, and the overriding importance of long-term con-
cerns.
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It must be remembered that the advantages of any managerial system are
necessarily somewhat short-lived. Streamlined management in 1976 does not
assure the safe disposition of radioactive waste 1000 years from now. But
the theory behind this discussion suggests a positive direction in which to
move from the present fragmented management structure.
The possible disadvantages of a management scheme which would pull
short-term commercial and military HL waste management into the same structure
that handles permanent disposition must be examined carefully. As for commercial
HL waste, the only apparent drawback to short-term/long-term integrated manage-
ment is that it would disrupt the status quo. But the cost of disruption now
would actually be minimal, since the structure that currently exists is only
a shell: most commercial HL waste is now contained in spent fuel assemblies
in storage basins adjacent to reactors.
There are more substantial disadvantages to be considered in the case
of military HL waste. First, it might be objected that a new management
authority should not be saddled with the existing inventory of mismanaged
military waste. In rebuttal, it may be argued that existing military HL waste
is the largest and most difficult problem, and the task of dealing with it
cannot be shirked. Second, short-term treatment for military HL waste is
quite different from that for commercial HL waste. Nevertheless, the long-term
solutions and risks are similar. Third, if short-term military and commercial
HL waste management operations are merged into the same authority, the public
might blend short-term commercial and military practices in its perception of
the overall radioactive waste problem. Although past AEC procedures for the
temporary storage of military HL waste have been inadequate, there is no
reason to suppose that commercial as well as ERDA waste operations cannot
achieve a substantially higher level of performance in the future.
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A fourth argument against including short-term military waste opera-
tions within an integrated management structure along with commercial HL waste
is that to do so would jeopardize national security. Disclosure of detailed
information regarding military waste composition, it is said, would reveal too
much about our nuclear weapons program. But the evidence we have about military
HL waste composition indicates that it is a heterogeneous and undecipherable
conglomeration. (It may be that certain TRU waste, rather than the HL waste
stream, could be revealing about weapons design and production.) Finally,
even if there may be a valid security rationale for keeping waste composition
classified, there is no reason why the waste management authority could not
receive appropriate security clearance. The manufacture of nuclear warhead
components and submarine reactor fuel is, in fact, contracted out to private
industries.
A final possible drawback to including military HL waste operations in
an integrated framework with commercial waste concerns international solutions
to permanent disposition. Of course, no international authority would volun-
tarily assume responsibility for the U.S. military HL waste problem. However,
a management structure within the U.S. that embraces commercial and military
waste would not preclude the U.S. waste management authority from participating
in multinational joint ventures concerning commercial waste.
TRU Waste
If unified management of HL waste is desirable, should TRU waste also
be included within the same management structure? With regard to permanent
disposition, the same sort of reasoning applies to TRU waste as to HL waste.
In the very long term, the risks incurred in the management of HL waste and TRU
waste will tend to equalize, since the quantities of long-lived nuclides
(especially plutonium) in these two streams are of the same order of magnitude.
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This indicates that a single management framework should be desirable.
Somewhat different final disposition technologies may be used for TRU and HL
waste, primarily because of their differing thermal properties. But, in the
future, permanent disposition of TRU waste is likely to be quite similar to
that of HL waste.
Although parallel economic and technological reasoning tends to show
that short-term TRU commercial waste management could be handled more safely
and efficiently in an integrated management system, the issue is somewhat prob-
lematical. Certain aspects of short-term TRU waste management do differ sub-
stantially from HL waste operations. TRU waste requires different treatment
(e.g., compaction or incineration). Also, the risks involved in the treatment,
packaging, transportation, and temporary storage of TRU waste are somewhat
less than for HL waste. This may imply the application of different management
concepts.
Furthermore, the inclusion of some military TRU waste poses a security
problem. Unauthorized personnel must not discover the isotopic compositions
of nuclear materials and shapes of components used in the weapons program. This
may be a sufficient reason for excluding certain military TRU wastes from
the system in the short term. However, since inclusion of military TRU waste
in the management structure promises to yield safety and efficiency benefits,
the burden ought to be on those arguing national security to show specifically
why particular wastes should be excluded.
Waste Management and Reprocessing
Having considered the advantages and disadvantages of an integrated
management structure for commercial and military waste, it is desirable to
carry our discussion a step further back into the nuclear fuel cycle. Let us
briefly consider implications of the preceding analysis for the spent fuel
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reprocessing operation from which HL and some TRU waste emerges.
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, reprocessing recovers plutonium
and uranium for purposes of recycling it into light water reactors, into
breeder reactors, or (in the military program) for use in nuclear weapons.
Reprocessing also generates HL and some TRU waste. However, reprocessing and
recycling give rise to certain radiological risks themselves. Although ERDA
reprocesses spent fuel for military requirements in the U.S. there are no
operable plants for reprocessing commercial power reactor fuel.
In these circumstances, the question arises: Should ERDA reprocessing
for military purposes and/or commercial reprocessing for the nuclear power
industry become part of an integrated waste management authority? Some factors
indicate that inclusion would be desirable.
First, reprocessing and fuel fabrication, and the temporary storage, treat-
ment, packaging, transportation, and final disposition of wastes from these
operations are all interdependent steps. Fuel reprocessing and final waste
disposition are arguably the most important operations, all others being
merely intermediate. The efficiencies of industrial integration, as argued
above, might well justify the inclusion of reprocessing in a management structure
along with waste operations.
Second, controlling the chemical composition of the waste streams from
the reprocessing plant is important as a method of facilitating the subse-
quent waste solidification process. This would also suggest the inclusion of
commercial reprocessing in a unified management structure.
The third factor transcends the issue of management efficiency.
Radiological safety might indicate the recovery via reprocessing of as much
plutonium and uranium as possible in order to reduce the long-term hazard. (This
point, including the plutonium "growth" effects caused by the presence of trans-
plutonium isotopes in the waste, is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3.)
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However, pushing the technology to the limit for safety reasons could make
reprocessing unprofitable as a private commercial enterprise. If reducing
potential long-term radiological hazards is the paramount concern, either
the government may absorb reprocessing operations into its functions, or
it may subsidize private reprocessors to recover more of the long-lived isotopes
from spent fuel than is justified from an economic viewpoint.
Nevertheless, the incorporation of ERDA and commercial reprocessing
into an integrated waste management structure might not be politically feasible.
The ERDA reprocessing operations upstream from HL waste generation relate
intimately and sensitively to nuclear weapon requirements. Furthermore, if
reprocessing is to be undertaken by the private sector, the recovery and
recycling of plutonium and uranium is an economic activity which would result
in net benefits to society as a whole. Assuming there are benefits to be realized,
the activity may be more efficiently conducted by private enterprise in a market
ecoriomy.
As a practical matter, however, large government subsidies will be
required in order to bring a private reprocessing industry into being in the
U.S. Moreover, certain key technologies, including plutonium conversion from
nitrate to oxide and waste solidification, remain to be demonstrated by the
government.
On balance, it seems reasonable to conclude that waste management
safety criteria may increase the costs of reprocessing to the point where this
step in the commercial fuel cycle becomes unprofitable. If this occurs,
government subsidy or take-over would seem preferable to relaxation of safety
requirements and resulting increases in long-term radiological risks. On
the other hand, the issue of the appropriate future role of the government
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in commercial reprocessing depends on many factors in addition to waste manage-
ment. If it is deemed desirable to establish an integrated radioactive waste
management system under government auspices, the launching of such an enter-
prise need not await resolution of that issue.
Once-Through Fuel Cycle
In the U.S., it appears likely that reprocessing of commercial power
reactor fuel will be delayed for some years. It will thus be necessary to
store large numbers of spent fuel assemblies, possibly for long periods of
time. If it is subsequently decided to abandon permanently commercial nuclear
fuel reprocessing, the issue of final disposition of spent fuel will arise.
In view of the quantities of unreprocessed commercial spent fuel and the
probable storage periods involved, substantial storage capacity will be re-
quired in addition to that which will exist at power reactor sites. This in-
terim spent fuel storage capacity should be provided at a few central locations.
The question thus arises as to whether this capacity would be part of an overall
waste management structure, or whether it would be a separate function of the
private sector.
Some central storage capacity already exists at private reprocessing fa-
cilities that are not now scheduled to become operable, in particular at the
General Electric plant at Morris, Illinois, and at the Allied General Nuclear
Services plant at Barnwell, South Carolina. Spent fuel is also being stored
at the West Valley site of the Nuclear Fuel Services plant. This spent fuel
capacity and additional capacity as required might be a private industry function
which is separate from any government waste management structure. Alternatively,
a unified waste management organization could take over responsibility for spent
fuel assemblies following their removal from storage basins at power reactor sites.
The organization could then lease existing spent fuel storage capacity from the
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private sector and provide itself the additional storage capacity that will be
required after existing private capacity has been filled. In view of the tech-
nical integration of the steps from interim storage through final disposition
of spent fuel in the once-through fuel cycle, and the long interim storage period
that is probable before any final decision is made concerning the disposition
of spent fuel, it appears appropriate for the government to take over responsi-
bility for spent fuel management and that such management should be an integral
part of the unified radioactive waste management structure.
Alternative Management Forms
The most appropriate organizational scheme for post-fission radioactive
waste management appears to be consolidated management of all waste streams
under a single authority. But regardless of whether management is integrated
or diversified, what possible forms could the manager or managers assume?
Several alternatives should be considered.
Conceivably, the federal government's involvement in waste management
might be reduced, rather than increased. This might entail handing over exis-
ting waste management responsibility to private industry (subject to regulation),
to state governments, to an international authority, or to some combination
thereof. If, however, the role of the federal government is to be expanded, three
forms are possible: management by agency, by contract, or by corporation.
We can sketch two scenarios in which the federal government's role
would shrink and waste management would become a responsibility of private
industry, subject of course to government safety regulation. First, waste
might be managed by a private entity which would be a monopoly. This could be
either an independent corporation or, in the case of commercial waste, a
cooperative venture by utilities. Government economic regulation, as well as
radiological safety regulation, would be necessary in order to assure that
prices charged for waste management services would bear a reasonable relation-
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ship to costs and that monopoly profits would not be realized.
As an alternative scenario, waste management might be imagined as a
competitive industry. However, there would be formidable obstacles to the
growth and operation of competitive enterprise in this field. The initial
capital investment for treatment, transportation,and storage facilities would
be high and would involve large technological risks. Private industry would
be unlikely to proceed in the face of these costs and risks without significant
government subsidization. Decentralization of operations in a competitive
market would prevent realization of economies of scale that might be possible
within a unified management structure. Several firms might not be able to
divide the waste disposal market profitably. Furthermore, as experience in-
dicates, more than a handful of acceptable permanent waste repositories will
be difficult to locate. Therefore, radioactive waste management could well
be considered to be a "natural monopoly."
Competition tends to force private firms to sell their products at a
price equal to the marginal cost of production, and over time the marginal cost
of the lowest cost producer tends to become the market price. In such circum-
stances competitive pressures could encourage the trimming of safety related
costs. Thus, private waste management firms would tend to generate significant
external costs (especially of a long-term nature). Government involvement in
the form of taxation or regulation is generally necessary to force industries
to internalize such costs. Indeed, radioactive waste is itself an externality
of the nuclear power business, and some form of government intervention in
waste management has been accepted as necessary to prevent a socially un-
desirable amount of the potential externalities from being imposed on society
as a whole.
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Another possible solution would be to turn the radioactive waste prob-
lem over to the state governments. A unified management structure would, by
definition, preclude this option, since several state governments with diverse
interests would be the managers. But if one prefers decentralized management
then this is a possibility, at least with regard to the various land-based
disposal options. State management would probably be more responsive to the
needs of local citizens. But it seems likely that states would rather not be
burdened with the expense and responsibility. Many NRC Agreement States are
now finding the financial strain and political turmoil associated with even
low-level waste regulation and surveillance too onerous.
Responsiveness to local needs may imply a flexibility of waste management
strategies between states. This contradicts the federal policy of uniformity
as a means of assuring safety. State-by-state management would drastically
alter the present federally dominated organization. Whereas today federal
preemptive power could ultimately compel states to accept national waste
repositories, in a state-managed situation one state might well refuse to
receive another's nuclear garbage without perhaps exorbitant compensation.
On balance, therefore, state management does not seem to be advisable.
To argue that individual states are inappropriate radioactive waste
management entities does not imply that the states should have no influence on
waste operations within their borders. On the contrary, state participation in
Congressional and administrative forums for decision making will be a political
necessity, especially with regard to such key matters as site selection. ERDA
has recognized this requirement in developing its National Waste Terminal Storage
Program plan.
A final means of reducing the federal government's role would be to
give waste management responsibilities to an international agency. Although
this may eventually be desirable, it is quite doubtful that it will occur
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in the near future. No international agency is likely to take on the respon-
sibility for the U.S. radioactive waste problem, which is one of the most
serious worldwide. However, international safety regulation, as distinguished
from managment, is feasible and necessary in certain circumstances. This
matter is discussed further below.
The foregoing analysis indicates that it would probably be unacceptable
to cut back the scope of the federal government's responsibility for waste
management by transferring the task to the private sector, to the states, or
to an international authority. The other broad option points toward a more
unified, integrated management structure under federal government auspices.
The government might unify waste management in three possible ways:
by agency, by contract, or by corporation. In the long term, about the same
end may be reached using any of these means. However, the management form cho-
sen in the near future will have an important influence on the quality of
future decision making and the possibilities for further institutional evolu-
tion. Furthermore, the short-term economic and political benefits to be gained
from an efficient and effective radioactive waste management organization are
important.
Management by executive agency, ERDA, is the predominant form of the
current framework. However, numerous activities are conducted by private
industry pursuant to government contracts under agency supervision, while
others are the exclusive management responsibility of private firms, sub-
ject to government safety regulation.
In our form of national government, management by executive agency is
a common mode. Agencies are entrusted with responsibility for implementing
broad Congressional policies such as those embodied in the Atomic Energy,
Energy Reorganization, and National Environmental Policy Acts. An agency such as
ERDA builds up substantial expertise and has significant fiscal resources at
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its command. Ideally, management by agency is responsive to the President,
the Congress, and the public at large.
An objection to government agency operations regarding radioactive
waste is their unbusinesslike character. The forces to which an agency
such as ERDA is responsive are primarily political, not economic. With regard
to the military waste generated by reprocessing operations, ERDA really has
no "customer" to whom it is providing waste services. This means it can of-
fer services which are more or less extensive, subject to the constraints of
Congressional appropriations and public opinion. If commercial reprocessing
is authorized, private reprocessors will be ERDA customers for long-term
waste management services. But in order to stay in the waste management
business, ERDA would not need to charge commercial reprocessors the full cost
of waste services provided. The balance might come from public appropriations.
If, however, the reprocessor is forced to pay the full cost of waste management,
that cost along with others incurred in reprocessing will eventually be re-
flected in the price for nuclear-electric service (as opposed to higher taxes).
Thus with management by government agency, the costs of commercial waste manage-
ment services may be distributed to society either through the tax structure
or the electric rate structure, or some combination of both.
Management by government contract is another possible mode. Here
again, this approach is frequently used in the existing arrangements for
ERDA operations. Waste management activities may be carried out by a variety
of private contractors on a cost-plus basis, under more or less government
supervision. Operations may be as tightly controlled as desired, simply
by the terms of the contract. This option offers considerable flexibility in
the selection of contractors so as to obtain the best available technical ex-
pertise in specialized areas. It has the further advantage of being a procedure
which is familiar to both government and industry in the nuclear field. Since
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management by contract is coupled with agency control, it will share the pros
and cons of this form outlined below.
The final possibility for an integrated organization structure for the
conduct of radioactive waste management would be to establish an independent
federal government corporation for this purpose. There are various precedents
for this approach, including numerous municipal waste management corporations
at the local level such as the New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority (NYSERDA) which may take over HL radioactive waste management from
Nuclear Fuel Services in West Valley. At the federal level, there are also
examples of federally chartered public corporations, such as TVA, although
we know of no existing federal corporation with primarily waste management
functions. Furthermore, a similar approach has been proposed in the recent
report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution which recommended
the establishment of a national nuclear waste disposal corporation for Great
Britain.
A federal waste management corporation could be established as an
economically viable entity. The corporation could be self-financing, raising
capital through the sale of bonds and charging users appropriate prices for
its various waste management services in order to recover its costs, including
a reasonable return on invested capital. The corporation would be subject
to safety regulation by an independent government agency, such as the NRC. How-
ever, it could have authority to set prices for its services without prior ap-
proval of an economic regulatory commission,as would be required in the case
of a private investor-owned utility. Such economic self-regulation is not
unusual for public corporations in monopoly positions.
In the establishment of a federal waste management corporation one key
factor would be the composition of the board of directors. It would be important
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to assure that the board was composed so as to assure responsiveness to exter-
nal criticism and representation of various relevant interests, including
certain government agencies, the private nuclear industry, environmental and
other citizens' groups, and the academic community. Moreover, the board
should not become a political dumping ground.
The executive structure of the corporation should also be designed so as
to assure internal incentives for effectiveness and efficiency. Strong
incentives for a high quality effort might be provided through clear-cut
responsibility for comprehensive problem-solving in waste management operations,
and by pay scales which would provide compensation for key executives and
employees that would be competitive with comparable positions in private industry.
To provide flexibility, the corporation might have the option of contracting
outside for activities which could not be performed as skillfully or economically
"in house."
A federal corporation may be substantially more independent from
political pressure than a government agency. Such independence may promote
businesslike operations, but a public corporation that is insulated from
immediate political pressure from the Executive Branch and Congress may also
be unresponsive to public criticism. Periodic governmental review can help in
this respect, and the outcome is also likely to depend on the quality of
appointees to the corporate board of directors and key executive positions.
Financing of a radioactive waste management corporation could present
cash flow problems initially. For a number of years, the Department of Defense
would be the corporation's principal customer. But payments by this customer
would necessarily be dependent upon future appropriations by Congress.
Financing would have to be assured in the transitional period until the
corporation could develop an independent viability.
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As regards wastes from the nuclear power industry, it is important to
note that ERDA could retain responsibility for research, development and de-
monstration while a federal corporation might take responsibility for waste
management with ERDA-demonstrated and NRC-licensed technology. Thus the
establishment of a new federal waste management corporation need not delay, for
example, ERDA demonstrations of waste solidification technology and permanent
waste repositories.
Waste Regulation
We have seen in Chapter 4 that the existing regulatory framework for HL
and TRU waste is fragmented between NRC and ERDA, with other agencies and certain
states playing more or less important subsidiary roles.
Contraction of or withdrawal from safety regulation of radioactive
waste operations seems impractical and unwise. Indeed, existing regulation is
sparse and in need of future development. This leaves us with three major
questions. Is strong federal preemption of the field of radioactive waste
regulation desirable? Is a strongly unified regulatory framework more workable
than the current one? Should the regulatory agency actively promote or passively
review and approve technological options?
Federal Preemption
The federal government now preempts virtually all regulation of HL and TRU
waste from a radiological safety standpoint. Thus federal regulation largely
displaces state regulation, whether the latter is more or less stringent.
Notwithstanding arguments based on states' rights and sensitivity to local
opinion, federal preemption will probably continue to be necessary. Uniformity
in waste management policy is highly desirable as long as the tendency is to
levelup, not down toward some least common denominator. Nevertheless, overly
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stringent state regulation may unduly restrict the nuclear industry or the
national security program. Because the adverse consequences of improper waste
management might be so widespread, the radioactive waste problem has a national
(and international) scope.
Federal preemptive authority will be required in the selection of sites
for permanent waste repositories. The best available sites must be chosen and
used. But few states are likely to welcome the idea of receiving the nation's
radioactive waste within their borders. The only feasible way to eliminate
these obstacles in our federal system is to repose paramount regulatory
authority in the federal government, subject to advice from any state affected.
It should be emphasized, however, that the notion of federal preemptive
power is an ultimate legal standard, not a day-to-day operating procedure.
A high degree of state-federal cooperaticn should prevail.
Integration of Regulatory Framework
Now we must consider whether the currently fragmented federal regu-
latory framework ought to be consolidated under a single authority. Integrated
regulation is feasible even without the kind of unified waste management suggested
above.
First, should commercial and military waste be regulated co-extensively?
Although the actors involved in each case are different, the long-term nature
of the problem is the same. (Short-term treatment of military and commercial
HL waste could be significantly different, as noted previously.) In view of
past experience, regulation of military waste may be necessary to insure that
ERDA proceeds toward a solution to its very difficult and costly military waste
problem. Presently, there are no real regulatory incentives for ERDA to do so.
The safety of military waste operations is presently assured by regulatory
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authority that is divided between short-term ERDA self-regulation and long-term
NRC independent regulation. Technically speaking, permanent disposition is
deeply affected by earlier reprocessing, treatment, and packaging. It there-
fore makes little sense to divide regulatory responsibility along an artificial
long-term/short-term line. Such a division invites regulatory conflicts and
perhaps irrevocable mistakes. Regulation of short-term operations involving
military waste may raise problems of dealing with classified information in some
areas. But concern for the public health and safety may at least raise a
presumption that national security does not justify exemption of a waste
management activity from independent safety regulation.
Is co-extensive regulation of HL waste and TRU waste appropriate? Albeit
less dangerous than HL waste in the short term, TRU waste does require safety regu-
lation. The question is merely who ought to be responsible for its regu-
lation.
TRU waste emerges from more points in the various post-fission nuclear
fuel cycle stages than HL waste. TRU waste comes from mixed oxide fuel fabrica-
tion and the head end of the reprocessing plant, as well as the back end. But
the multiplicity of sources does not justify fragmented regulation. Moreover,
the number of point sources involved in future industry operations should not
itself be a major difficulty in regulation. As long as economies of scale in
commercial reprocessing and fuel fabrication are realized, the number of
facilities involved will remain quite manageable. Finally, unified regulation
would eliminate NRC's current inability to exercise any authority over military
TRU waste regarding either short- or long-term facilities.
Regulatory Role
A final issue is whether or not the regulator, NRC, should actively;
participate in the selection of technological options to be implemented in waste
management activities. Some would contend that a regulator needs to exercise
5-25
this function in order to promulgate meaningful rules. But a passive role
for the regulator is more appropriate for the independent, adjudicatory nature
of the licensing function. The regulator's duty is to set levels of performance
to be attained in waste management. The manager then has the incentive to
devise the most cost-effective means for reaching these criteria. The regu-
lator must then approve or disapprove proposals for operations.
Waste Research and Development
The final radioactive waste function to be considered is research and
development. As of now, ERDA carries on most waste management research and
development. It operates its research program largely through contracts with
laboratories and firms throughout the country. NRC maintains a comparatively
modest level of research and development activities, as does the private
sector.
Is primary research and development responsibility properly reposed in
ERDA or should it be shifted to another entity? A problem with the present sys-
tem is that management and research and development functions as well as
substantial regulatory authority are all found within ERDA. Differentiation
of these three functions would serve to increase management incentives and,
at the same time, help to assure that research and developments efforts are
objective.
An effective research and development effort is vital to the success
of both management and regulation in the long term. In separating manage-
ment from research and development, there is a possibility that research
and development will be pursued increasingly for its own sake, rather than as
a process for improvement of operations. While we conceive of management,
regulation,and research and development as three properly separable functions,
at least a small amount of research and development will probably be a crucial
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element of any organization, regardless of its primary mission.
It may be argued that, in a dynamic industrial setting, it is a
mistake to separate research and development from operations. If so, the
current division between ERDA and the private energy industry with regard to
the development and commercial use of many advanced energy technologies is a
much more fundamental mistake than would be the case with a federal corporation
for radioactive waste management. However, there are also industries where
research and development are not a major activity. The electric utility in-
dustry is an important historical example. The utilities themselves do rela-
tively little of their own research and development, which is performed instead
by the electrical equipment suppliers or the government. (The Electric Power
Research Institute is now, however, performing some research and development
for the industry as a whole.)
On the other hand, keeping management and research and development
under the same roof (ERDA) may mean either that aggressive management of a cur-
rent problem is hampered by the prospect of a better solution always on the
research and development horizon, or alternatively, that promising research
avenues are foreclosed too early by the overwhelming pressure of demonstrations
which can lead to premature applications. Moreover, separating waste management
from waste research and development means that ERDA research and development
in this field can also be more responsive to the requirements of an independent
regulatory agency, NRC.
Assuming that a rather clear separation of management, regulation, and
research and development is, on balance, desirable, the concerns expressed
above can be dealt with in determining an appropriate institutional relationship
between ERDA, NRC, a federal waste management authority, and the private sector
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of nuclear industry in addressing two issues: the establishment of radio-
active waste research and development priorities, and the development of a
mechanism to assure rapid and effective application of promising results of
ERDA research and development programs in this field. These issues, summed
up in the word "commercialization," are complex and pervade ERDA's primary
mission as provider of energy technology to the nation as a whole.
Post-fission radioactive waste is highly toxic for long periods
of time-at least thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of years. Whether
optimists or pessimists, as we look to the future we share an expectation that
the vital imperatives of military security and energy supply will surely re-
sult in the creation of rapidly growing volumes of radioactive waste in the
United States. But is it right to continue activities which generate radio-
active waste when a safe method for permanent disposition has not been fully
demonstrated?
An optimist may deny there-is a serious problem because time and money
will provide technology for a variety of solutions. A pessimist may deny there
is a solution because-sometimes, somewhere--man-made or natural cataclysms
will inevitably breach any technological containment, and toxic radioactive
waste may then spill or seep into the biosphere.
The risks posed by radioactive waste must be viewed in context and
balanced against the benefits to be derived from activities which product the
waste and the consequences if those activities were stopped. Our security
as a nation appears to rest in part on our nuclear deterrent, and the well-being
of every society depends on adequate energy. The world urgently needs practical
alternatives to fossil energy, and nuclear fission has been demonstrated to
be a practical way to generate electricity.
5-28
There is today no long-term management of radioactive waste, no com-
prehensive scheme for regulation of such waste, and no commercial reprocessing
industry in the United States. The central conclusion that emerges from
this report is that institutions can be developed which will provide reasonable
assurance of safe management of radioactive waste in the U.S. and elsewhere in
the world. We have an opportunity to do so now, but it may well be our last
clear chance.
1GLOSSARY
actinide series: The series of elements beginning with actinium, element
No. 89, and continuing through lawrencium, element No. 103, which to-
gether occupy one position in the periodic table. The series includes
uranium, element No. 92, and all the man-made transuranium elements.
The group is also referred to as the "actinides."
cladding waste: Fuel rods in most nuclear reactors today are made up of
fissionable materials clad in a protective alloy sheathing which is
relatively resistant to radiation and the physical and chemical conditions
that prevail in a reactor core. The spent fuel rods, after removal from
the reactor and storage to permit radioactive decay of the short-lived
fission products, are removed and in certain fuel cycle systems, are
chopped up, and the residues of the fissionable materials are leached
out chemically. The remaining residues, principally the now radioacti-
vated cladding material (zirconium alloys, etc.) and insoluble residues
of nuclear fuel, fission products, and transuranium nuclides, are left
behind as cladding waste, which is a special category of transuranium
radioactive waste.
critical: The condition in which a material is undergoing nuclear fission at
a self-sustaining rate; the critical mass of a material is the amount
that will self-sustain nuclear fission when placed in an optimum arrange-
ment in its present form; the minimum critical mass is the amount of
a fissile isotope that will self-sustain nuclear fission when placed
in optimum conditions.
curie(Ci): A unit of radioactivity defined as the amount of a radioactive
material that has an activity of 3.7 x 10 disintegrations per second
(d/s); millicurie(mCi) =10 - 3 curie; microcurie (uCi)= 10- 6 curie;
2nanocurie (nCi)= 10- 9 curie; picocurie (pCi)= 10- 1 2 curie; femtocurie
-15
(fCi)= 10 curie.
decomissioning: The process of removing a facility or area from operation and
decontaminating and/or disposing of it or placing it in a condition of
standby with appropriate controls and safeguards.
disposal: The planned release or placement of waste in a manner that precludes
recovery.
engineered storage: The storage of radioactive wastes within suitable, sealed
containers, in any of a variety of structures especially designed to
protect them from water and weather, and to help keep them from leakage
to the biosphere by accident or sabotage. They may also provide for ex-
tracting heat of radioactive decay from the waste.
fertile material: A material, not itself fissionable by thermal neutrons,
which can be converted into a fissile material by irradiation in a
reactor. There are two basic fertile materials, uranium-238 and thorium-232.
When these fertile materials capture neutrons, they are partially con-
verted into fissile plutonium-239 and uranium-233, respectively.
fissile material: While sometimes used as a synonym for fissionable material,
this term has also acquired a more restricted meaning, namely, any
material fissionable by neutrons of all energies, including (and
especially) thermal (slow) neutrons as well as fast neutrons; for
example, uranium-235 and plutonium-239.
fission: The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two approximately equal
parts (which are nuclei of lighter elements), accompanied by the
release of a relatively large amount of energy and generally one or
more neutrons. Fission can occur spontaneously, but usually is caused
by nuclear absorption of gamma rays, neutrons, or other particles.
3fissionable material: Commonly used as a synonym for fissile material. The
meaning of this term also has been extended to include material that
can be fissioned by fast neutrons only, such as uranium-238. Used
in reactor operations to mean fuel.
fission products: The nuclei (fission fragments) formed by the fission of
heavy elements, plus the nuclides formed by the fission fragments'
radioactive decay.
fuel (nuclear, reactor): Fissionable material used as the source of power when
placed in a critical arrangment in a nuclear reactor.
fuel cycle: The complete series of steps involved in supplying fuel for
nuclear power reactors. It includes mining, refining, the original
fabrication of fuel elements, their use in a reactor, chemical proces-
sing to recover the fissionable material remaining in the spent fuel,
re-enrichment of the fuel material, and refabrication into new fuel
elements, transportation of materials between these various stages, and
management of radioactive waste.
fuel reprocessing: Processing of irradiated (spent) nuclear reactor fuel to
recover useful materials as separate products, usually separated into
plutonium, uranium, and fission products.
half-life: The time in which half the atoms of a particular radioactive sub-
stance disintegrate to another nuclear form. Measured half-lives vary
from millionths of a second to billions of years. After a period of
time equal to 10 half-lives, the radioactivity of a radionuclide has
decreased to 0.1 percent of its original level.
high-level liquid waste: The aqueous waste resulting from the operation of
the first-cycle extraction system, or equivalent concentrated wastes
from subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent wastes from a process
not using solvent extraction, in a facility for processing irradiated
4reactor fuels. This is the legal definition used by ERDA. Another
definition used at the ERDA Hanford Reservation for its waste is:
fluid materials, disposed of by storage in underground tanks which are
contaminated by greater than 100 microcuries/milliliter of mixed fission
products or more than 2 microcuries/milliliter of cesium-137, strontium-90,
or long-lived alpha emitters.
ionizing radiation: Any radiation displacing electrons from atoms or molecules,
thereby producing ions. Examples: alpha, beta, gamma radiation, short-
wave ultraviolet light. Ionizing radiation may produce severe skin or
tissue damage.
isotope: One of two or more atoms with the same atomic number (the same
chemical element) but with different atomic weights. An equivalent
statement is that the nuclei of isotopes have the same number of protons
but different numbers of neutrons. Isotopes usually have very nearly the
same chemical properties, but somewhat different physical properties.
long-lived isotope: A radioactive nuclide which decays at such a slow rate that
a quantity of it will exist for an extended period; usually radionuclides
whose half-life is greater than 3 years.
nuclide: A species of atom having a specific mass, atomic number, and nuclear
energy state. These factors determine the other properties of the
element, including its radioactivity.
partitioning: The process of separating liquid waste into two or more frac-
tions. In this report, partitioning is used specifically with reference
to the removal of certain radioisotopes from the waste in order to fa-
cilitate subsequent waste storage and disposal. "Isotope mining" is
used to describe the fractionation of waste when radioisotopes are
extracted and used in other applications.
plutonium: A heavy, radioactive, man-made, metallic element with atomic
number 94. Its most important isotope is fissionable plutonium-239,
produced by neutron irradiation of uranium-238. It is used for reactor
fuel and in weapons.
rad (acronym for radiation absorbed dose): The basic unit of absorbed dose
of ionizing radiation. A dose of one rad means the absorption of 100
ergs of radiation energy per gram of absorbing material.
radiation: The emission and propagation of energy through matter or space
by means of electromagnetic disturbances, which display both wave-like
and particle-like behavior; in this context the "particles" are known
as photons. Also, the energy so propagated. The term has been extended
to include streams of fast-moving particles (alpha and beta particles,
free neutrons, cosmic radiation, etc.). Nuclear radiation is that
emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclear reactions, including
alpha, beta, and gamma radiation and neutrons.
radioactive contamination: Deposition of radioactive material in any place
where it may harm persons, spoil experiments, or make products or
equipment unsuitable or unsafe for some specific use. The presence of
unwanted radioactive matter. Also radioactive material found on the
walls of vessels in reprocessing plants, or radioactive material that
has leaked into a reactor coolant. Often referred to only as "contami-
nation."
radioactivity: The spontaneous decay or disintegration of an unstable atomic
nucleus, usually accompanied by the emission of ionizing radiation.
Activity is a measure of the rate at which a material is emitting
nuclear radiations, and is usually given in terms of the number of
nuclear disintegrations occurring in a given quantity of material over
a unit of time. The standard unit of activity is the curie (Ci), which
6is equal to 3.7 x 1010 disintegrations per second. The words "activity"
and "radioactivity" are often used interchangeably.
radioisotope: A radioactive isotope. An unstable isotope of an element that
decays or disintegrates spontaneously, emitting radiation. More than
1300 natural and artificial radioisotopes have been identified.
rem: A unit of measure for the dose of ionizing radiation that gives the
same biological effect as one roentgen of X rays; one rem equals
approximately one rad for X, gamma, or beta radiation.
roentgen (abbreviation r): A unit of exposure to ionizing radiation. It is
that amount of gamma or X rays required to produce ions carrying 1
electrostatic unit of electrical charge (either positive or negative)
in 1 cubic centimeter of dry air under standard conditions. Named after
Wilhelm Roentgen, German scientist who discovered X rays in 1895.
special nuclear material (SNM): Plutonium uranium-233, uranium-235, or
uranium enriched to a higher percentage than normal of the 233 or 235
isotopes.
transuranics: Nuclides having an atomic number greater than that of uranium
(i.e., greater than 92). The principal transuranium radionuclides of
concern in radioactive waste management are tabulated below with their
half-lives:
Half-Life
Nuclide (Years) Principal Decay Modes
Neptunium-237 2,140,000 alpha
Plutonium-238 86 alpha, spontaneous fission
-239 24,390 alpha, spontaneous fission
-240 6,580 alpha, spontaneous fission
-242 379,000 alpha
Americium-241 458 alpha
-243 7,950 alpha
Curium -245 9,300 alpha
-246 5,500 alpha, spontaneous fission
7The transuranium nuclide produced in largest amounts is Pu-239; Am-241
is also produced in significant amounts,
transuranic (TRU) waste: Any waste material measured or assumed to contain more
than a specified concentration of transuranic elements. This is the
definition used by ERDA. The specified concentration is currently set
at 10 nanocuries of alpha emitters per gram of waste. (The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission [NRC] has not yet adopted a regulatory definition
of transuranic waste.) The 10 nanocuries/gm standard is under scrutiny
and may be revised upward, or completely redefined.
uranium: A radioactive element with the atomic number 92, and as found in
natural ores, an average atomic weight of approximately 238. The two
principal natural isotopes are uranium-235 (0.7% of natural uranium),
which is fissionable, and uranium-238 (99.3% of natural uranium), which
is fertile. Natural uranium also includes a minute amount of uranium-234,
Uranium is the basic raw material of nuclear energy.
'·
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